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Recent literature in religious epistemology has overlooked a significant debate in mainstream 
epistemology. In short, theories in religious epistemology have failed to consider the value 
problem. This essay, then, hopes to rectify this omission by arguing that one of the most 
influential accounts of religious epistemology reformed epistemology fails to adequately 
account for the value of knowledge. I argue, however, that a reasonable way out for the reformed 
epistemologist comes by way of endorsing the achievement thesis. The achievement thesis, put 
simply, states that knowledge is valuable because it is a cognitive achievement unlike, for 
example, mere true belief. The central question of this essay, then, is this: Is Knowledge of God a 
Cognitive Achievement?  In order to better answer this question I highlight two different ways in 
which one can understand the nature of cognitive achievements. First, a cognitive achievement 
can be understood as success from ability that is always primarily creditable to the agent. Or, 
second, a cognitive achievement can be understood as success from ability that is jointly creditable 
to the agent. Both, I argue, are compatible with knowledge and the achievement thesis. Whether 
knowledge of God is primarily or jointly creditable, however, will depend on the way in which 
one understands the role the agent plays in the belief forming process. Given the nature of 
reformed epistemology, I argue that knowledge of God is the kind of achievement that is jointly 
creditable.   
Further, and central to the argument, I argue that the reformed epistemologist is in a good 
position to meet the requirements for the strong achievement thesis. The strong achievement 
thesis argues that an achievement should be understood in terms of overcoming some obstacle 
account I propose not only meets the requirements of the strong achievement thesis, but also 
retains a distinctive feature of reformed epistemology namely, that the belief in God can be said 
to overcome the obstacle of cognitive malfunction that, as the reformed epistemologist argues, is 
brought about 
environment (what I call the maxi-environment) that is not conducive to belief in God given the 
cognitive consequence of sin. In the end, it is possible to provide an account of reformed 






What motivates this current project is the idea that a religious epistemology ought to engage with 
relevant topics in mainstream epistemology. I discuss the reasons for this in chapter one, but 
highlight the fact that in doing this, the religious epistemologist provides the religious thinker 
(whether this be a philosopher, theologian, minister, or layperson) with a deeper understanding of 
the specific religious epistemology they are endorsing.  Given this understanding, this project 
should be understood as an attempt to balance the effort of contemporary work being done on 
the value problem in epistemology with an influential account in religious epistemology namely, 
reformed epistemology. As a result of this attempted harmony, the central question becomes this: 
Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement? In answering this question, the outcome is not 
only a better understanding of the value problem and all that it entails, but also a more holistic 
understanding of reformed epistemology.  
 Before I outline the project, a few preliminaries are at hand. First, the title of my thesis is 
Achievements, Value, and God: An Essay on the Cognitive Suc
in question 
cognitive abilities. This will be discussed at length in chapter four, but the general idea here is that 
ue 
belief and his abilities. When it comes to religious knowledge, then, the key will be to 
 
 But what kind of religious knowledge is this project concerned with? After all, there are 
religious knowledge. And there is perhaps no more a foundational religious question than the 
question of knowledge of God. Thus, while I take it that other types of religious knowledge 
might be understood as cognitive achievements, I am only concerned here with whether a 
specific kind of religious knowledge namely, knowledge of God is a cognitive achievement.   
This of course leads to another question: which specific God is this project concerned 
with? Perhaps the best way to deal with this question is to discuss it in light of reformed 
epistemology and the reformed thinkers who gave shape to this religious epistemology. The 
Reformed epistemologist is theistic in his outlook and understanding of the person of God. They 
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hold that God is all-powerful, all-knowing, all-
1  Further, reformed 
epistemology is uniquely Christian as well. There are many reformed doctrines that make this 
approach uniquely Christian, but one such indicator of the relationship arises when we consider 
our physical and mental condition as humans in this providentially guided universe. Our current 
condition is one of rebellion and turpitude. And given this, it is the belief that there is something 
wrong or amiss about our condition as humans. As a result of this condition, there is the belief 
that we need a deliverer who can redeem both the universe and those creatures who inhabit it. 
This project, then, reflects these classical theistic beliefs and, more specifically, those traditional 
Christian beliefs within the reformed tradition.  
 
Outlining the Project 
 
I begin the project in chapter one by asking what we should expect from a religious 
epistemology. One of the things we should expect, I argue, is that the adopted religious 
epistemology engage with issues in contemporary epistemology. It should be noted, of course, 
that this expectation goes beyond contemporary epistemology. It should also engage, where 
appropriate, with issues in all areas of philosophy. This in turn ought to give us a better 
understanding of our religious epistemology. In this project, I have chosen reformed 
epistemology as my starting point. The reasons for this are many, but primarily because I take 
reformed epistemology to offer the best explanation of both warrant and practical applicability
something I believe to be essential for a successful religious epistemology. What I mean by this is 
of warrant has strong explanatory power. Note, though, 
believes in God does so in the manner described by the reformed epistemologist. The point here 
is that reformed epistemology presents, at the very least, the most plausible account of how 
ordinary theists (i.e., the majority of theists) who perhaps lack theological and philosophical 
training might be warranted in their belief. Other epistemic systems of religious belief lack this 
unity and provide accounts of justification that are intellectually out of reach for ordinary theists.  
                                                 
1  Alvin  Plantinga,  Warranted  Christian  Belief  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2000),  vii.      
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With reformed epistemology as my starting point (for reasons discussed in chapter one), I 
then move on to an overview of reformed epistemology in chapter two. In this chapter I focus 
primarily on the work of Plantinga. While there are many other reformed epistemologists that I 
might have chosen, I focus on Plantinga because he has been the leading voice for the past 30 
years in reformed epistemology. The aim of this chapter is not to offer a detailed account or 
into the key arguments and motivations behind reformed epistemology. With this understanding 
in place, we will be better positioned to see how exactly reformed epistemology meets the 
challenges and expectations of a successful religious epistemology.   
Moving on from the summary offered in the second chapter, I transition, in the third 
chapter to a discussion about the value of knowledge. Specifically, this chapter outlines some of 
the issues that arise when considering what makes knowledge more valuable than, for example, 
mere true belief. I attempt to locate the value problem by considering four questions:  
 
 
Simple Value Question            Sophisticated Value Questions  
 
Why is knowledge generally valuable?                          (1)  Why is knowledge more valuable  
             than mere true belief? 
 
                  (2)  Why is knowledge more valuable  
              than that which falls just short of  
                                    knowledge? 
 
             (3)  Why does knowledge have          
        distinctive value over anything       
                              that falls short of knowledge   
 
I argue that if we can answer the third of the sophisticated value questions, then we can answer 
the other value questions. The tertiary value question is this: Why does knowledge have 
distinctive value over anything that falls short of knowledge? This, then, is the value question that 
needs to be answered with regard to knowledge. Later in the chapter, I discuss the different types 
of value and conclude that final value is the kind of value we are aiming for when it comes to 
knowledge. Something is said to be finally valuable when its value is derived from something 
something extrinsic to it in this case, the fact that the dress was worn by Princess Diana. The 
reason for preferring final value over other kinds of value becomes more apparent in chapter 
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four, but the general idea is that knowledge is finally valuable because it is, unlike mere true belief, 
a cognitive achievement.  
How, though, does one go about arguing for the final value of knowledge (and in turn, 
answer the tertiary value problem)? This is the primary concern of chapter four. One of the most 
plausible and eloquent accounts of the final value of knowledge is offered by the virtue 
epistemologist. Put simply, here is the argument:  
 
1. Achievements are finally valuable.  




3. Knowledge is finally valuable. 
 
The argument put forth by the virtue epistemologist is quite simple: knowledge is a cognitive 
achievement and thus finally valuable. This, then, is the distinctive nature of knowledge. Mere 
true belief, as I discuss in chapter four  cognitive achievement given its 
compatibility with luck. Knowledge, as the argument goes, is always the result of a cognitive 
achievement. In other words, where there is knowledge there is a cognitive achievement. The 
crucial part of the argument depends, of course, on how exactly we are to understand the nature 
of achievements. And as we will see in chapter four one 
would assume. Briefly, though, I argue that there are three kinds of achievements: 
achievements(pc), achievements(jc), and achievements(pcul)
Most discussions in the literature have been focused on achievements(pc), at the expense of other 
kinds of achievements namely, achievements(jc). Against the virtue epistemologist I argue that 
there are only two kinds of achievements that are compatible with knowledge: achievement(pc) 
and achievement(jc). Thus, when we consider knowledge of God as a cognitive achievement in 
chapter five, it needs to be the kind of achievement that is compatible with knowledge. In other 
words, it needs to be an achievement(pc) or an achievement(jc). I define achievements in the 
following way:  
 





Also, I point out in chapter four that there needs to be a distinction between those kinds of 
that achievements are finally valuable, the kind of achievement we have in mind is one where the 
agent involved overcomes some obstacle or displays considerable skill on his way to achieving 
the success. This is what I am calling a strong achievement. Thus, when considering the nature of 
achievements in chapter five, it is a strong achievement (one that is finally valuable) that I have in 
mind.      
In chapter five, I bring together the ideas that were discussed in the previous chapters 
and offer an answer to the central question of the thesis: Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive 
Achievement? An answer to this question will provide, I think, an appropriate response to the 
value question. Applying it specifically to knowledge of God, it should become clear why 
precisely this knowledge is more valuable than that which falls short of this knowledge. My 
argument has two main components. First, knowledge of God comes by way of the deliverances 
of sensus divinitatis (as discussed in chapter 1). The sensus divinitatis, however, in its current state, is 
unable to function properly given our postlapsarian condition. This might be the result of several 
things. Perhaps the faculty itself is broken (this is the line that is taken by Plantinga and other 
reformed epistemologists). There is such a thing, as Plantinga notes, as cognitive malfunction. 
Our faculties are not immune to disease or failure.  Another possibility that I discuss is that the 
environment we find ourselves in is hostile to the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis and is not 
conducive or favorable to belief in God. sensus divinitatis, but the environment in 
which the sensus divinitatis is attempting to function in that is a hindering factor to belief in God. 
Another possibility is that there is something about us as individuals (given our human condition 
or depravity) that hinder the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis (e.g., we care too much about 
ourselves and have little desire to know much beyond this).  I consider all three options and 
conclude that the model I present can adequately deal with all the various understandings of the 
malfunctioning sensus divinitatis. 
 The second part of the argument, then, involves a discussion on how one repairs or 
nurtures the sensus divinitatis. In order to do this, I distinguish between what I call the maxi-
environment and the mini-environment. The maxi-environment is that environment that we 
currently find ourselves in. It is that postlapsarian environment where knowledge of God is 
smothered or hindered because of the cognitive consequences of sin. On the reformed model I 
am endorsing, the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis are hindered given the conditions of the 
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maxi-environment. Then there is the mini-environment, where the conditions are more 
conducive or favourable to belief in God. In other words, in these environments, the deliverances 
of the sensus divinitatis are less hindered. As agents, then, we must do what is necessary to allow 
the proper functioning of the sensus divinitatis by putting ourselves in those mini-environments 
where the nurture and repair of the sensus divinitatis can take place. The way to do this might 
involve many things, such as being open minded (e.g., you are at least open to the idea of theism), 
Plantinga!), or, to adopt a line from Pascal, spend time participating in the sacraments. As an 
agent, then, you have an important role to play in the process of nurturing and repair of the sensus 
divinitatis. In this way, then, the agent is involved in the process of coming to belief in God. But is 
it a cognitive achievement? What obstacles am I overcoming? I am overcoming the maxi-
environment that postlapsarian environment that is not conducive or favourable to belief in 
God because of the cognitive consequences of sin.        
 In the last chapter, I also consider several objections to the model I am presenting. One 
important objection I consider is whether my model is endorsing some form of semi-pelagianism. 
The pelagian controversy, which involves a disagreement concerning Divine grace and human 
agency, is something I certainly want to avoid. The way around it, I argue, is by noting that the 
pelagian controversy is one that concerns saving faith. This project, however, only concerns 
warranted belief in God. There is nothing directly transformational about knowledge of God. 
There is, however, something transformational about saving faith. It is the transformational 
process, I argue, that is at the center of the pelagian controversy. With this in mind, I think we 
can happily avoid any discussion of the relationship between Divine grace and human agency. 
Last, I also highlight several benefits of my model;; in particular, the benefit that my model 
provides is that it does away with the claim that belief in God in reformed epistemology is 
knowledge of God is neither the result of some arbitrary choice nor the result of mysteriously 
 Rather, it is a process a process in which we have an important part 








§1 Introduction: What Should One Expect from a Religious Epistemology? 
  
Those who give the matter their careful attention and spend time meditating with me will 
clearly see that there is within us an idea of supremely powerful and perfect being, and also 
that the objective reality of this idea cannot be found in us, either formally or eminently. 
(Descartes, Second Replies).2 
 
I do not doubt that everyone has within himself an implicit idea of God, that is to say, an 
aptitude to perceive it explicitly;; but I am not surprised that not everyone is aware that he has it 
or notices what he has it. Some people will perhaps not notice it after reading my Meditations a 
thousand times. (Descartes, Hyperaspistes August 1641).3  
 
The question concerning the rational justification for belief in the existence of God is, of course, 
an important one. And attempts to answer this question have a long and important history within 
the study of philosophy. As a result, many, whether successfully or unsuccessfully, have taken up 
this task. Some out of desire to show that their (and perhaps others) belief in God is justified and 
rational;; while others perhaps in an attempt to persuade those who believe in God to abandon 
their belief hoped to show that believing in God is akin to believing that a magical teapot orbits 
the sun.4  
 The aim of this project, however, is different. I am interested in a different kind of 
question a question that arises when we consider what we ought to expect from an account that 
provides religious believers with justification. The question, rarely asked or discussed by those 
who work in religious epistemology, is this: What should one expect from a successful religious 
epistemology? There are of course many different responses that the religious epistemologists 
could give to this question. I have identified two, however, that I believe are fundamental to the 
question:  
  
1) We ought to expect an account that is consistent with the way in which 
religious believers actually come to their beliefs. 




specifically concerned with those religious accounts that provide us with an account of the nature 
of religious knowledge. In other words, (1) and (2) are conditional on the fact that the particular 
religious epistemology has provided an account of the nature of religious knowledge. Thus, if we 
                                                 
   2  Second  Replies  AT  7:  135-­‐136.    
   3     
   4  
demonstrate  that  the  burden  of  proof,  with  regard  to  belief  in  God,  lies  with  the  theist.        
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have an account of the nature of religious knowledge, then (1) and (2) seem to be consistent with 
what we should expect from a successfully holistic religious epistemology.5     
 But why think this? Why think that a religious epistemology that has provided an account 
of the nature knowledge ought to be at all concerned with the expectations of (1) and (2)? 
Beginning with (1), Suppose a particular religious epistemology endorses something like this:  
 
A) The justification of the practice of religion depends upon the justification of religious 
beliefs.  
B) The justification of religious beliefs depends upon the justification of theism.  
C) The justification of theism depends upon the success of arguments the premises of 
which must be accessible to any ordinary intelligent person. No special experience can 
be assumed, and no reliance on authority can be made.6  
 
What the above argument claims is that belief in God must, necessarily, entail that the belief be 
the result of successful arguments in order to be justified. Suppose then that it follows from this 
that the vast majority of those who believe in God lack warrant given that their belief in God is 
not the result of what is being claimed in (C). This, as I understand it, would be an unsuccessful 
religious epistemology.  and why should we be concerned 
successes that I am concerned with: epistemic success and practical success. In order to give an 
account of a successful religious epistemology, that account, if epistemically successful, will provide 
the means for which the particular belief can have warrant.7 We have this in (A-C). Concerning 
practical success, however, it might be said that if an account of the nature of religious knowledge 
is to be practically successful, it ought to be a reflection of the way in which believers come to 
-C). Thus, we have the epistemic component but not the 
practical one. And as I understand it here, (A-C) represents an unsuccessful religious 
                                                 
5  
provide  an  account  of  the  nature  of  religious  knowledge  and  meet  the  expectations  set  forth  in  (1)  and  (2)  from  
those  accounts  that  neglect  the  expectations  of  (1)  and  (2).          
6  Linda  Zagzebski  argues  that  this  argument  has  often  been  the  motivator  of  skepticism.  Here  is  what  
(4)  would  like  as  a  result  of  1-­‐ und  argument  for  theism  that  begins  with  premises  accessible  to  
The  Routledge  Companion  to  Epistemology    ed.  Sven  Bernecker  and  Duncan  Pritchard  (New  
York:  Routledge,  2011),  395-­‐396.  
7  There   is   a   distinction,   I   think,   between   a   belief   being   epistemically   successful   and   the   epistemic  
account   being   successful.   I   am   only   concerned   here   about   the   latter,   which,   as   described   above,   merely  
concerns   the  extent   in  which   any  particular   epistemic  model  provides   the  means   for  which   the  belief  might  
have  warrant.  The  former  concerns  the  extent  in  which  any  particular  belief  meets  conditions  that  are  set  forth  
in  acquiring  knowledge.      
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epistemology (where the religious epistemology is concerned with the nature of religious 
knowledge).   
that religious epistemology which provides an account of the nature of knowledge and also 
reflects the expectations of (2))? The reason is that a successful religious epistemology has great 
explanatory power. In other words, a successful religious epistemology would not only give the 
agent warrant for their specific religious belief, but also in turn explain why the individual holds 
that specific belief. Intuitively, I think, we ought to always prefer this model when available. The 
issue, however, is that there is very little discussion (traditionally anyway) concerning the 
connection between the nature of religious knowledge and (1) in contemporary religious 
epistemology. The reason for this is that many accounts of religious warrant only understand 
epistemic issues from the viewpoint of the model they are endorsing. It matters very little, from 
an epistemic standpoint, whether the model they are endorsing has lasting consequences on any 
specific group of people. For example, (A-C) represents the way in which many, traditionally 
anyway, might have understood justification. Therefore, if someone who believes in God does 
not meet the criteria in (A-C) the problem is with their belief and not the model. This of course 
entails that the vast majority of theists (excluding of course the philosopher theist is lucky enough 
to understand complex arguments concerning the existence of God) would lack justification.  
Thus, a more successful model (and the one we ought to endorse) will approach things 
differently. Instead, a more successful model will consider the way in which people come, for 
example, to believe in God and determine whether it is an epistemically successful model. If there 
is such a model, then, it would meet the criteria of a successful religious epistemology.  
One worry here is that one might think that we ought to first establish the norms of 
religious epistemology before considering whether these norms fit the current model of belief. In 
other words, the worry might be that (1) is seeking to understand the criteria of religious 
knowledge based on whatever model is most popular with religious believers. This, I think, is an 
important worry. After all, if a group of people come to believe in God (and this belief happens 
to be true) based on some method that is clearly the result of dumb luck, endorsing such a 
t would approve of. So in a sense, the 
way in which religious believers come to believe in God is irrelevant to the question of how they 
ought to come to belief in God. In turn, the focus, one might argue, ought to be on the reliable or 
trusted method and not merely based on the particular modes of belief within a particular 
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religious community. But this worry lly capture the motivation of (1).8 What (1) implies 
is merely that whatever particular method is endorsed by a religious epistemologist, if epistemically 
successful, it ought to be the one that most closely aligns with the way in which religious believers 
actually come to their beliefs. There is no call here to endorse any method of religious belief that 
is epistemically suspect. The argument here is simple: a successful account of the nature of 
religious is one that has explanatory power. Given this, we ought to endorse those accounts in 
religious epistemology that are epistemically and practically successful.  
The key, then, is to find an account of religious epistemology which understands the 
importance of the connection between warrant and actual belief. As Stephen Wykstra puts it, any 
adequate account of 9  Put 
another way, a successful religious epistemology will not only tell us something important about 
the way in which the religious believer might have warrant, but will in turn provide the religious 
believer with an important understanding of how that belief came about.  
While (1) is central for a successful religious epistemology, (2) is the main concern of this 
project. The reason for this is twofold: First, there is already a successful account that adequately 
deals with the concerns addressed above. This account, I believe, is reformed epistemology. 
Reformed epistemology not only provides an account of the nature of religious knowledge, but it 
also provides an account that is firmly committed to providing the religious believer with a model 
that is consistent with the conditions set forth in (1). The account not only describes the way in 
which belief in God might have warrant, but it also provides a plausible account that is consistent 
with the way in which religious believers come to believe in God. Given the harmony of warrant 
and actual belief that is found in reformed epistemology, it will be very difficult (and perhaps 
unnecessary), I think, to provide an alternative or improved account in this regard.  
Further, a second reason to focus on (2) is that very little work has been done in 
exploring the relationship between accounts in a successful religious epistemology and issues in 
contemporary epistemology. It should be noted, of course, that Plantinga and other reformed 
epistemologists have done similar work to what I am proposing in (2). They provided an entirely 
                                                 
8  This  concern,  I  think,  is  related  to  the  problem  of  the  criterion.  Perhaps  there  is  a  worry,  then,  that  
tion,  it  is  one  we  can  avoid  for  the  purposes  of  
The   Foundations   of  
Knowing  (Sussex:  Harvester  Press,  1982),  61-­‐75.    




new way to think about nature of religious knowledge given the contemporary philosophical 
mood at the time. With the rise of externalism and reliabilist accounts of knowledge, for example, 
reformed epistemology provided a religious epistemology that was consistent with the evolving 
views on evidentialism, internalism, and the traditional understanding of justification. This in turn 
provided a fresh account of the way in which religious believers might have warrant.  What I am 
proposing is that even when the expectations of (1) has been adequately dealt with, as I believe it 
has been, the question of whether the account remains relevant is only adequately dealt with 
when one considers issues from contemporary philosophy. This question, I think, is rarely, if ever, 
explored.  
But why think that we should even care about (2)? There are at least two reasons that we 
should care about the extent in which accounts in religious epistemology consider issues from 
contemporary philosophy.  First, a successful religious epistemology ought to consider issues in 
contemporary philosophy for the sake of relevance. Suppose a particular religious epistemology 
develops a theory of warrant for religious believers that depends heavily on specific accounts in 
the epistemology of perception. Suppose further that this account while initially plausible given 
the research in the respective areas, fails, at a later time, to consider more recent research in the 
area which seemingly calls into question (or stronger, invalidates) the accepted account in religious 
epistemology. This account, it would seem, becomes irrelevant. Not because the religious 
epistemic account is necessarily wrong, but because the account itself is no longer a live option 
for those who take the contemporary research (in this case, the epistemology of perception) 
seriously. In other words, the account becomes static the result perhaps of an inability or 
unwillingness to adapt (specifically by those who endorsed the account in question) to the 
changing philosophical moods.10 The way to safeguard against such irrelevance, then, is to ensure 
that the accepted account of religious epistemology always be a part of the conversation by 
considering issues from contemporary philosophy.11  
                                                 
10  Note  here  that  I  am  not  endorsing  a  contextualized  religious  epistemology.  Thus,  just  because  there  
might  be  a  shift  in  philosophical  thinking  concerning  a  particular  position  that  is  important  to  my  understanding  
religious   account  ought   to   consider   the   contemporary  philosophical  mood   in   an  attempt   to   remain   relevant  
and  part  of  the  overall  philosophical  conversation.          
11  
religious  epistemology.  It  might  be  the  given  the  implications  of  the  philosophical  positions  it  might  be  best  to  
abandon   the   accepted   position   in   religious   epistemology.   I   take   it   that   this   is   what   happened   with   the  
introduction  of  reformed  epistemology.  It  was  necessary  to  not  merely  adapt  in  the  way  that  (2)  demands,  but  
to  change  the  understanding  of  the  nature  of  religious  knowledge.          
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Second, and equally important, considering issues in contemporary philosophy will 
illuminate and give one a deeper understanding of the particular account of religious 
epistemology they are endorsing. In considering and attempting to harmonize issues in 
contemporary epistemology, we will likely come to a better understanding of certain issues within 
that religious epistemology. An issue in reformed epistemology, for example, that is not often 
Does the agent exhibit any particular cognitive abilities worthy of note? Or does the agent only 
believe in God because God 
inevitably faced with questions and issues relevant to the value question in epistemology. Thus, in 
considering the value question we are coming to a better understanding of the particular issues 
within reformed epistemology. In other words, in considering whether knowledge of God is a 
cognitive achievement, we come to a better understanding of the role of the agent in the belief 
forming process. And as will become evident later in this essay, a deeper and more robust 
understanding of reformed epistemology is precisely what this project is attempting to achieve.  
In summary, then, the aim of this project is to consider an issue in contemporary 
epistemology and attempt to incorporate, where possible, some those ideas into reformed 
epistemology. The reason for choosing reformed epistemology is that reformed epistemology, I 
believe, best incorporates the necessary harmonization of the nature of knowledge and the way 
people actually come to believe in God. While it is successful in accomplishing the goals and 
expectations of (1), it has, until now anyway, been unsuccessful with regard to (2). This project, 
then, hopes to rectify this by providing a more robust reformed model that will incorporate 
issues from contemporary epistemology and deepen the understanding of key claims within 
reformed epistemology.  While there are several possible projects that are both interesting and 
beneficial, the topic I will explore in this project will be the value of knowledge. The main 
question I will ask is this: Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement? In answering this 
question we will have a better understanding of why knowledge of God is more valuable than 
that which falls short of this knowledge. Further, we will be able to answer some of the key issues 
sensus divinitatis with regard to belief in God. This in turn will give us a deeper understanding of 
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gigantic intricate world, I cannot believe that it just came about. I do 
not mean that I have some good arguments for its being made and that I believe in the arguments. I mean 
that this conviction wells up irresistibly within me when I contemplate the world.  
                                                                 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Lament for a Son12 
 
 2.1  Introduction  
 
Is knowledge of God a cognitive achievement?13 Before we can answer this question, we need an 
account of the nature of religious knowledge. Further, we want an account of the nature of 
religious knowledge that is consistent with the way in which religious believers seemingly come to 
this knowledge.14 Reformed epistemology, I believe offers us this option. To begin, reformed 
epistemology is a thesis about the nature of religious knowledge. More specifically, though, 
reformed epistemology is a thesis about knowledge of God and how the theist might hold a 
warranted belief about God. s account has 
become one of the most discussed within the philosophical literature. 15  
the belief in question was brought about in the same way as other beliefs we take to be basic. 
Perceptual beliefs, for example, are thought to be basic in that the acceptance of the perceptual 
experience is immediate and non-inferential. In other words, the perceptual belief is immediate 
the basis of any other beliefs. Thus, Plantinga asks, if perceptual beliefs (as 
  
                                                 
12  Nicholas  Wolterstorff,  Lament  for  a  Son  (Grand  Rapids,  MI:  Eerdmans,  1987),  76.      
13  An  answer  to  this  question  will  of  course  tell  us  a  number  of  other  important  things.  For  example,  it  
will  tell  us  whether  knowledge  of  God  is  more  valuable  than  mere  true  belief.  And,  as  we  will  see  later,  it  will  
tell  us  whether  knowledge  of  God  is  more  valuable  than  that  which  falls  short  of  this  knowledge.      
14   m  not  
claiming,   for   example,   that   the   account   put   forth   by   the   reformed   epistemologist   is   in   fact   the   only  way   in  
which  religious  knowledge  is  acquired.  It  does,  however,  seem  to  be  more  of  a  live  possibility  (as  we  will  discuss  
below)  than,  for  example,  those  accounts  that  depend  heavily  on  evidentialism.            
   15   Faith   and  
Rationality   (Notre   Dame,   Indiana:   University   of   Notre   Dame   Press,   1983).   See   especially   the   chapters   by  
-­‐Peter  
Baker,  Tayloring  Reformed  Epistemology  (London:  SCM  Press,  2007).  Baker  dedicates  the  first  two  chapters  of  
the   book   to   Alston   and   Wolterstorff   in   an   effort   to   better   understand   their   sometimes   overlooked  
understanding  of  reformed  epistemology.      
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 Thus, according to Plantinga, belief in God might be basic if the belief comes about in 
the same way that other basic beliefs arise. Given this, there needs to be some faculty similar to 
your perceptual faculty that gives rise to this immediate and non-inferential belief. The faculty 
that is similar to the perceptual faculty, it is claimed, is the sensus divinitatis. This faculty, then, gives 
rise to belief in God when occasioned by some event or experience. Plantinga notes that the 
working of this faculty is triggered by any number of circumstances (e.g., beauty, grandeur, guilt, 
etc.) and that 
 16 Thus, 
belief in God should enjoy the same epistemic status that perceptual beliefs enjoy.   
 
provides the theist with an account of how their belief in God can be warranted without that 
particular belief being inferred from any evidence or argument. 
only an account of warranted belief;; it is also a claim about knowledge. If the theist holds a 
warranted belief, then this will constitute knowledge if true. In short, Plantinga argues that the 
theist can be said to have knowledge of God if the belief is produced by a properly functioning 
faculty that is working in an appropriate environment according to its design plan.17 And this 
faculty, the sensus divinitatis, gives rise to belief in God in an immediate and non-inferential fashion 
when occasioned by some event or experience. If these conditions hold, then the theist can be 
said to not only have warrant for their belief in God, but also have knowledge.   
 In what follows, then, I will outline and discuss some of the k
reformed epistemology. Section 1.2 highlights the de jure objections to religious belief and notes 
that while many objections to theism take an ontological form, what Plantinga is primarily 
concerned with answering is the de jure evidentialist objection. Section 1.3 locates the roots of the 
evidentialist objection in classical foundationalism (CF) and discusses some the key claims made 
by the (CF). Section 1.4 
proposed Aquinas/Calvin (A/C) model.  Section 1.5 argues that while classical foundationalism is 
a key motivating factor for religious skepticism, internalism plays an important role as well. 
ant. Section 2.6 lays the 
                                                 
   16  Alvin  Plantinga,  Warranted  Christian  Belief   (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2000),  174.  Note  that  
Plantinga   calls   his  model   (where   belief   in   God   is   said   to   enjoy   positive   epistemic   status)   the  Aquinas/Calvin  
(A/C)  model.  As  we  will  note  later,  there  is  also  the  extended  A/C  model  where  the  concern  is  specifically  the  
positive  epistemic  status  of  specific  Christian  doctrines  (e.g.,  resurrection,  incarnation,  trinity,  etc.).  
   17  Ibid.,  178.    
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namely, that belief in God 
should enjoy the same epistemic status that other basic, non-inferential beliefs enjoy. And last, 
section 2.8 considers the often overlooked extended A/C model which provides warrant for 
belief in Christian doctrine.18   
 
 2.2  Religious Skepticism De Jure  
 
 religious skeptic someone who has serious doubts or questions concerning 
the central tenets of a particular religion.19 And these doubts or questions typically arise from 
some objection that undermines the religious belief in question. However, it is not merely this 
questioning alone that makes one a religious skeptic. The religious skeptic is one who takes these 
particular objections as a reason not to believe in particular religious claims. For some religious 
skeptics, the reason for rejecting belief in God might be a lack of experience. They reason that 
much of what they find themselves believing in is the result of some perceptual experience;; and if 
they were to believe in God they would want some perceptual experience as well.20 For others, 
perhaps, their skepticism is an intellectual struggle. Why would this God simply not reveal 
himself when called upon? Why, in times of distress and anguish, would this God remain hidden? 
-belief. If 
there is a God, he is perfectly loving. A perfectly loving God would not allow reasonable non-
belief. Reasonable non-belief occurs, therefore a perfectly loving God does not exist. Thus, the 
skeptic argues, there is no God.21           
Yet, while the religious skeptic may have many different objections to religious claims, 
these can be identified, as Plantinga argues, as two distinct types of objections namely, the de 
facto and de jure objections.22 The de facto objection, historically anyway, is the form many religious 
objections take (at least in terms of the initial skeptical questions). As Duncan Pritchard puts it, 
                                                 
18  As  noted  in  the  forward,  the  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  not  to  assess  reformed  epistemology  critically  
(though  I  do  occasionally),  but  to  merely  provide  a  foundation  for  the  project.  In  doing  so,  we  will  have  a  better  
understanding  of  how  to  answer  the  main  question  that  concerns  this  project:  Is  knowledge  of  God  a  cognitive  
achievement?          
19  Note  here  that  I  am  referring  to  religious  skepticism  in  its  broadest  form.      
20  Of  course  some  do  argue  that  belief  in  God  might  be  the  result  of  a  kind  of  perceptual  experience  
Perceiving   God   (Ithaca,   NY:   Cornell  
University  Press,  1991).      
21  This  is  often  called  the  argument  from  Divine  Hiddenness.  See  J.L.  Schellenberg,  Divine  Hiddenness  
and  Human  Reason  (Ithaca,  NY:  Cornell  University  Press,  1993).      
22  Plantinga,  Warranted  Christian  Belief,  viii-­‐x.          
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23 That is, 
religious skeptics often question the reality or truth of the religious conviction before directly 
considering epistemological questions.  De facto objections take many forms, with perhaps the 
problem of evil being the most well-known and discussed in philosophical literature. For example, 
God24 cannot possibly exist given the amount of unnecessary or gratuitous evil;; thus, religions 
that argue for the existence of God while at the same time acknowledging the existence of evil 
are patently false. In other words, belief in God and existence of evil are logically incompatible.25   
The epistemological question or as Plantinga calls it, the de jure objection ignores the 
the justification of belief in God. 
The de jure objector asks whether belief in God is irrational, unjustifiable, or epistemically 
irresponsible. This objection comes in various forms as well. For some, belief in God was 
argument.26 In a similar vein, belief in God, as Daniel Dennett argues, is akin to belief in Santa 
 undiluted 27 Or perhaps, 
in a slightly softer tone, the issue is that those who believe in God, as Locke puts it, are simply 
r 28  
No matter which line the de jure objector takes, what seems to unite these objectors is the 
idea that belief in God lacks the kind of epistemic justification necessary for rational belief. And 
for many de jure objectors there is the assumption, as Plantinga notes, that having a justified belief 
in God requires (propositional) evidence in order to have adequate epistemic support.29 Call this 
                                                 
23   Basic   Belief   and   Basic   Knowledge,   ed.  
Sabine  Roeser,  Ron  Rood,  and  Rene  van  Woudenberg,  177-­‐209.  (Frankfurt:  Ontos  Verlag,  2005),  178.            
24  When   using   the   term  God,   I   will   be   referring   to   the  monotheistic   God,   namely   the   one   found   in  
Christianity.   Further,   I  will   assume   the  orthodox  notion  of  God   found   in  Christianity.   For   an  overview  of   the  
Christian   understanding   of   God   see   Richard   Swinburne,   The   Christian   God   (Oxford:   Oxford  University   Press,  
1994).  
25  For   a   similar   argument   see   J.L.   Mackie,   The   Miracle   of   Theism   (Oxford:   Oxford   University   Press,  
1983),   150-­‐176.   For   a   response   to   the   logical   problem  of   evil   presented   by  Mackie   see  Alvin   Plantinga,   The  
Nature  of  Necessity  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  1978),  164-­‐196.    
26  Richard  Dawkins,  The  God  Delusion  (Boston:  Houghton  Mifflin,  2006),  38,  308.  
   27  Daniel  Dennett,   (London:  Penguin  Books,  1996),  18.    
28  This  is  not  to  say  of  course  that  Locke  thought  belief  in  God  lacked  justification.  He  held  that  belief  in  
God   possessed   the   necessary   evidence   for   justification.   See   Nicholas   Wolterstorff,  
The  Cambridge  Companion   to  Locke,  ed.  Vere  Chappell   (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  
1994),  172-­‐198.  
   29  See   Plantinga,  Warranted,   viii-­‐x,   67-­‐
Namely,   the   form   of   many   de   jure  
justified  because  it   is   inferred  from  insufficient  evidence.  Note  that  the  kind  of  evidence  here  is  propositional  
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the evidentialist de jure objection.30 Evidentialism comes in various forms, but Brand Blanshard 
articulates the evidentialist position clearly when he states that  
 
everywhere and always belief has an ethical aspect. There is such a thing as a general ethics of the 
 intellect. The main principle of that ethic I hold to be the same inside and outside religion. The 
 principle is simple and sweeping: Equate your assent to the evidence.31  
 
32 The idea being 
expressed by the evidentialist, then, is that one ought to believe only when one has the 
appropriate evidence. Thus if theism is indeed similar to belief in Santa Claus (for which there is 
no good evidence) as Dennett argues, then it seems that belief in God is indeed dubious and the 
force of the evidentialist de jure objection becomes a bit clearer. Epistemic justification depends 
on evidence and theism lacks the appropriate evidence. Here is how the evidentialist objection 
might be stated more formally:  
 
1) Beliefs about God are rational only if they are based on good reasons that serve for 
their evidence. 
2) But there are no good reasons for believing that God exists. Beliefs about God are 




3) Beliefs about God are not rational.33   
 
 Many projects in religious epistemology have tried to reject (2). Thus, as a result, they 
have attempted to provide good reasons and arguments as to why it is rational to infer belief in 
God from those arguments. The reformed epistemologist, though, rejects (1). After all, not all 
beliefs are subject to the standard that is required in (1).34 That being the case, why is belief in 
God subject to the conditions of (1)? There are two ways that Plantinga has answered the 
evidentialist objection and sought to undermine (1). In his earlier work, Plantinga assumes that 
                                                                                                                                                        
evidence  and  evidence  for  belief  in  God  would  be  inferred  from  other  propositions  you  believe.  In  other  words,  
-­‐basic  belief.  
30  I  will  use  evidentialist  objector  and  evidentialist  de  jure  objector  synonymously.    
   31  Brand  Blanshard,  Reason  and  Belief  (New  Haven,  Conn.:  Yale  University  Press,  1975),  401.      
   32   Evidentialism  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  
2004),  83.      
33   The  Routledge  Companion  to  Philosophy  of  Religion  eds.  
Chad  Meister  and  Paul  Copan  (London:  Routledge,  2007),  690.        
34  
set  forth  in  (1)  it  would  lead  to  an  infinite  regress.      
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(2) is correct but argues that there is a double standard with regard to (1). 35  So while the 
evidence and arguments for belief in God are far from conclusive, they are in fact on par with 
other beliefs that we take to be rational. For example, as the argument goes, we take the belief 
that other minds exist to be rational despite the fact that philosophical arguments in its favor 
suffer many of the same problems that the plague traditional theistic arguments. Thus, concludes 
former is rational;; so, therefore, is the 36 
arguments.37  
 In more recent literature, however, Plantinga abandons this earlier parity argument as a 
way to deal with the evidentialist objector.38 This is due in part to the fact that in God and Other 
Minds Plantinga assumed, like the evidentialist objector, that the way to go about discussing the 
rationality of religious belief was to first consider the evidence. This much is evident given the 
amount of time Plantinga devotes to the traditional theistic arguments in his earlier work. Here is 
Plantinga discussing this assumption: 
 
I was somehow both accepting but also questioning what was then axiomatic: that belief in God, if it is to 
be rationally acceptable, must be such that there is good evidence for it. This evidence would be propositional 
evidence: evidence from other propositions you believe, and it would have to come in the form of 
-evident 
evidentia (a better title 
39    
 
Plantinga, then, initially attempted to confront the evidentialist objection by merely pointing out 
its inconsistent nature. This of course changed shortly after and Plantinga adopted a new, bolder 
approach in response to the evidentialist objection. He directly confronted the evidentialist by 
showing that it is motivated by a failed theory of justification namely, classical 
                                                 
   35   k,  God  and  Other  Minds,  (Ithaca:  Cornell  
standard  with  the  way  in  which  (1)  is  implemented.        
   36  Ibid,  271.    
   37   er  more  recent  parity  argument  below.    
   38  Note   that   by   abandoning   this   parity   argument   Plantinga   has   not   rejected   it.   If   one   were   still   a  
committed  evidentialist  then  perhaps  this  parity  argument  would  still  be  attractive.  See  the  preface  to  the  1990  
paperback  edition  of  God  and  Other  Minds.  See  also  the  discussion  in  Warranted  Christian  Belief,  68-­‐71.    
39  Warranted  Christian  Belief,  70.      
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foundationalism.40 Crucial to the argument, then, is the belief that the evidentialist objection 
arises from the influence of classical foundationalism.41  
 
 2.3  Classical Foundationalism  
 
In order to see the connection between evidentialism and classical foundationalism more 
cl
that what motivates the religious skeptic de jure objection is the assumption that 
belief in God requires good evidence in order to be rationally justified. How, though, are we to 
evidence that is propositional. And second, the belief in question needs to be inferred from other 
beliefs that one already knows. 42  Thus, as the evidentialist would argue, if belief in God is 
accepted by any person who lacks good evidence, then this belief would be irrational.  
The issue for Plantinga and the reformed epistemologist, then, is the idea that belief in 
God can only be justified if inferred from other propositions that are already known. But what 
does this evidential objection have to do with classical foundationalism? The connection 
concerns the limits that classical foundationalism might place on what counts as a justified belief. 
are two kinds of belief basic and non-basic. Belief in God, 
traditionally, falls into the latter category. This is because what counts as a basic non-inferential 
belief is restricted to a few select beliefs that meet certain criteria. And theism, traditionally, 
, then, is 
a historical one. Because of the dominance of classical foundationalism, belief in God, as it fails 
to meet the criteria for a basic belief, is a non-basic inferential belief that is open to evidentialist 
objections. Why exactly belief in God is
critique of classical foundationalism.43  
                                                 
   40  
Philosophy  of  Religion  ed.  Paul  Copan  and  Chad  Meister  (Oxford:  Blackwell,  2008),  38-­‐40.    
41  To  be  clear,  the  de  facto  objection  could  also  be  a  result  of  the  evidentialist  objection.  For  example,  
one  could  claim  that  God  does  not  exist  given  the  lack  of  evidence.            
   42  Plantinga,  Warranted  Christian  Belief,  70.    
   43  Note  that  by  historical  here   I   simply  mean  that   the  dominance  of  classical   foundationalism  means  
that  belief  in  God  as  properly  basic  is  never  even  considered.  It  is  assumed  by  most  that  belief  in  God  is  the  kind  
of  belief  that  is  inferential.  But,  as  Plantinga  often  puts  it,  why  think  a  thing  like  this?  
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Classical foundationalism states that certain beliefs are properly basic iff the beliefs are not 
inferred from or justified by any other propositions. While attitudes are varied as to what might 
count as a properly basic belief, the classical view, according to Plantinga, is that only 
propositions that are  





should count as properly basic. Plantinga notes that in order for a belief to be properly basic 
within classical foundationalism, these conditions must be met.44 And so any belief that is not 
within the foundational framework (e.g., evident to the senses, incorrigible, or self- evident), must 
be the kind of belief that is inferred through evidence in order to be justified. Every belief, if not 
basic, must be inferred from the foundational beliefs that are considered basic. The connection 
may not always be immediate, but it must ultimately point to an evidential path that finds its way 
back to the foundations.  Put more directly, 
a person S is justified in accepting a belief p if and only if either (1) p is properly basic for S, that is self-
evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses for S, or (2) S believes p on the evidential basis of 
propositions that are properly basic and that evidentially support p.  
 
J.L. Mackie, arguing from an atheist perspective, takes this claim as palpable:   
 
If it is agreed that the central assertions of theism are literally meaningful, it must also be admitted that they 
are not directly verifiable. It follows then that any rational consideration of whether they are true or not will 
ve reasoning 
or, if that yields no decision, by arguments to the best explanation;; for in such a context nothing else can 
have any coherent bearing on the issue.45   
 
Mackie is not alone is his demands. Locke, as noted above, placed similar demands on religious 
belief by boldly claiming that those who do assent to (religious) belief without evidence 
designed to evaluate the evidence necessary for belief.46 So for the theist and atheist alike, belief 
                                                 
44  Plantinga,  Reason   and   belief   in   God,  
include  the  Ancient/Medieval  (eg.,  Aquinas)  and  Modern  views  (e.g.,  Descartes  and  Locke)  on  proper  basicality.    
45  Mackie,  The  Miracls,  4-­‐6.      
46  John  Locke,  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding,  IV,  xvii,  24,  pp.  414.         
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in God is non-basic and should therefore be inferred evidentially;; meaning, of course, that belief 
in God fails to meet the classical foundationalist criteria for basicality.47   
It should be clear, then, the problem that is mounting for the theist. Either belief in God 
is basic (non-inferential) or it is non-basic (inferential). 48  In order for belief in God to be 
rationally justified, propositional evidence must be presented. But is there such evidence 
available? If not, why would the theist agree to such standards? In the case of Locke (and perhaps 
other theistic evidentialists), the evidence pointed him towards belief in God and he believed the 
evidence to be more than sufficient for belief. Locke was clearly no evidentialist objector, as in 
the case of Mackie, Hume, and others. Yet today, few who believe in God would claim that 
natural theology and other forms of religious apologetics make any compelling case for God that 
might lead to belief;; at least not with the high probability that Locke seems to have required. In 
fact, as odd as this might seem, some of the most important arguments attacking and critiquing 
the project of natural theology have come from those who already believe in God.49    
 So the theist, arguably, has only herself to blame for this dilemma. She has agreed to a 
strict standard of justification that she herself cannot live up to the standard being evidentialism 
motivated or dictated by classical foundationalism. Not only does classical foundationalism drive 
the skeptical argument, according to Plantinga, it places the theist in the unlikely position of 
constantly having to reevaluate the evidence to ensure that her belief is justified. As Plantinga 
puts it, classical foundationalism ensures that the theist will constantly be checking the latest 
50     
 It is these standards, coupled of course with the desire to answer the evidentialist de jure 
objection, that motivate Plantinga to offer some relevant alternative to evidentialism. Of course, 
his solution to the evidentialist objector must first involve some detailed rejection of classical 
foundational on which evidentialism rests. Thus, by defeating classical foundationalism Plantinga 
attempts to remove any notion that propositional evidence is a necessary component for theism. 
                                                 
   47   sitional   evidence  
(unless   stated   otherwise).   You  might   think   that   basic   beliefs   are   based   on   evidence   (perceptual   beliefs   for  
example),  but  the  belief  is  thought  to  be  basic  if  it  is  not  inferred  from  other  beliefs.  
   48   It   is   important   to   note,   again,   that   this   is   a   historical   point.   The   dominance   of   classical  
foundationalism   leads   to   this   kind   of   inferential   evidentialism   that   Plantinga   is   after.   Your   basic   belief,   for  
example,   might   be   based   on   evidence   (e.g.,   perceptual   beliefs),   but   the   idea   is   that   basic   beliefs   are   non-­‐
inferential.      
49  See  Plantinga,  God  and  Other  Minds.  
50Plantinga,  Reason,  67.      
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And given that evidentialism, historically anyway, is the motivation behind the de jure objection, a 
rejection of classical foundationalism should present a reasonable rebuttal to the skeptical 
challenge.   
 
 2.4   
 
Plantinga begins his anti-evidentialist argument by demonstrating how classical 
foundationalism fails to live up to its own standards. This analysis and initial rejection is 
important since classical foundationalism would never place belief in God at the foundation of 
s epistemology as Plantinga would like, but would assume that belief in God could, at best, 
only be inferred from the foundation. Thus, if classical foundationalism fails, which Plantinga 
believes it does, then the notion that belief in God can only be legitimately inferred from the 
foundation, as opposed to being part of the foundation, is called into question.51 In the end, 
important to note, however, that Plantinga does not completely reject foundationalism. After all, 
 
al foundationalism in hopes of answering the 
evidentialist objector. He presents two arguments against classical foundationalism. First, he 
claims that classical foundationalism is self-referentially incoherent. If the central claim that 
foundationalism makes namely that  
 
(CF) A person S is justified in accepting a belief p if and only if either (1) p is properly basic for S, that is self-
evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses for S, or (2) S believes p on the evidential basis of 
propositions that are properly basic and that evidentially support p deductively, inductively, or abductively52 
 
 is to be taken as foundational, it would need to be the case that (CF) be properly basic and 
meet at least one of the criteria named in (1). This, however, does not seem to be the case. There 
is no reason, according to Plantinga, why one should accept (CF) given the criteria in (1). 53 
Concerning (2), then, there would have to be some inferred bases for accepting (CF). Yet (CF) 
seems to fall short in that regard as well. After all, what evidential support can (CF) present? Of 
course, notes Plantinga, no such support exists.  In the end, then, classical foundationalism 
                                                 
51  While   there   is   an   obvious   connection   between   foundationalism   and   evidentialism,   some   seem   to  
think   that   Plantinga   has   the   iscussion   on   this   see   Norman   Kretzmann  
Philosophy  of  Religion:  A  Guide  and  Anthology    ed.  Brian  Davies  (New  York:  
Oxford,  2000).  
52  Plantinga,  Warranted  Christian  Belief,  93-­‐4.      
53  Ibid.,  94-­‐95.          
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appears to be self-referentially incoherent in that it attempts to define a properly basic belief 
through foundational propositions that are themselves not properly basic.54 
 Yet there is another problem facing those who are committed to classical foundationalism. 
As Nicholas Wolterstorff points out, any commitment to such a strict  standard of knowledge 
means that we hold a substantial amount of unjustified beliefs given that the majority of our 
beliefs do not conform to classical foundationalism. 55  In agreement, Plantinga argues that 
committing to classical foundationalism means that most of the beliefs that we take as basic have 
the unfortunate consequence of being unjustified and therefore epistemically suspect.  
 
One crucial lesson to be learned from the development of modern philosophy Descartes through Hume, 
roughly is just this: relative to propositions that are self-evident and incorrigible, most of our beliefs that 
form the stock in trade of ordinary life are not probable at any rate there is no reason to think they are 
probable. Consider all those propositions that entail, say, that there are enduring physical objects, or that 
there are persons distinct from myself, or that the world has existed for more than five minutes: none of 
these propositions, I think, is more probable than not with respect to what is self-evident or incorrigible for 
me;; at any rate, no one has given good reason to think any of them is.56  
 
The point Plantinga is making, then, is that beliefs about the past and other persons are deemed 
irrational on (CF). Consider, for example, the belief that I had tacos for lunch today.  This belief 
 be self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the 
57 For Plantinga, this is highly 
problematic precisely because this is the kind of belief that is basic 
basis of other propositions). There is something mistaken, then, with the criteria for proper 
basicality according to (CF).  
 In the end, there are two important problems with classical foundationalism. First, (CF) 
falls short in that it fails to recognize the possibility that many of the beliefs that we hold qualify 
as properly basic despite the standards imposed by the classical foundationalist. Second, and 
perhaps more devastating, (CF) is self referentially incoherent.  
                                                 
54  For   a  more   detailed   commentary   on   this   see   Plantinga,   Ibid,   94-­‐97.   Also,   for   a   brief   overview   of  
Alvin   Plantinga  ed.  Deane-­‐Peter   Baker  
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2007),  24-­‐25.  
55   Nicholas   Wolterstorff,   Thomas   Reid   and   the   Story   of   Epistemology   (Cambridge:   Cambridge  
University  Press,  2004),  187-­‐192.     
56  Plantinga,  Reason  and  Belief  in  God,  59-­‐60.      
   57  See  van  Woudenberg,  Reformed  Epistemology,  40-­‐41    
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 Without going into a detailed response, the problems presented against classical 
foundationalism do appear to be detrimental to the classical foundationalist proposal.58 Yet given 
assume that in defeating classical foundationalism one silences the evidentialist objectors. Of 
classical foundationalist;; indeed, he may not be a foundationalist at all. He could accept a 
59  What this does do, however, is open the door for other 
possible versions of foundationalism that can accommodate belief in God as properly basic. For 
if (CF) fails in the way described by Plantinga, then the criteria used to determine properly basic 
beliefs needs to be reevaluated.  
Before moving on to a discussion of how exactly belief in God can be seen to be properly 
basic, more needs to be said about the evidentialist challenge. As noted above, Plantinga himself 
concedes that the evidentialist objector need not be a classical foundationalist or a foundationalist 
at all.  This is echoed by others, including Pritchard who notes that 
evidentialist challenge without making any mention of classic 60 
that one can still be an evidentialist without holding to any form of classical foundationalism. I 
could, for example, be a coherentist with regard to epistemic justification and reject the idea that 
all justified beliefs should rest on some non-inferential basic beliefs. In this manner, then, I can 
(successful) attempt to reject classical 
foundationalism. And while the two are clearly connected, evidentialism still stands even in the 
defeat of classical foundationalism.  
   
 2.5  Internalism and the Evidentialist Challenge  
 
While classical foundationalism is still a motivating factor for the evidentialist objectors, 
there seems to be another motivating factor behind the skeptical argument namely, internalism. 
While Plantinga clearly makes classical foundationalism the key motivating factor behind the 
evidentialist objection, he is well aware of the role that internalism plays and considers it part of 
                                                 
 58 I avoid   a   detailed   discussion   on   this   as   the   discussion   is   beyond   the   scope   and   intention   of   this  
though,  see   The  Theory  of  Knowledge,  ed.  Loius  
Pojman  (Belmont,  CA:  Wadsworth,  2003),  194-­‐206.  
   59  Plantinga,  Reason  and  Belief  in  God,  63.      
60  Pritchard,  Reforming  Reformed  Epistemology,  181.      
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the classical package.61  As Pritchard notes, 
62 In other words, the 
skeptical challenge is ultimately motivated by internalist commitments rather than classical 
foundationalism. 63  The reason for this is that in defining evidentialism one inevitably appeals to 
some aspect of an internalist epistemology. Before showing the connection, however, a brief 
overview of internalism is at hand.  
 Epistemological internalism makes the general claim that in order for a belief to be 
justified sufficiently for knowledge, the agent must be aware or have access to the reasons that 
support the belief that is being held.64 Or, as others have put it, the agent must have internal 
reflective access to those reasons for justification. 
65 These justifiers, then, might come in 
different forms. For some internalists, a belief is epis
has cognitive access to evidence that supports the truth of the belief. Justifying evidence must be 
66 So on this account, the internalist uses evidence as a justifier for belief. 
This is an attractive position for the religious evidentialist who might state that belief in God 
should be based on good evidence given that the internalist might claim that a belief is justified 
only when the evidence is internally accessible.  Moreover, it is easy to see how the evidentialist 
objector might also rely on epistemological internalism to make the case that evidence is needed 
justified belief in God, for both the skeptic and religious internalist 
evidentialist, is dependent upon the accessibility one has to the evidence.67 
evidence and my belief in God is not based on any good evidence. My lack of awareness of this 
good evidence, according to the internalist evidentialist, means that I lack justification.       
The demand for reflective access made by the internalist, then, clearly makes it one of the 
key motivating factors behind the skeptical challenge and the evidentialist demands. 
                                                 
   61  See  Plantinga,  Warrant:  The  Current  Debate,  especially  chapter  1.      
62  Pritchard,  Reforming  Reformed  Epistemology,  183.      
63  
Faith   and  
Rationality  (1983),  the  internalism/externalism  debate  was  still  not  as  clearly  defined  and  relatively  new  to  the  
philosophical  scene.      
   64  See  Michael  Bergmann,  Justification  Without  Awareness  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2006),  9-­‐
12.    
   65   The  Theory  of  Knowledge,  2nd  ed.,  310.    
66   Philosophical  Studies  48,  no.  1  (1985):  15.      
67  See  Louis  Pojman,  What  Can  We  Know?  (Belmont:  Wadsworth,  2001),  136-­‐37.    
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position. However, similar to our discussion of classical foundationalism above, the dominance 
of internalism has shaped the discus
evidence for belief in God, but the evidentialist challenge is often presented as a personal 
question of justification (e.g., Where is your evidence that God exists?).  
This is not to say of course that classical foundationalism plays no role in the skeptical 
challenge. Both classical foundationalism and internalism seem to be guilty of this honor;; but by 
presenting classical foundationalism as the main culprit or the only motivating factor one might 
miss the governing role that internalism plays.68 Thus, given the importance of epistemological 
the evidentialist objector in terms of externalism;; as opposed to, say, simply a denial or rejection 
of classical foundationalism.69 
 
 2.6  Externalism and Warrant   
 
foundationalism and its evidentialist assumptions. It was noted, however, that while classical 
foundationalism is historically linked to evidentialist assumptions, another important force 
behind the evidentialist assumption is internalism.70 
evidentialist objector would be a defense of externalism. Given that internalism does seem to 
motivate the skeptical challenge and evidentialist assumptions, an embrace of externalism seems 
the obvious next step.  And while not explicit in some of his earlier works (e.g., God and Other 
Minds, Faith and Rationality), his support of an externalist position becomes more obvious in his 
more recent work.  
                                                 
68  Pritchard,  Reforming  Reformed  Epistemology,  182-­‐184.    
69  I   th directly   to   the   evidentialist,  
however,  since  his  motto  
  anti-­‐evidentialist  claim.  Nonetheless,  as  noted  above,  the  thinking  
behind   this   evidentialist   claim   is  motivated   by   a   historical   commitment   to   internalism.   So  when   Plantinga   is  
responding  to  evidentialism,  he  is  in  turn  responding  to  the  internalist  as  well.  I  think  one  of  the  issues  at  play  
of   the   conversation  within   the   epistemological   literature.   The   discussion   of   internalism  was   still   in   the   early  
stages.  As  noted  above,  Plantinga   is  well   aware   though   that   internalism  plays   an   important   role   in   skeptical  
arguments.  This  much  is  clear  in  Warrant:  The  Current  Debate  where  internalism  is  art  of  the  classical  package  
that  include  deontology  and  evidentialism.      
70  See  Plantinga,  Warrant:  The  Current  Debate,  4-­‐7.  Plantinga  makes  note  of  the  role  that  internalism  
plays  in  justification,  duty,  and  evidentialism;  all  features  that  are  present  in  classical  foundationalism  as  well.        
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 Externalism, simply put, is the rejection of internalism. In other words, justification is not 
dependent upon one having any reflective access or awareness of the particular justifiers. Instead, 
justification can be conferred by factors external to (and thus not reflectively accessible to) the 
cognizer. This, of course, is in distinct contrast with internalism which demands reflective access 
important and distinct views, but for the purpose of this chapter I will focus on reliabilism and its 
71   
Reliabilism, roughly, is concerned with whether or not the belief in question is acquired 
by a reliable process. A common component amongst reliabilist theories of knowledge is their 
agreement that a reliable belief-forming faculty is a sufficient condition for knowledge. Reliabilists, 
such as Goldman and Greco, discuss knowledge in terms of a reliable belief-forming process72 or 
agent.73 In general, though, the claim is 
operating correctly (i.e., sensory faculties, through introspection, etc.) then one is justified in the 
beliefs one forms. So, for example, if I note by way of introspection that I am feeling sick then, 
according to reliabilism, I not only believe that I am sick, but I can have knowledge of my 
sickness (so long as the target belief is true). After all, introspection usually provides a reliable 
portrayal of the way I am feeling.     
Alvin Goldman notes that just as there are reliable processes that aid in obtaining 
knowledge, there are also unreliable processes that produce error in judgment. Unreliable 
74 So if one sees a red car driving by at a 
high rate of speed and assumes from this that all red cars are similarly fast, one could not say this 
person has knowledge given that his belief forming process was unreliable (since such a belief 
 
 
iabilism given its failure to 
                                                 
71  For  a  nice  collection  of  various  papers  on  the  topic  see  Hilary  Kornblith,  Epistemology:  Internalism  
and  Externalism  
-­‐162.  
   72     The  Theory  of  Knowledge  ed.  Louis  Pojman,  
(Belmont:  Wadsworth,  2003),  265.        
   73   Nous  33  (1999).      
74     The  Theory  of  Knowledge  ed.  Louis  Pojman,  
(Belmont:  Wadsworth,  2003),  265.        
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adequately answer the generality problem.75 The generality problem, as it relates to reliabilism, 
poses a question about the relevant process types and how one might determine which process 
type is most reliable in acquiring kn
it turns out that every true belief is the product of a reliable process. If we define it too broadly, 
76  Moreover, as Richard Feldman notes, 
77 An example of this, and one that is similar to 
e a black four legged animal, 
which happens to be a dog, walking towards him. Initially, one might simultaneously assume 
through his cognitive faculties that this image is an animal and a dog. Yet, until it can be better 
verified you are more justified in believing that the image is indeed an animal as opposed to both 
an animal and a dog;; it might after all be some other type of four-legged animal off in the 
distance.    
Thus, until it can be determined which natural belief forming mechanisms are most 
reliable and relevant in every situation, the generality problem is insurmountable for Plantinga 
and leads him to initially reject it in favor of a modified reliabilist account namely, faculty 
reliabilism. For example, Plantinga argues that in order for our beliefs to be justified (or have 
warrant as he calls it), our cognitive faculties must function according to the design plan and in 
the correct environment for which they were created.78  
But what exactly does it mean for cognitive faculties to function properly according to 
                                                 
   75  Plantinga,  Warrant:  The  Current  Debate,  197-­‐199.    
76  Pojman,  What  Can  We  Know?,  149.      
77 The  Monist  68  (1985):  164.          
78  One  might   worry   here   that   Plantinga   also   faces   the   same   generality   problem   with   regard   to   his  
Warrant  and  Proper  Function,  this  issue  was  raised  by  Goldman  at  an  
ldman  suggests  
The   fact   that   it   is   not   easy   to   individuate   faculties   is   not,   by   itself,  much   cause   for   alarm.   It   is   also   hard   to  
individuate  mountains  and  sentences;  everything  depends  on  what  you  propose  to  say  
course,   say  that   the  degree  of  warrant  of  a  belief   is  determined  by  the  degree  of   reliability  of   the   faculty  or  
faculties  that  produce  it;  the  analogue  of  that  claim  for  processes  is  what  creates  the  problem  for  Goldman;  so  
at  any  rate  I  am  not  afflicted  with  the  very  same   s  29-­‐31  of  Warrant  and  
Proper  Function




in which they should function. The heart, on average, beats about 72 times per minute and has a 
similar weight in most humans. It is responsible, through moderate contractions, for pumping 
blood through our three types of blood vessels. There is a way in which the heart is supposed to 
work. If the heart is not pumping blood through to the blood vessels it is not functioning 
properly according to its 
introduced some theistic dependence into his understanding of proper function and design. 
While Plantinga does ultimately believe this, his understanding of warrant need not entail that 
God be the designer;; simply put, there is a way in which most things (human organs, cognitive 
it is not functioning in a way that was originally intended), our cognitive faculties are also subject 
to malfunction and disorder. 
Not only do our faculties have a purpose and function, they are designed to operate in a 
certain environment that is essential to its proper function. The heart cannot function properly if 
it is deprived of oxygen in the same way that a person cannot breathe while standing on the 
moon. The same can be said for our cognitive faculties. Thus, a belief has warrant when it is 
acquired through the proper functioning of our cognitive faculties in the cognitive environment 
for which they were designed. The conditions for warrant, according to Plantinga, might be 
summed up as follows: 
  
S knows p if (1) the belief that p is produced in S by cognitive faculties that are functioning properly 
(working as they ought to work, suffering from no dysfunction), (2) the cognitive environment in which p is 
produced is appropriate for those faculties, (3) the purpose of the module of epistemic faculties producing 
the belief in question is to produce true beliefs (alternatively, the module of the design plan governing the 
production of p 
being true, given that it is produced in those conditions, is high.79      
 
With this in 
reliabilism namely, faculty reliabilism. His account depends on our cognitive faculties for 
knowledge and rejects internal access to evidence as a necessary condition for justification.
 
section 2.7) and the 
idea re no inferential evidence in order to 
be warranted;; for if our everyday beliefs (such as our perceptual sensations or introspectively 
                                                 
79   Philosophy   of   Religion,   3rd   ed.,   ed.   Louis  
Pojman  (Belmont:  Wadsworth,  1998),  529.        
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based beliefs) are justified based on the reliability of our cognitive faculties, then other beliefs, 
 
 
rejection of classical foundationalism and internalism. His rejection of the latter depends on his 
ular belief. As we will 
see in the next section, Plantinga relies heavily on an externalist view of warrant to defend his 
case for parity and argues that belief in God is warranted apart from evidential considerations.        
  
2.7  The Case for Parity  
 
 
as God and Other Minds. There, Plantinga argues that belief in other minds and belief in God are in 
the same epistemological dilemma;; all their arguments for justification seem to fail. Yet, as 
former is rational;; so, therefore, i 80 
argument for parity among religious belief. The key difference in his thinking, as he notes in 
Warranted Christian Belief, is that he no longer takes proofs as the only way to justify belief in God.81  
that in the same way that perceptual experiences are justified, belief in God through the divine 
sense is also justified and should thus enjoy the same epistemic status as ordinary perceptual 
experiences.    
patterns that are justified without being inferred from evidence. Further, it must be the sort of 
belief where if held hostage to the evidential demands it would have devastating epistemological 
results;; perceptual beliefs are of that sort.82 Consider, for example, the belief that I see a clock 
hanging on the wall. It would be difficult to present any non-circular or non-question begging 
evidence to justify my belief.83 Yet, this is what the evidentialist demands. So if we can disregard 
the demands of the evidentialist in the case of perceptual beliefs, then perhaps the demands the 
                                                 
80  Ibid.,  271.  
81  Plantinga,  Warranted  Christian  Belief,  69.  
82  
high  of  a  demand  on  what  might  count  as  a  justified  belief.      
83  Pritchard,  Reforming  Reformed  Epistemology,  184-­‐85.         
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evidentialist places on religious belief should be reconsidered as well;; neither can produce the 
required (non-question begging) 
said to be unjustified or an epistemically irresponsible belief. This, of course, raises further 
questions about evidential demands. Pritchard notes that this is the first parallel that Plantinga 
84 The second parallel, notes Pritchard, deals with the 
similarities between perceptual and religious experiences.  
A perceptual belief arises from some perceptual experience;; the belief arises suddenly 
with the cognizer having no control over the initial belief. The perceptual belief that arises, then, 
from the experience is prima facie justified. Plantinga and other reformed epistemologists take their 
irresistible, but it is immediate;; that is, it is not by train of reasoning and argumentation that we 
come to be convinced 85 What Reid wants to argue is that 
perceptual beliefs are not inferred, but immediately known by the perceiver given the nature of 
the experience. It is this sort of experience that Plantinga wants to compare. If the belief of some 
perceptual experience, say, seeing a tree, is prima facie justified, then if the belief of some religious 
experiences arises in the same manner, the religious belief is also prima facie justified.               
 One can begin to see Plantinga
justification of the perceptual belief would only be merited if the belief were gained through some 
se
be some cognitive faculty that is similar in that it can produce true beliefs concerning 
propositions about God. As with perceptual experiences, then, belief in God needs some faculty 
or cognitive mechanism to ground itself in. Plantinga uses a concept that is well known to most 
in the reformed tradition called the sensus divinitatis. Calvin, an early proponent of this cognitive 
faculty, claimed that one can accept and know that God exists without any argument or evidence.86 
Given the sensus divinitatis;; then, belief in God is properly basic and is not inferred from any other 
proposition. Plantinga defends this view and notes that 
 
hat God has created us in such a way that we have a strong tendency or inclination 
toward belief in him. This tendency has been in part overlaid or suppressed by sin. Were it not for the 
                                                 
84  Ibid.,  186.    
85  Thomas  Reid,  Essays  on  the  Intellectual  Powers  of  Man,  II,  v.      
86  In  chapter  5  I  discuss   in  more  detail  the  role  of  the   sensus  divinitatis  as   it  relates  to  belief   in  God.  
And  in  more  detail,  I     
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existence of sin in the world, human beings would believe in God to the same degree and with the same 
natural spontaneity that we believe in the existence of other persons, an external world, or the past. This is 
the natural human condition;; it is because of our presently unnatural sinful condition that many find belief 
in God difficult or absurd.  The fact is, Calvin thinks, one who does not believe in God is in an 
epistemically substandard position rather like a man who does not believe that his wife exists, or thinks 
she is likely a cleverly constructed robot and has no thoughts, feelings, or consciousness. Although this 
belief in God is partially suppressed, it is nonetheless universally present.87 
  
Calvin calls sensus divinitatis or a sense of divinity, which in a wide variety of circumstances 
88 
are non-inferential and properly basic, belief in God, when occasioned by the appropriate 
circumstances (e.g., such as one feeling a sense of guilt, dependence, beauty, etc.), can also be 
properly basic because of the cognitive working of the sensus divinitatis.89      
In comparison then, it is noted above that there are certain experiences which one might 
classify as properly basic given that they do not depend on any other propositions for their 
justification
have something like this:  
 
1) I see a tree (known perceptually), 
2) I am in pain (known introspectively), 




4) God exists (known through the sensus divinitatis). 
    
ilism 
produced by one whose cognitive faculties are functioning properly in the correct environments 
according to a design plan that is successfully aimed at truth).90   
 There is another important question to be asked however. Does it follow from this that 
my belief is groundless? Plantinga argues that in the same way that 
                                                 
87  Plantinga,  Reason  and  Belief  in  God,  66.  
88  Plantinga,  Warranted  Christian  Belief,  172.    
89  Plantinga,  Reason  and  Belief  in  God,  78-­‐81.    
90  Ibid,  156.    
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is not groundless. Understanding 
the distinction between evidence and grounds for belief. Perceptual experiences, such as those 
caused by visual experiences, are not considered to be groundless because of their reliance upon 
the senses.  Likewise, Plantinga claims that belief in God is not groundless, because it is rooted in 
the experience of the sensus divinitatis. Neither experience, however, means that belief in question 
is inferential. Thus, the cognitive faculties that give rise to these experiences do not count as 
evidence in the traditional se 91 
model, there is no reflective conclusion when one comes to believe in God;; rather, the belief is 
occasioned by the circumstance (e.g., the circumstance of beholding some majestic mountains or 
desert sunset). The circumstance does not count as evidence for my belief in God, I simply 
believe given the circumstance that is involved. In other words, the believer simply finds himself 
with a belief in God.  
This has further implications for the nature of defeaters against belief in God, which 
Plantinga clarifies in some detail in Warranted Christian Belief.92 He argues that not only is belief in 
God not groundless, but it is also open to defeat.  Suppose that someone offers a defeater for the 
proposition that God exists;; then, claims Plantinga, that particular belief would have to be 
abandoned. It is possible however for there to be a defeater-defeater, which would obviously 
entail the proposition being justifiably maintained.  Again, this can be compared to some 
given a pill that would induce sensations of a dog every time you saw a cat. This would count as a 
defeater for the person who would normally believe that what he perceives is accurate. This is an 
important point in that we can now see that a properly basic belief, for Plantinga, is not some 
incorrigible or indubitable belief that one can always believe despite defeating evidence.  It is, in 




                                                 
91  As  we  will  note  later  on,  this  the  main  difference  between  the  reformed  and  evidentialist  camp.    For  
the  evidentialist,  some  proof  or  axiom  might  lead  one  to  believe  in  God.  So  naturally,  this  proof  will  be  prior  to  
the  belief  and  will  depend  on  the  proof  in  order  to  be  held  logically.    For  the  reformed  epistemologist,  belief  in  
God  depends  on  nothing  but  should  lead  to  (not  from)  some  demonstration  that  belief  is  not  groundless.       
92  See  chapter  11.    
93  Plantinga,  Reason  and  Belief  in  God,  82-­‐87.  For  an  important  discussion  on  epistemic  defeaters  see  




2.8  Christian Doctrines and the Extended Aquinas/Calvin Model   
  
 
While this is often the most discussed and disputed aspect of his reformed epistemology, there is 
an often-overlooked aspect of his religious epistemology that is just as noteworthy. 94 Plantinga 
calls it the extended A/C model. 95 Similar to Planti
model), the extended A/C model is an attempt to determine the positive epistemic status of 
religious belief. However, unlike the A/C model, the extended A/C model is concerned with the 
positive epistemic status of specific Christian doctrines. The differences might be summed up as 
follows: The A/C model concerns warranted theistic belief while the extended A/C model 
concerns warranted Christian belief. Plantinga sums up the aim of extended A/C nicely in stating 
that  
 
full blooded Christian belief in all its particularity is justified, rational, and warranted. Further, Christian 
belief can be justified, rational, and warranted not just for ignorant fundamentalists or benighted medievals 
but for informed and educated twenty-first-century Christians who are entirely aware of all the artillery that 
has been rolled up against Christian belief since the Enlightenment. I shall argue that if Christian belief is 
true, then it is rational and warranted for those who accept it. 96 
   
 
It is important to note, of course, that in the same way that the A/C model is concerned with the 
epistemological rather than ontological status of belief in God, the extended A/C model is also 
primarily concerned with warrant. 97  Given this, how exactly does Plantinga claim that Christian 
doctrines can have warrant? First, according to Plantinga, Christian doctrines can be warranted in 
the same way that belief in God has warrant namely through the deliverances of some belief 
producing faculty like the sensus divinitatis. However, Plantinga make it clear that unlike the sensus 
divinitatis
result of a supernatural gift from God. It might be helpful here to think of this belief-producing 
                                                 
   94  Perhaps  the  reason  this  is  often  overlooked  in  philosophical  circles  is  that  the  extended  A/C  model  
might  seem  more  theological  than  philosophical.  At  any  rate,  there  is  very  little  discussion,  in  either  circles,  on  
the   extended   A/C   model.   For   an   excellent   critical   analysis,   however,   see   James   Beilby,   Epistemology   as  
Theology  (Burlington,  VA:  Ashgate  Publishing,  2005),  ch.  6.      
   95  Plantinga,  Warranted  Christian  Belief,  ch.8.  Also,  see  footnote  2  in  this  chapter.    
   96  Ibid.,  242.  
   97  
possible   Epistemology  as  Theology   (Burlington,  
VA:  Ashgate  Publishing,  2005),  180.      
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faculty as a postlapsarian (post fall) faculty that is unaffected by the noetic effects of sin. In which 
case, this process cannot fail to function properly.98 
 So what is this belief producing faulty that provides warrant for Christian doctrine? As 
ome to the Christian just by way of memory, 
perception, reason, testimony, the sensus divinitatis, or any other cognitive faculties with which we 
human beings were originally created;; they come instead by way of the work of the Holy Spirit, 
who gets us to 99 It is the Holy Spirit, 
or better, the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit that gives rise to the beliefs that Christians 
take to be central to the gospel. Plantinga is clear that his theory of warrant and proper function 
also applies to the extended A/C model in that these deliverances are warranted because they are 
produced by a belief producing faculty that is properly functioning in the appropriate cognitive 
environment according to the design plan.100  
 There is much more to say about the extended A/C model, but a more detailed analysis 
would take us beyond the scope of this chapter. What we are primarily concerned about in this 
 in a basic way. It is important to 
epistemology that is often overlooked (see footnote 71) despite its theological and philosophical 
depth.101  
2.9  Conclusion and Summary  
 
                                                 
   98  See   Plantinga,  Warranted   Christian   Belief,   245-­‐246.   Also   see   footnote   10.   The   reason   this   faculty  
cannot  fail  to  function  properly   is  precisely  because  it   is  not  part  of  our  prelapsarian  cognitive  equipment.   In  
other  words,  it  is  something  that  appears  after  the  noetic  effects  of  sin  have  been  calculated.    
   99  Ibid.,  245.    
   100  Ibid.,  246.    
   101  Plantinga   ends  Warranted   Christian   Belief  
eyond  the  competence  of  philosophy,  whose  main  
elf   and   of  
course  not  in  the  name  of  philosophy,  I  can  only  say  that  it  does,  indeed,  seem  to  me  to  be  true,  and  to  be  the  
of  this  is  not  to  demonstrate  the  truth  of  Christianity  (that  can  be  left  to  the  natural  theologians  after  all!),  but  
show  that  there  are  no  objections  that  demonstrate  that  theism  is  somehow  intellectually  subpar  or  lacking  in  
warrant.  Thus  paving  the  way  for  a  model  that  might  show  how  Christian  belief  can  have  warrant.    
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of warrant (both critical and complimentary),102 and many challenges to his fundamental claim 
that belief in God is basic. 103 
model, we have highlighted, I think, some of the most important parts that will lay the 
foundation for the remainder of the thesis and give the reader a good grasp of the primary claims 
of reformed epistemology.104    
 To summarize, then, it would appear that Plantinga has argued for several things. First, he 
has found the de jure evidentialist objection to belief in God to be rooted in classical 
foundationalism. Thus, c
and its overly narrow qualification of what qualifies as a properly basic belief. An example of this, 
according to Plantinga, can be seen in that many people hold beliefs that seem to be basic 
without meeting the defined criteria of classical foundationalism. Plantinga further rejects 
classical foundationalism as self referentially incoherent. Once the root of evidentialist objection 
is found to be incoherent, Plantinga then goes on to adopt a form of foundationalism that can 
account for the notion that belief in God is basic.  He further adopts a form of reliabilism 
(faculty reliabilism) in order to defend the notion that belief in God, if produced in the right 
environment and through the appropriate functioning faculties, requires no inferential 
propositional evidence in order to be justified. It is, in other words, properly basic. This 
nt, which claims that in the same 
way that perceptual experiences are justified, belief in God through the divine sense is also 
justified and should thus enjoy the same epistemic status as ordinary perceptual experiences.  
  In chapters 3 and 4 we will set aside the discussion of reformed epistemology 
temporarily and discuss issues relating to the value of knowledge. In chapter 5, we will return to 
reformed epistemology and discuss whether the reformed epistemologist can account for the 
value of knowledge. More specifically, we will discuss whether knowledge God, on reformed 
accounts, is a cognitive achievement.  
                                                 
102   Warrant   in   Contemporary  
Epistemology  ed.  Jonathan  Kvanvig  (London:  Rowman  &  Littlefield,  1996).    
103  I  have  in  mind  here  the  Great  Pumpkin  and   the  Son  of  the  Great  Pumpkin  objections.  For  a  good  
summary  of  these  arguments  see  James  Beilby,  Epistemology  as  Theology,  53,  130-­‐135.  The  Son  of  the  Great  
us  
epistemology.  See  Michael  Martin,  Atheism:  A  Philosophical  Objection   (Philadelphia:  Temple  University  Press,  
1990),  ch.  10.      
104   d   more   generally,      the   reformed  




§3 The Value of Knowledge 
 
 3.1  Introduction  
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, reformed epistemology is a thesis about the nature of 
religious knowledge. A comprehensive epistemology, however, ought to include both an answer 
to the nature question and the value question. With reformed epistemology, so far anyway, we 
have an answer to the nature question, but not the value question. Thus, in order to present a 
more comprehensive account of religious knowledge, the reformed epistemologist ought to 
consider whether its model can account for the value of knowledge. The goal, then, is to see 
whether reformed epistemology is compatible with the intuition that knowledge is valuable and 
whether it can be integrated into other reliabilist accounts that attempt to account for the value of 
knowledge.105  
 Before discussing the reformed response to the value question, however, one might ask 
that we need an answer to the value question just because the nature 
question has been answered. The reason why we need an account of both questions, I think, is 
that the two are closely related.106  If a successful answer to the nature question tells us how we 
are to obtain knowledge, a successful answer to the value question ought to tell us, among other 
things, why obtaining that knowledge is something we ought to value. Without the latter, the 
former becomes irrelevant. After all, if arriving at true belief is just as epistemically praiseworthy 
or valuable as arriving at knowledge then the nature question, while possibly interesting, becomes 
less relevant. Further, if the nature question were unrelated to the value question then the goals 
and aims of epistemology would have looked much different in history of philosophy. So even if 
the value of knowledge is not explicitly discussed, it is at least assumed in most theories on the 
so concerned with providing an analysis of the nature of knowledge. It is this emphasis, then, 
which points to the distinctive value we take knowledge to have.  
                                                 
   105  I  am   interpreting  reliabilism  broadly  here  to   include  some  virtue  accounts.  Specifically,  as  we  will  
see  in  the  next  chapter,  I  am  concerned  with  demonstrating  the  compatibility  of  reformed  epistemology  with  
  
   106  For  more   on   this   see   John  Greco,  Achieving   Knowledge   (Cambridge:   Cambridge  University   Press,  
2010),   91.   See   also   Jonathan   Kvanvig,   The   Value   of   Understanding   and   the   Pursuit   of   Understanding  
(Cambridge:   Cambridge   University   Press,   2003),   ix-­‐
,  American  Philosophical  Quarterly  44:  85-­‐110.     Kvanvig  claims  that  an  adequate  account  of  knowledge  
will  answer  two  
that  we  need  to  explain  the  master  intuition  that  knowledge  is  valuable.    
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 But is knowledge valuable? Or put more directly, is knowledge distinctively valuable? It is of 
course one thing to have the intuition that knowledge is distinctively valuable and quite another 
for it to actually be distinctively valuable. In this chapter, we will discuss the belief that knowledge 
is valuable and look into the different ways of understanding this value. In the next chapter, 
however, we will discuss an account where the value of knowledge is demonstrated.  In section 
3.2, I highlight the initial value problem and discuss the simple value question (whether 
knowledge is generally valuable) and the more sophisticated value questions (e.g., whether 
knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief). In the end, I conclude that the question we 
really need to answer is why knowledge is taken to be distinctively valuable. There are different 
ways to think about something being distinctively valuable, but as I understand it here, in claiming 
that knowledge is distinctively valuable I am claiming that its value is distinct in both degree and 
kind.  Thus the real question, I argue, is whether knowledge has distinctive value over and above 
that which falls short of knowledge. Section 3.3 highlights the relationship between knowledge 
and value in more detail and argues that the kind of value knowledge has is final value. I claim 
that the intuition that knowledge is of distinctive value has merit and examine the differences that 
need to be made with regard to final value and instrumental value. I further discuss the 
relationship between intrinsic and extrinsic value. In section 3.4, I consider the swamping 
problem, which is thought by some to be detrimental to any reliabilist account of knowledge that 
hopes to account for the value of knowledge over and above true belief. Section 2.5, then, goes 
into a more detailed look at the central claims of the swamping problem. Following Pritchard, I 
claim that what is really at stake in the swamping problem is epistemic value and not general 
value. Thus, if one concedes that true belief is the fundamental epistemic good (as I do), then this 
poses little problem for the belief that knowledge is of greater general value than true belief. In the 
end, I conclude that the swamping problem alone does not challenge the idea that knowledge can 
be finally (and thus distinctively) valuable.  
3.2  The Value Problem  
 
Knowledge is thought to be valuable. Call the attempt to explain why knowledge is 
generally valuable the simple value problem.107 At first glance, it might seem like the simple value 
                                                 
   107  In   saying   that   knowledge   is   generally   valuable   I   am  merely  noting   that  we  are  not   comparing  or  
evaluating   knowledge   to   any   other   acquired   epistemic   state.   The   question,   so   far   anyway,   is   simply   this:  
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problem is both easy to answer and sufficient for dealing with t
not hard to see why knowledge of x is at least more practically valuable than not knowing x. It is 
better to know, for example, how to calculate simple mathematical equations than to not know. 
Knowing simple math will help 
lly 
valuable. Even cases of trivial knowledge might be practically valuable at some point.  You might 
ask, for example, if knowing how many hairs you have on your head is really the type of thing 
that is practically valuable. However, you can envision a scenario where this might come in handy. 
Say you are taken captive by a superstitious evil dictator who determines the fate of his captives 
based on ones knowledge of such seemingly trivial matters. In this case, then, it would be better 
to know seemingly trivial truths than to not know.  
 Perhaps, then, even trivial instances of knowledge have value because of their (future) 
potential usefulness.108 Yet, in thinking about the value problem in terms of the simple value 
l issues surrounding the value problem. The epistemic 
concerned about it is figuring out what exactly makes knowledge more valuable than any other 
epistemic state. The question we are also hoping to answer is the intuition that knowledge is 
somehow unique or distinctive. After all, our research and effort into knowledge seems to 
indicate that we do in fact value knowledge more than other epistemic state. This, I believe, 
follows from the intuition that there is in fact something distinctive about the way we value 
knowledge.  Thus, there is a more sophisticated value question: Is knowledge distinctively 
valuable? In attempting to answer this question there are several possible questions that might 
account for its distinctive value. One might think, for example, that in accounting for the 
                                                                                                                                                        
necessarily  an  easy  question  to  answer.  What  I  mean  by  simple  is  only  that  the  kind  of  value  in  question  is  not  
distinctive  or  unique  to  knowledge  (at  this  point  anyway).    
108  The  issue  of  whether  knowledge  is  always  practically  valuable  goes  beyond  the  scope  of  this  
important  to  note  that  there  might  be  problems  in  thinking  that  knowledge  is  always  
practically  valuable.  First,  even  is  one  concedes  that  trivial  instances  of  knowledge  might  be  practically  valuable  
because  of  some  future  possibilities,  there  are  still  cases  where  the  practical  value  of  knowledge  is  suspect.  
Consider  cases  where  knowledge  is  forgotten.  Imagine,  for  example,  that  regardless  of  the  situation,  you  are  
only  able  to  remember  knowledge  of  x  for  a  very  short  period  of  time  (5  seconds  say).  It  seems  this  forgotten  
explained  in  terms  of  immediate  or  future  possibilities.  So  while  the  simple  value  question  seems  easily  
answered,  there  are  still  questions  about  whether  knowledge  is  always  practically  valuable    
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distinctive value of knowledge we merely need to show why knowledge is more valuable than 
mere true belief. Or perhaps we need something stronger and need to account for the value of 
knowledge by demonstrating its distinctive nature over anything that falls short of knowledge? 
Whatever the question amounts to, the simple value question is insufficient to account for the 
distinctive value of knowledge.   
 Below, then, is a breakdown of the questions we will answer:   
 
Simple Value Question     Sophisticated Value Questions  
 
Why is knowledge generally valuable?                          (1) Why is knowledge more valuable  
             than mere true belief? 
       (2) Why is knowledge more valuable  
             than that which falls just short of  
             knowledge? 
(3)  Why does knowledge have          
      distinctive value over anything       
      that falls short of knowledge?109 
 
 
sophisticated value questions. Starting with (1), then, the question is what makes knowledge more 
problem. This is the obvious place to start given that much of the contemporary literature has 
been concerned with this question. Further, and more importantly, this is a question that we find 
Plato considering in the Meno Meno, Socrates asks whether a true belief is just as 
valuable as knowledge given that both true belief and knowledge produce the same desired 
results.110 The line of questioning in the text concerns a true belief about the way to Larissa 
versus knowledge of the way to Larissa. In the end, Socrates concedes that true belief can be as 
action guiding as knowledge given that both true belief and knowledge help us achieve the 
opinion about that which the other has knowledge, he will not be a worse guide than the one 
                                                 
109  This  section  follows  closely  the  work  of  Pritchard  on  this  question.  For  a  more  detailed  look  at  the  
  in  The  Nature  and  Value  of  
Knowledge  ed.  Duncan  Pritchard,  Alan  Millar  and  Adrian  Haddock  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2010).  Also,  
The  Routledge  
Companion  to  Epistemology  eds.  Sven  Bernecker  and  Duncan  Pritchard  (New  York:  Routledge,  2011),  219-­‐231.    
   110  Plato,  Meno,  97a-­‐98d.      All   quotes   and   references   from   the  Meno  will   be   from   the  G.M.A  Grube  
translation  (Cambridge:  Hackett,  2002).   I  am  taking  true  opinion  (found  in  the  Meno  text)  to  be  synonymous  
with  true  belief.    
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111  In other words, true belief seems to be as practically beneficial as knowledge. This 
 112 One possible solution to the primary 
value question is from the Meno itself: 
 
 Socrates: Do you know why you wonder, or shall I tell you? 
 
 Meno: By all means tell me 
 
 Socrates: It is because you have paid no attention to the statues of Daedalus, but 
 perhaps there are none in Thessaly. 
 
 Meno: What do you have in mind when you say this? 
 
 Socrates:  That they too run away and escape if one does not tie them down but  
 remain in place if tied down. 
 
 Meno: So what? 
 
Socrates: To acquire an untied work of Daedalus is not worth much, like acquiring a 
runaway slave, for it does not remain, but it is worth much if tied down, for his works are 
very beautiful. What am I thinking of when I say this? True opinions. For true opinions, 
as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are not willing to 
remain 
one ties them down by [giving] an account of the reason why. And that, Meno, my friend, 
is recollection, as we previously agreed. After they are tied down, in the first place they 
become knowledge, and then they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized 
higher than correct opinion in being tied down. 113 
 
There are, I think, two ways to interpret Socrates here. First, it might appear that the only point 
Socrates is trying to make is that knowledge and true belief are different in that true belief is more 
transient than knowledge. After all, the main point seems to be that knowledge is worth more 
given that it is tied down. 114 rely Socrates was 
aware that knowledge is just as transient as true belief (especially if transient is taken here to be 
merely a case of forgetfulness). The other way to interpret this analogy (and perhaps one that 
involves a more complete understanding), is to see the agent in question as playing a role in the 
process. The first and less charitable interpretation is agent-neutral, while the second is agent-
                                                 
   111  97b.         
   112  97d.    
   113  97d-­‐  98a.    
   114  Kvanvig   seems   to   think   that   at   first   glance   this   is   all   you  might   get   from   the   story.   The  Value  of  
Knowledge  and  the  Pursuit  of  Understanding,  13.      
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centered. The idea that Socrates is trying to convey, I think, is that true belief is transient because 
the agent might easily abandon true belief in the face of internal or external conflict. What I mean 
by this is that the agent who holds a true belief might be more easily swayed from the truth (than 
the agent who holds knowledge) if some apparent evidence to the contrary is presented. 
Knowledge, from the analogy, seems less transient given that it is tied down or linked to reason. 
115 If this is right, transient or fleeting should not be understood in terms of forgetfulness (over 
which the agent has little control), but rather understood in terms of abandonment (over which 
the agent has some control).     
 If this interpretation is correct, then perhaps Socrates is right. We ought to value 
knowledge more than true belief if it ensures a less frequent abandonment of the truth. Timothy 
than mere present true belief to rational undermining by future evidence, which is not to say that 
it is completely invulnerable to such undermining. If your cognitive faculties are in good order, 
the probability of your believing p tomorrow is greater conditional on your knowing p today than 
on your merely believing p  116 117  
 Assuming this analysis is right and knowledge can be shown to be both different from 
and more valuable than true belief, are we any closer to answering the value question (recall that 
we are claiming the value question must account for the distinctive value of knowledge)? Not really. 
This is because the line o
answer to the question of whether knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. The reason 
for this is that even if knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, it might not be more 
valuable than that which falls just short of knowledge. Consider the following from Pritchard:  
 
Suppose that one answered the primary value problem by, for example, pointing to a necessary condition 
for knowledge which in general added practical value (the justification condition, say), but suppose further 
that the satisfaction of this condition, in conjunction with true belief, was not sufficient for knowledge. 
Perhaps, for example, when one knows that p p is thereby justified that 
ensures that knowledge has a greater practical value than mere true belief that p alone.118       
 
The issue here is this. There are those epistemic states in between knowledge and true belief that 
might be more valuable than mere true belief (justified true belief, for example), but equally as 
                                                 
   115  I  am  taking  reason  here  to  be  close  or  similar  to  justification.      
   116  Knowledge  and  Its  Limits  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2000),  79.    
   117   The  Value  of  Knowledge  and  the  
Pursuit  of  Understanding,  14-­‐21    
118   The  Nature  and  Value  of  Knowledge  
ed.  Duncan  Pritchard,  Alan  Millar  and  Adrian  Haddock  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2010),  6.    
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valuable as knowledge. So if I consider knowledge to be more valuable than mere true belief 
because some condition ensures this (e.g., justification), then is it the case that knowledge is any 
more v
Gettier cases and justified true belief always amounted to knowledge. But given this is not the 
case, then we need an account of why knowledge is more valuable than Gettier cases where 
justified true belief falls short of knowledge.119 Thus, even if we successfully answer the primary 
value problem, we are immediately faced with the second value problem (2): Is knowledge more 
valuable than that which falls just short of knowledge?  But as Pritchard points out, even if we 
successfully answer (2), we are still faced with another kind of question. What is it that makes 
knowledge distinctly valuable from that which falls short of knowledge? Call this the tertiary value 
problem. The problem is that (1) and (2) are merely attempting to answer the value problem in 
terms of degree. What we want from a holistic account of the value question is not merely an 
explanation of why we think knowledge is greater in degree, but in kind.  Thus, knowledge is 
distinctly valuable not only as a matter of degree, but of kind.120 But what exactly does this mean? 
Pritchard puts the point nicely: 
knowledge and that which falls short of knowledge is not just a matter of degree, but of kind. After all, if 
one regards knowledge as being more valuable than that which falls short of knowledge merely as a matter 
of degree rather than kind, then this has the effect of putting knowledge on a kind of continuum of value 
with regard to the epistemic, albeit further up the continuum than anything that falls short of knowledge. 
fails to explain 
why the long history of epistemological discussion has focused specifically on the stage in this continuum 
of value that knowledge marks 
intuitions about the value of knowledge requires us to offer an explanation of why knowledge has not just a 
greater degree but also a different kind of value than whatever falls short of knowledge
from the fact that we often treat knowledge as being, unlike lesser epistemic standings, 
precious, in the sense that its value is not merely a function of its practical import. 121    
 
What needs to be demonstrated, then, is that knowledge is not only more valuable than that 
which falls short, but why knowledge is thought to be distinctively valuable over and above that 
which falls short of knowledge. In other words, the kind of value that knowledge is said to have 
is distinct, say, from the kind of value that we place on mere true belief. The question that 
concerns us, then, is why precisely knowledge is thought to have this distinctive value. In other 
words, what is it exactly that makes knowledge distinct in kind from that which falls short of 
                                                 
119  Pritchard  points  out  that  this  is  precisely  what  Kapla
The  Journal  of  Philosophy  82:1985    350-­‐363.      
   120   -­‐8    
   121   -­‐8.    
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knowledge? This is what I take to be the tertiary value problem and the question we must 
consider before determining whether knowledge of God is cognitive achievement. Before we can 
provide an answer to this question, however, we need a better idea of the kinds of value that 
knowledge is a candidate for.122  
 
3.3  Knowledge and Its Distinctive Value  
 
to claim that knowledge is merely more valuable in terms of degree, but that its distinctive value 
is the result of a unique kind of value. But what exactly does this mean? The point is this: if we 
take knowledge to be distinctively valuable, it seems to suggest that we ought to be looking for a 
different kind of value that is unique to knowledge, but lacking in that which falls short of 
knowledge. What precisely, then, is the kind of value that gives knowledge its distinctive 
epistemic place? We have, at minimum, four options to choose from: instrumental value, 
extrinsic value, intrinsic value, and final value. The three I want to briefly discuss, however, are 
instrumental, intrinsic, and final value. 123 In the end, I conclude that the kind of value that we are 
going to look for in the case of knowledge is final value.      
 Instrumental value was previously discussed above, but might be defined as something 
that is valued often because of some other desired good that comes as a result. Money is a good 
example of something that has instrumental value. We value money not because, as an object, it 
is an end in and of itself to be valued;; rather, we value money because it often helps us acquire or 
achieve our desires it is a means to an end.124 However, as it was shown above, there is nothing 
particularly distinct about instrumental value. Justification, for example, is said to have 
instrumental value. And even if one can successfully demonstrate that knowledge has more 
                                                 
122  To  clarify,  then,  the  next  chapter  will  attempt  to  account  for  the  tertiary  value  problem:  Why  does  
knowledge  have  distinctive  value  over  and  above  anything  that  falls  short  of  knowledge.  When  using  the  term  
degree  (it  has  value  over  
anything  that  falls  short  of  knowledge)  and  kind  (which  I  discuss  in  the  next  section).            
   123  
knowledge  have  never  really  involved  any  debate  on  extrinsic  value.    The  primary  issues  surrounding  the  value  
of  knowledge  have  usually  pitted  intrinsic  value  vs.  instrumental  value  against  each  other.  In  other  words,  the  
options  were  usually  intrinsic  or  instrumental  value.  As  I  will  discuss  later,     
   124  Of  course  it  is  always  possible  that  someone  might  value  money  as  an  end.  Hoarding  it  not  because  
they  desire  something  that  comes  as  a  result  of  having  it.   I  take  it  that  these  would  be  special  cases  and  that  
generally  money  is  that  kind  if  thing  that  is  valued  because  it  might,  for  example,  fulfill  our  desires.   If  I  desire  a  
new  Ferrari  and  the  only  legal  way  to  about  getting  this  is  to  have  money,  then  I  ought  to  attempt  to  acquire  
money  in  order  to  fulfill  that  desire.  The  money,  however,  is  merely  contingent  on  my  desire  for  the  Ferrari.  
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instrumental value than true belief, this kind of comparison puts the discussion back on the 
continuum that we are hoping to avoid. Thus, instrumental value gets us no closer to answering 
the question of distinctive value.  
 Intrinsic value, however, is a more plausible candidate. In many earlier discussions about 
the value of knowledge, the kind of value discussed is intrinsic value. For something to have 
intrinsic value, it is said to have value for its own sake. As Christine Korsgaard puts it, to say that 
125 In other words, its 
value is derived from properties that are internal to the object in question. This rules out, then, 
the possibility that something has value because of its relational or external properties. Further, 
the value of the object in question does not, if intrinsically valuable, derive its value from some 
instrumental good that comes as a result.126 
 Intrinsic value, then, is a possibility when it comes to determining what kind of value 
knowledge. However, this is not the kind of value (I argue anyway) that knowledge has.  This is a 
good thing given that a discussion on the intrinsic value of knowledge would lead to a discussion 
on intrinsic value skepticism. By denying that knowledge has intrinsic value, we avoid a difficult 
debate concerning even the possibility of whether anything (let alone knowledge) has intrinsic 
value.127 This leaves us, then, with one final option: final value. 128 
 The kind of value that knowledge has, I argue, is final value. If something is finally 
valuable, it is non-instrumentally valuable and valuable as an end, and not merely a means to an 
end. What exactly is the difference between final value and intrinsic value? The key difference is 
that final value allows for its value to come from some external property. In other words, 
something is said to be finally valuable because of its relational properties and not merely because 
of its internal properties. For example, what makes the first car ever built by Henry Ford valuable 
is different from what make a 2012 Maserati valuable. The former has value because of 
                                                 
   125  Christine  M.  Korsgaard,     The  Philosophical  Review,  92  (1983):  170.    
   126  With  Korsgaard,   I  agree  that   it   is  best  to  keep  the  categories  of  value  as   intrinsic   vs.  extrinsic  and  
final  vs.  instrumental.  However,  if  something  is  intrinsically  valuable,  it  is,  by  most  accounts,  finally  valuable  (i.e.,  
non-­‐instrumental).  As  we  will   see   in   the  next  paragraph,  however,  something  can  be   finally  valuably  without  
being   intrinsically   valuable.   See   Wlodek   Rabinowicz   and   Toni   Rønnow-­‐
Proceedings  of  the  Aristotelian  Society  100  (2000):  33-­‐51.  
   127  For  a  discussion  on  this   Value, Journal  of  Ethics  2,   (1998):  
277 297.  
   128  
re  
not   trying   to   account   for   the   intrinsic   value   of   knowledge,   as   this   would   take   us   into   a   debate   about   the  
coherence  of  intrinsic  value.    As  will  become  apparent  in  the  next  chapter,  final  value  really  is  the  only  option  in  
accounting  for  the  distinctive  value  of  knowledge.          
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 its relational properties (e.g., 
important piece of US history). Thus, the former might have final value without having intrinsic 
 the first car built in Detroit its value would be questionable). 129  
3.4  The Swamping Problem: An Initial Assessment   
 
 Now that we have located the kind of value that knowledge might have, how exactly can 
knowledge be shown to have final value. This will be the primary concern of the next chapter. 
Before discussing the source from which knowledge derives its final value, however, any 
discussion of the value of knowledge is immediately faced with an important problem  namely, 
the swamping problem. The swamping problem was initially presented as a problem for reliabilist 
theories and is supposed to show that true belief, whether reliably or unreliably formed, is, 
ultimately, what we value.  And that a reliable faculty adds nothing to the value of true belief given 
that if an unreliable faculty had produced the same result (e.g., true belief), the value of the true 
true belief as a result of a reliable faculty or a true belief as a result of an unreliable faculty. They 
have both given us what we want namely, a true belief. Thus, we only value reliable faculties 
because of what they produce. In other words, we value reliable faculties only as a means to true 
belief. 
 There are several important cases where the swamping effect of true belief is supposedly 
demonstrated.130 However, the clearest example, I think, is the one provided by Zagzebski.131 
Suppose I really enjoy a good cup of coffee. And presented before me are two equally great cups 
of coffee. Each cup possesses whatever the necessary properties are that make a good cup of 
coffee (e.g., freshly brewed, the beans are from the best regions, etc.). However, one cup was 
made from a reliable coffee-making machine and the other was made from an unreliable coffee-
making machine. The reliable machine routinely produces great cups of coffee while the 
unreliable machine routinely produces bad cups of coffee. In this case, however, both machines 
                                                 
   129  I   think   we   can   ignore   here   what   kind   of   value   the  Maserati   has.   You  might   think   it   is   valuable,  
though,  because  of  its  parts,  trim,  top  speed,  etc.        
   130  See   Kvanvig,   The   Value   of   Knowledge   and   the   Pursuit   of   Understanding,   47-­‐48.   See   also   Richard  
Swinburne,  Providence  and  the  Problem  of  Evil  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  1999),  57-­‐66.    
   131   Metaphilosophy,  34  (2003):  12-­‐
28.   For   a   good   analysis   of   Zagzebski   and   other   issues   relating   to   the   swamping   problem   see   Pritchard,   The  
Value  Problem  for  Knowledge,  8-­‐ forthcoming).    
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have produced great cups of coffee. The problem, then, is that it seems we ought to value both 
cups of coffee equally given that they both contain the desired end the desired end being a 
that one of the cups comes from an unreliable coffee-making machine (in this case anyway).  
 What this example shows, then, is that where the coffee comes from is irrelevant to its 
value. In other words, what is of value is the great cup of coffee and not the process that brings 
about the great cup of coffee. The similarities to the discussion on the value of true belief and the 
value of knowledge should be obvious. The value of two equally true beliefs is the same 
regardless of the process that produced these 
that knowledge has a distinctive value over anything that falls short of knowledge.  
 The force of the swamping argument comes from its discrediting of the intuition that 
knowledge is of more value than true belief. This is because whatever property (reliable faculties, 
justification, etc.) is added to true belief will fail to confer any further added value to that true 
belief. Thus, if one holds that knowledge is a reliable true belief, then once true belief is attained 
knowledge) could be of any more value.  
 
belief (this observation will be important for the next section). You might think the claim is 
simply that whatever value knowledge has, true belief is at least as valuable. Thus, the main issue 
any value, but whether knowledge has more value than mere true 
belief. As such, we can now rule out the possibility that the swamping problem poses a difficulty 
for the simple value question (Why is knowledge generally valuable?). After all, even if the 
swamping problem is successful, knowledge might still, at the least, be instrumentally valuable.   
 
which value problem is the force of the swamping problem directed at? It would seem, initially 
anyway, that the force of the swamping argument is directed at the first of the sophisticated value 
questions (Why is knowledge more valuable than true belief?). 132 It appears, then, that if the 
sw  After 
all, the supposed force of the swamping problem is that in cases where an agent has a true belief 
                                                 




but lacks knowledge, the true belief is no less valuable than those cases where the agent has 
knowledge the desired end, a true belief, is achieved in both cases.  
 Why, though, is this a problem for the value is knowledge? Especially, you might ask, if 
we are primarily concerned with showing that knowledge is distinctively valuable (and not merely 
that knowledge is more valuable than true belief)? In order to see the force of swapping problem, 
we need to discuss in detail exactly what the problem amounts to and what the main assumptions 
of the swamping argument amounts to. Once this is clearly laid out, we will see that the 
swamping argument poses little problem to the question of the value of knowledge.  
 
 3.5  The Swamping Problem: Part II  
   
 Before attempting to offer a solution to the swamping problem, it will be important to 
point out exactly what the swamping problem implies and what assumptions are implicit in the 
argument. As noted above, it was initially thought that the swamping problem was only a 
problem for reliabilism. Zag roblem illustrates this belief nicely. 
However, it is clear that the swamping problem is not simply a problem for reliabilism. 133 After 
all, you could just plug in any epistemic property or condition for knowledge and the force of the 
swamping argument still stands. The reason for this is that the property in question plays the 
same role with regard to true belief as any other property that is paired with true belief. Consider, 
for example, the belief that epistemic properties are only instrumentally valuable in that they 
bring us closer to true belief. Thus, whatever the property in questions is, it seems that this 
property will play the same role with regard to truth in that the property will serve as merely a 
means to an end (that end being a true belief). Take justification, as opposed to reliability, for 
example. We think justification is valuable because it is usually a good indicator of the proximity 
of truth. Of course justification for some proposition p p, it does, in 
many cases, put the agent on better epistemic footing than those who believe p without the 
appropriate justification. Justification, then, is instrumentally valuable. This being the case, it 
seems that any epistemic property (whether it be reliability, warrant, justification, etc.) will only be 
instrumentally valuable insofar as it helps you achieve some other epistemic good. 134 In this case, 
the epistemic good in question is true belief.  
                                                 
   133  See  Pritch ,  8-­‐  11.      
   134   forthcoming).    
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 abilism, but also 
any account where epistemic properties are understood to only have instrumental value in 
relation to true belief. The swamping argument does of course make this implicit claim. We have, 
then, what appears to be the first assumption of the swamping problem:  
  
(1) Once the fundamental epistemic good in question is attained, no epistemic property 
that is merely instrumental can be added to confer additional value.  
 
This seems right and the swamping problem is convincing in this regard. Whether we are 
concerned about a true belief or a great cup of coffee, once the end is attained, the instrumental 
135 Consider, again, 
which equally great cup of coffee you would prefer: the one from the reliable coffee maker or the 
we can easily concede (1).  
 However, the swamping problem makes another very important point: 
  
 (2) The fundamental epistemic good is true belief.  
 
In (1), it was simply stated that once the fundamental epistemic good in question is attained, no 
epistemic property that is merely instrumental can be added to confer additional value. However, 
e fundamental epistemic good is (though, it is implied in the above 
paragraph). 136 The swamping problem, then, assumes the truth of (2). Veritism, or epistemic 
value T-monism as it is sometimes referred to, is the belief that there is one fundamental 
epistemic good namely, true belief. 137 In other words, what we are aiming at and hoping to 
                                                 
   135  I   take   it   that   one   might   reasonably   think   there   is   value   in   the   process,   but   this   is,   I   think,  
independent  of  the  value  that  concerns  the  end  in  question.  For  example,  if  there  are  two  equally  great  houses  
that  have   the  same  value   (in   this   case,  market  value),  how  you  come   in  possession  of   these  houses  matters  
little  to  the  true  value  of  the  houses.   Imagine  that  one  of  the  houses  was  gained  through  a  random  game  of  
chance  (you  won  the  house  through  an  email   lottery)  and  the  other  house  was  one  that  you  built  over  many  
years   as   the   result   of   your   skill   and  effort.   The   former  was  gained   through  a  process   that  holds   little   value,  
while  the  latter  was  gained  through  what  many  would  consider  a  valuable  process.  The  home  you  own  because  
of  your  skill  and  effort  is  something  you  can  be  proud  of,  perhaps  even  brag  about.  All  this,  though,  is  in  spite  of  
the  fact  that  both  houses  have  the  same  market  value.      
   136  I  think  it  is  best  to  keep  (1)  and  (2)  apart.  After  all,  I  might  concede  (1)  and  not  (2).  I  might  think,  for  
example,  that  the  (1)  is  true  but  that  the  fundamental  good  in  question  is  something  other  than  true  belief  (e.g.,  
knowledge).    
   137  Pritchard   uses   the   phrase   epistemic   value   T-­‐monism   in   the   Nature   and   Value   of   Knowledge.  
represent  the   idea  that  truth   is  the  fundamental  epistemic  good.  See  
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acquire as agents is the accumulation of true beliefs. As such, we hope to avoid false beliefs. As 
elief;; and the sole basic 
 138  
 I think there is good reason to assume that true belief is the fundamental epistemic good 
at which we are aiming. 139 However, I will leave these considerations aside for moment. What is 
most important is determining whether the swamping problem does in fact assume veritism and 
what this might imply for the force of the swamping problem. To begin, it is important to note 
 
the value of knowledge vs. true belief, given the truth of the veritist position. The way the 
swamping problem is set up, we are told to compare some desired end (e.g., coffee) with the 
epistemic desired end (e.g., true belief). As (1) and (2) suggest, then, what is really going on in the 
example is a discussion about conferring additional value to the fundamental epistemic good  that 
is true belief. Thus, there can be little discussion, I think, on whether the swamping problem does 
in fact assume the veritist position.   
 From this, we are now in a position to discuss the conclusion that is to taken from (1) 
and (2):  
 
(3) Thus, given (1) and (2), knowledge is of no more value than true belief. 
 
What (3) is saying is simply that if (1) and (2) are true, then (3) seems to follow. After all, how can 
anything be more epistemically valuable than the fundamental epistemic good? I take it that (3) is 
what most conclude should be taken to be the force of the swamping problem.140 Thus, we have, 
taken together, the following argument: 
 
(1) Once the fundamental epistemic good in question is attained, no epistemic property 
that is merely instrumental can be added to confer additional value.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Knowledge,   Truth,   and   Duty:   Essays   on   Epistemic   Justification,   Responsibility,   and   Virtue  
(Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2001).      
   138   Contemporary   Debates   in  
Epistemology  eds.  Matthais  Steup  and  Ernest  Sosa  (Oxford:  Blackwell,  2005),  308.    
   139   Contemporary   Debates   in  
Epistemology,  286-­‐295.  
   140  
ine-­‐product  model   of  
-­‐based  belief  model  avoids  the  swamping  problem.  However,  so  long  as  you  take  




(2) The fundamental epistemic good is true belief.  
 
(3) Thus, given (1) and (2), knowledge is of no more value than true belief.  
 
Given the above reasoning, it seems that if we going to account for the distinctive value of 
knowledge we need to deny (3). One thing to keep in mind, however, is that just because (3) 
seems to be a conclusion about the value of knowledge over and above that of true belief (and 
not specifically a question about the final value of knowledge), it is still imperative that we answer 
this question given that our inability to provide an answer as to why knowledge is more valuable 
answered the most important question with regard to the value of knowledge namely, Why 
does knowledge have distinctive value over anything that falls short of knowledge 
 Given this, what are the options, then, if we are to hold on to the intuition that 
knowledge is of distinctive va
possibility here since I take the real source of (1) to be the belief that (2) is true. 141 Rejecting (2), 
then, seems to be the obvious choice if we are going to ultimately deny (3).  
  Yet, how exactly should one go about rejecting (2)? First, we need to get clear on what 
exactly (3) entails. In claiming that true belief is the fundamental epistemic good I am claiming 
that the good in question, true belief, is ultimately non-instrumentally valuable. For example, (1) 
makes that claim that justification is only instrumentally valuable in that we value it as a means to 
true belief. True belief, however, is to be valued as an end. Its value is not derived from its 
relation to any other good.  
 Further, in claiming that the fundamental epistemic good is true belief, I am claiming that 
true belief is the primary epistemic goal at which we are aiming. If something is the primary or 
fundamental epistemic goal, it seems to follow naturally that this goal would also be the 
fundamental epistemic good.  This assumption runs the other way as well. If I take true belief to 
be the fundamental epistemic good, it seems to follow that I ought to take true belief to be my 
primary epistemic goal. This being the case, it follows, then, that true belief is not only the 
                                                 
   141  For  an  argument   that   targets   something   similar   to  what   (1)   claims   see  Alvin  Goldman  and  Erik   J.  
Epistemic   Value,   ed.   Adrian   Haddock,   Alan  Millar   and  




fundamental epistemic good, but also the primary epistemic goal. 142 After all, it would seem odd 
to claim that the primary epistemic goal is true belief while the fundamental epistemic good at 
which we are aiming is something different. I take it, then, that the important question to ask 
about (2) is why one should assume that true belief is the primary epistemic goal. 143 Why not 
knowledge, for example? Knowledge, after all, has been the primary issue both ancient and 
contemporary philosophers have been concerned with.   
 A thorough defence of why true belief is the primary epistemic goal (as opposed to 
knowledge) will take us beyond the scope of this section. In the end, what we are really looking 
for is a response that will guide us in ultimately rejecting (3). However, I will offer a brief 
of (3). First, it seems natural to assume that true belief is that which we are aiming at given that 
most would endorse, prima facie anyway, the idea that our primary epistemic goal as agents is to 
maximize true beliefs and minimize false ones.  
be attracted to epistemic value T-monism, at least pre-theoretically (i.e. independently of 
 144    
 Despite this apparent consensus, however, there are those who would reject the notion 
that true belief is the primary epistemic goal (and thus the fundamental epistemic good). There 
are two different camps of thought here. First, there is Timothy Williamson who, as I understand 
him, takes knowledge to be the fundamental epistemic good. Thus, knowledge would be the 
primary epistemic goal. On this account, however, Williamson would still be an epistemic value 
monist. 145 However, another way to reject the idea that truth is the fundamental epistemic good 
(and thus not the primary epistemic goal) is to deny value monism and accept a pluralist account 
                                                 
   142  In  the  literature,  it  seems  that  many  simply  assume  the  two  are  synonymous.  Saying  that  true  belief  
is  the  primary  epistemic  goal  is  to  simply  endorse  the  idea  that  true  belief  is  the  fundamental  epistemic  good.  I  
have  kept  them  apart,  however,  in  order  to  keep  the  distinction  clear.  However,  I  take  it  that  what  we  ought  to  
be  aiming  at  as  agents  is  just  whatever  the  fundamental  epistemic  good  in  question  is.    
   143  
same  thing.    
   144    Pritc   
   145  
The   Routledge   Companion   to   Epistemology   ed.   Sven   Bernecker   and  Duncan   Pritchard  
(New  York:  Routledge,  2011),  208-­‐218.                 
60 
 
of epistemic value. For example, one could argue that knowledge, justification, understanding, 
wisdom, etc., all have value and truth is just one of the many epistemic goods among others. 146 
 However, despite the varying opinions mentioned above, there is still good reason to 
think that true belief is the primary epistemic goal. This is because the relationship that other 
goods, such as justification and knowledge, play with regard to true belief seem to be better 
understood when the other goods in question play an instrumental role with regard to true belief. 
Consider the following: 
 
 (4) We want justified beliefs because we want true beliefs. 
 
Note that (4) seems much more plausible than  
 
 (5) We want true beliefs because we want justified beliefs. 147 
 
 suggesting that justified beliefs have no value;; rather, what is 
being claimed is simply that its value is instrumental to true belief. Given this, the true belief goal 
seems to be more basic than the goal of have justified beliefs. In other words, true belief seems 
more fundamental. I think there is a similar argument that can be made with regard to other 
goods such as knowledge and its relation to true belief. Consider the following: 
 
(6) As epistemic agents, we ought to be concerned with maximizing true beliefs and 
minimizing false ones. 
 
 (7) Knowledge gives us the best chance of minimizing false beliefs while maximizing  
      true beliefs.    
 
 (8) Thus, knowledge is merely epistemically instrumentally valuable with regard to  
       true belief.  
 
If we accept the idea that was put forward above that we want justified beliefs because we want 
true beliefs then the above seems to follow as well. Knowledge is simply a kind of true belief, 
namely one that is justified.148 Thus, knowledge and justification play the same epistemic role with 
                                                 
   146   Contemporary  
Debates  in  Epistemology,  286-­‐295.  
   147     
   148  I  am  awar
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regard to true belief. They both help us achieve the primary goal of maximizing true belief and 
minimizing false ones. 149  
 Where then, does this leave us with regard to the swamping problem? If we accept that 
true belief is the fundamental epistemic good, I think there is a very easy solution to the 
swamping problem. 150  Here is a recap of what is going on in the swamping problem:  
 
(1) Once the fundamental epistemic good in question is attained, no epistemic property 
that is merely instrumental can be added to confer additional value.  
 
(2) The fundamental epistemic good is true belief.  
 
(3) Thus, given (1) and (2), knowledge is of no more value than true belief.  
 
    
We have tried, unsuccessfully however, to argue that the problem with the swamping problem is 
(2). With the swamping problem still unanswered, however, what other options are available? The 
solution, I think, is to argue that the conjunction of (1) and (2) do not entail (3). As was 
mentioned above, the swamping problem is really a thesis about epistemic value. And (2) is 
simply a specific claim about epistemic value, namely veritism.  
 
 
(3) given (1) and (2), knowledge is of no more value than true belief,  
   
but rather,  
   
 (3*) given (1) and (2), knowledge is no more epistemically valuable than true belief. 151  
 
And of course (3*) is something a veritist can happily concede. Thus, we now have a revised 
swamping problem: 
 
(1) Once the fundamental epistemic good in question is attained, no epistemic property 
that is merely instrumental can be added to confer additional value.  
                                                                                                                                                        
condition   is   instrumental   to   the  epistemic   goal   of   true  belief   (e.g.,   such  as  warrant,   a   true  belief   that   is   the  
result  of  a  reliable  process,  etc.).    
   149  I  realize  here  that  I  have  not  given  a  robust  defense  of  veritism.  However,  what  is  presented  should  
suffice  given  that  I  mainly  concerned  (see  argument  in  the  paragraph  below)  with  showing  that  conceding  (2)  
general   value   than   true  belief.    
The  issue  with  the  swamping  problem,  as  will  be  discussed  below,  is  with  epistemic  value  and  not  general  value.      
   150  
(forthcoming).      




(2) The fundamental epistemic good is true belief.  
 
 (3*) Given (1) and (2), knowledge is no more epistemically valuable than true belief 
 
 It now appears that we have a harmless conclusion for the thesis that we are trying to defend
namely that knowledge is of distinctive value. This conclusion should come as no surprise since 
all through the discussion of the swamping problem we have been primarily concerned with 
epistemic value as opposed to distinctive value.  
 With the real force of the swamping problem settled, we are now in a position to once 
again discuss the question of the general value of knowledge. And as discussed above, the real 
question that we need to answer is what makes knowledge distinctively valuable over and above 
anything that falls short of knowledge.  
 
 3.6  Summary and Conclusion  
  
 In this chapter, I have argued for several things. First, I have argued that the question of 
the 
asked concerning the value of knowledge. While each question brings different possible answers 
to the question of the value of knowledge, I conclude that the question we really need to answer 
is why knowledge is taken to be distinctively valuable (as described in the tertiary value problem 
above). If we can find an answer to this question, then we can answer the other relevant value 
questions that are discussed.  
 However, before demonstrating the final value of knowledge, I argue that we need to 
address the swamping problem. I argued that what is really at stake in the swamping problem is 
epistemic value and not distinctive value. Thus, if one concedes that true belief is the 
fundamental epistemic good (as I do), then this poses little problem for the belief that knowledge 
is of distinct value over and above that which falls short of knowledge. In the end, I conclude 
that the swamping problem alone does not rule out any potential solution we might have for the 
tertiary value problem. 
  The next chapter will be primarily concerned, then, with providing an answer to the 
 
and argue that if this account is successful, the reformed epistemologist is in a good position to 
adopt the achievement thesis in order to account for the value of knowledge.  
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§4 Knowledge as a Cognitive Achievement 
 
4.1  Introduction  
 
 In §3, it was noted that any account of the nature of knowledge ought to provide an 
account of the value of knowledge.152 It was further noted that in order to account for the value 
of knowledge, we must account for the intuition that knowledge is of distinctive value (i.e., 
distinctive in kind and not simply degree).  Thus, we have identified the tertiary value problem as 
the attempt to show that knowledge has distinctive value over anything that falls short of 
knowledge. Further, the kind of distinct value that knowledge has, it is argued, is final value. 
(Something is said to be finally valuable (i.e., non-instrumentally valuable) because of its relational 
properties of the object in question.) How, then, does one go about arguing for the final value of 
knowledge (and in turn, answer the tertiary value problem)? One of the most plausible and 
eloquent accounts of the final value of knowledge is offered by the virtue epistemologist. Put 
simply, here is the argument:  
 
1. Achievements are finally valuable.  




3. Knowledge is finally valuable.153  
 
The argument is quite simple: knowledge is a cognitive achievement and thus finally valuable.154 
This, then, is the distinctive nature of knowledge. Mere true belief, as we will discuss below, isn
                                                 
152  Various  sections  of  this  chapter  and  chapter  5  w
God,  Mind,  and  Knowledge  ed.  Andrew  Moore  (Ashgate:  2013).    
153  For   a   good   summary   of   the   The   Routledge  
Companion  to  Epistemology,  ed.  Sven  Bernecker  and  Duncan  Pritchard  (New  York:  Routledge,  2011),  219-­‐231.        
154  An  important  point  of  discussion  here  is  the  nature  of  wicked  achievements.  If  I  claim,  for  example,  
that  achievements  are  finally  valuable  am  I  really  claiming  that  all  achievements  are  finally  valuable?  Claiming  
that  wicked  achievements  have  final  value  seems  counter  intuitive.  Suppose  there  is  some  crafty  murderer  who  
chooses  his   victims  based  on  the  difficulty  of   fulfilling  the  murder.  Each   victim,   then,   is  chosen  as  a   result  of  
detailed  planning  and  the  culprit  demonstrates  great  skill   in  each  crime  that   is  committed.  The  criminal  even  
overcomes  all  kinds  of  obstacles  on  the  way  to   committing  his  crime  (e.g.,  he  avoids  security  and  detection).  
Two  questions  arise  as  a  result  of  this  example.  First,  do  we  consider  it  an  achievement?  And  second,  if  it  is  an  
achievement,   is   it   the   kind  of   success   that  has   final   value?  Concerning   the   first   question,   the  answer   seems  
obvious especially   given   the   way   the   example   is   set   up.   After   all,   the   agent   certainly   demonstrates   the  
relevant  abilities  that  are  necessary  for  a  genuine  achievement.  But  does  this  mean  that  we  need  to   say  that  
this  kind  of  achievement  (namely,  a  wicked  achievement)  is  finally  valuable?  One  response  to  this  might  be  to  
qualify  the  final  value  of  achievements.   In  other  words,   I  might  claim  that   (1)  excludes  wicked  achievements.  
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always the result of a cognitive achievement given its compatibility with luck. Knowledge, as the 
argument goes, is always the result of a cognitive achievement.155 In other words, where there is 
knowledge there is a cognitive achievement. The crucial part of the argument of course comes in 
one would assume. 
I begin the chapter by discussing two ways one might understand the nature of 
achievements:  
 
(A1) Achievements are successes from ability.   
 
 (A2) Achievements are successes from ability that are creditable to the agent. 
 
Both, I conclude, are insufficient in explaining the nature of achievements. I then offer another 
definition (A3) and then discuss a slightly modified version in (A4):     
 
(A3) Achievements are successes from ability that are primarily creditable to          
         the agent. 
 
 (A4) Achievements are successes because of abilities that are primarily              
         creditable to the agent.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Thus,  in  saying  that  achievements  are  finally  valuable  all  I  am  claiming  is  that  the  nature  of  achievements  are  
such   that   they   are   generally   finally   valuable.   This   claim,   then,   seems   consistent   with   the   idea   that   not   all  
achievements,  however,  have  final  value.  Another  way  to  respond  to  the  problem  of  wicked  achievements   is  
claim  that  while  all  achievements  are  finally  valuable,  the  value  can  be  overridden  by  other  factors.  An  example  
by  Pritchard  illustrates  this  nicely:    
  
that   something   is  beautiful   is   always  a   consideration   in   its   favour,   even   if   sometimes   the  all   things   considered  
value  of  a  beautiful  thing  is  quite  low,  perhaps  negligible  or  of  negative  value,  because  of  other  factors  (e.g.,  that  
s  life  depends  on  the  destruction  of  the  artifact  in  question).  Some  things  certainly  are  of  pro  tanto  value  in  
this  way,  and  finally  valuable  things  seem  to  be  an  obvious  case   in  point   in  this  respect.   If  we  had  to  destroy  a  
beautiful  art  work  because  a  ch o  doubt  grant  that  this  was  the  
right   thing   to   do  all   things   considered,  we  would   surely   also   recognise   that   in   destroying   this   art  work  we  are  
destroying   something   precious,   something   of   final   value.   That   is,   we  would   recognise   that   we   are   destroying  
something   of   final   value   whose   value   has   not   been   .   (Pritchard,  
  Think  25  (2010):  1-­‐12.)  
  
Returning  to  the  example  above,  then,  we  do  have  a  case  of  a  finally  valuable  genuine  achievement.  However,  
the  wickedness   of   the   achievement   overrides   the   final   value   in   question.   In   the   end,  whichever   response   is  
chosen,   it s   important   to  note   that   the  claim   that   achievements  are   finally  valuable   isn t  undermined  by   the  
problem  of  wicked  achievements.   In  any  case,  when  discussing  the   final  value  of  achievements  this  does  not  
include  wicked  achievements.            
155  As  we  will  discuss  below,  though,  it  might  be  the  case  that  a  cognitive  achievement  while  necessary  
for  knowledge,  is  not  always  a  sufficient  for  knowledge.      
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adequate understanding of achievements so far as individual achievements are concerned and so 
responsible for nearby failures. This explains a number of difficult cases, I argue, including the 
Barney case.     
 Further, in section 4.6, I offer an account of joint achievements and argue that joint 
achievements represent cases of achievements where one individua
creditable for the success in question. On joint achievements, then, two or more agents are 
creditable for the success in question. I give numerous examples of a joint achievement below. 
Last, concerning achievements, I discuss those achievements where the primary credit is 
undermined by luck. I argue that these cases (e.g., Barney cases) are still achievements, but not 
the kind of achievements that are compatible with knowledge. The only kinds of achievement 
that are compatible with knowledge are those achievements that are primarily or jointly creditable 
to the agent. This has important implications for how we understand and answer the tertiary 
value problem.  
4.2  Achievements: An Initial Assessment  
 
 Before considering whether knowledge ought to be regarded as a cognitive achievement, 
we need to get clear on what exactly it means to say that something is an achievement. This is not 
nearly as straightforward as it might appear. In ordinary language we often think of achievements 
in different ways. Intuitively, for example, it seems that what counts as an achievement will 
depend on a variety of factors. Some factors to consider would be environment, age, or even 
natural abilities. These are all relevant factors when considering whether something counts is an 
achievement.156 For example, walking on an uneven surface should pose little problem for an 
adult who walks on a regular basis. A child, however, who is just learning to walk will find it 
difficult to walk on an uneven surface. Yet, if the child does successfully complete the walk, we 
tend to think that this counts as an achievement (despite the fact that an adult completing the 
same task would not be considered as a genuine achievement). The reason for thinking the small 
child ought to be credited with an achievement, perhaps, is that many tend to think of 
                                                 
   156  I  will  discuss  some  of  these  issues  below.    
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on the uneven surface because it takes so little effort. The child, on the other hand, has 
demonstrated great ability by overcoming the uneven surface. Given this, does this mean that 
achievements are only considered genuine if the agent involved overcomes some obstacle along 
the way? These issues are not without controversy and need to take each relevant point in 
turn.   
 that an achievement is success 
from ability.157  
 
 (A1) Achievements are successes from ability.  
 
A well-known example from Sosa illustrates (A1) nicely.158 
goal of hitting a certain target using his bow and arrow. There are three possible outcomes of 
having this goal. First, Archie can achieve the goal because of his abilities. Second, Archie can 
achieve the goal because of luck. And third, Archie can achieve the goal both because of his 
does in fact hit the target because of his abilities. According to (A1), this qualifies as a genuine 
achievement given that Archie is successful in hitting the target because of his abilities. What 
 
 Considering the second possibility, Archie takes aim and fires his arrow. The arrow is off 
target, but a gust of unexpected wind puts the arrow on course to hit the target. This, however, 
his goal of hitting the target, he does so not because of his relevant abilities but because of the 
involvement of some external factor over which Archie has no control. Thus, given that the 
attainment of the goal in question fails to meet the criteria set out in (A1), we would not consider 
the attainment of this goal to be an achievement. What this means, then, is that an agent can be 
said to achieve something only if the achievement comes by way of some ability that can be 
credited to the agent. While Archie is successful in hitting the target, it is not, however, a success 
that is creditable to his ability as an archer.  
 Possibility three, however, is slightly different in that Archie hits the target both because 
ie is an 
                                                 
   157  See  John  Greco,  Achieving  Knowledge  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2010).    
   158  Ernie   Sosa,  A   Virtue   Epistemology:   Apt   Belief   and   Reflective   Knowledge   (Vol.   1),   (Oxford:   Oxford  
   -­‐29.  
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expert archer. He always takes the environment into account (e.g., weather conditions, distance, 
etc.) and usually achieves his goal of hitting the target with ease. Thus, he takes careful aim and 
shoots his arrow. The arrow is headed straight for the target.  However, a gust of unexpected wind 
blows the arrow exactly 5 degrees off course. Yet, surprisingly, another gust of unexpected wind 
blows the arrow 5 degrees back in the direction it came so that the arrow is exactly on its original 
course. Does this count as an achievement? After all, the way the example is described, had 
Archie not been an expert archer whose arrow was originally heading for the target, the goal 
would never have been realized. So his abilities play an important role here. Perhaps intuitions 
will vary in this particular case. However, it does seem clear that what is happening in this case is 
different from what is going on in the fi
achievement (according to (A1) anyway).  
 
correlating features between this case and cases that might undermine the knowledge-as-
achievement (KA) thesis. Thus, we can better answer the above example once all the relevant 
cases are discussed. 159  However, the above examples necessitate a reevaluation of (A1). 
Achievements need to be more than just success from ability. Achievements need to be 
understood as those successes from ability that are creditable 
achievement of hitting the target, for example, needs to be such that we can credit the success of 
his achievement to his agency.  
 
 (A2) Achievements are successes from ability that are creditable to the agent. 
 
While (A2) is an improvement on (A1) in that it clarifies where the credit for the achievement 
ought to be primarily focused, it does raise some other questions as well. One question, for 
example, is to what extent the achievement ought to be creditable to the agent. Does the 
achievement need to be primarily creditable to the agent or merely partially creditable to the agent? 
                                                 
   159    What  I  will  argue  below  is  that  this  does  count  as  a  genuine  achievement  given  that  Archie,  in  this  
case,  would  be  responsible  for  nearby  failures.  Put  another  way,  in  some  possible  world  where  Archie  failed  to  
hit   the   target,   in   this  particular   case,  his   lack  of   success  would  be  a  direct   result  of  his  abilities  as  an  archer  
(despite  the  fact  that  Archie   is  an  expert  archer,  in  some  close  possible  world  he  fails  he  would  fail  to  hit  the  
target).    Note  that  this  will  only  apply  in  cases  where  some  external  factor  ensures  the  goal  is  met  with  success.  




Pritchard argues that what we want from an understanding of an achievement is that the 
cognitive success (true belief that comes about as the result of a cognitive achievement) be 
primarily creditable. 
In particular, we need to make a distinction between a true belief being of credit to an agent, in the sense that 
the agent is deserving of some sort of praise for holding this true belief, and the true belief being primarily 
creditable to the agent, in the sense that it is to some substantive degree down to her agency that she holds a 
true belief.160   
 
Riggs, in a more ambiguous tone, claims that  
 
what we have to do in order to be responsible for some outcome is: enough. There is not some stable 
threshold of effort or determination or skill that must be superseded on my part before it is reasonable to 
say that I did such-and-such. I simply have to do enough to bring it about. If the world cooperates by 
making it easy, so much the better It would be silly to require that someone do more than was necessary to 
bring about some end in order for it to be attributable to them that they did so.161  
 
Sosa, in a discussion on the nature of testimony and credit, takes somewhat of a middle ground: 
 
 If we think of animal knowledge as apt belief and of belief as apt when correct attributably to a 
 competence, then the fullest of credit often belongs to a group, even a motley group. Seated in the 
 group collectively is a competence whose complex exercise leads through testimonial links to the 
 in part to a 
 competence seated in oneself individually, but the credit that one earns will be partial at best.162   
 
What should we make of these three understandings of achievements? For now, I think we can 
ignore the proposal offered by Riggs. While Riggs is attempting to answer the same question as 
Pritchard and Sosa, his concerns seem better suited to a discussion on the distinction between 
strong and weak achievements.163 As such, we will reserve this discussion until later in the essay. 
The issue, then, is between primary and partial credit.  
 
 4.3  Primary Credit vs. Partial Credit  
 
 The issue of primary credit vs. partial credit arose from a discussion concerning cases of 
testimonial knowledge where it was argued that the agent had acquired knowledge in absence of a 
                                                 
   160     
   161   Synthese  169  (2009),  215.      
   162  Sosa,  A  Virtue  Epistemology:  Apt  Belief  and  Reflective  Knowledge  (Vol.  1),    94-­‐95    
   163  Riggs   is   particularly   concerned,   as   is   Sosa,   with   the   nature   of   testimonial   knowledge.   However,  
there   is   some   confusion   in   the   final   part   of   the   essay   concerning   the   nature   of   easy   achievements   and   its  
relationship  to  testimonial  knowledge.  The  issue  of  easy  achievements,  however,  is  a  separate  issue  from  the  
one  we  are  currently  concerned  with.  What  we  are  asking  is  to  what  extent  does  the  ability  of  the  agent  need  
to   explain   the   cognitive   success.   As   we   will   see   later,   easy   achievements   do   not   undermine   the   notion   of  
primary  credit.          
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genuine achievement.164 Thus, it seemed to follow that we had cases of knowledge where credit 
for the true belief was not attributable to the agent. This observation is important given that we 
are attempting to answer the tertiary value problem that knowledge has distinctive value over 
anything that falls short of knowledge. Thus, if we have a cognitive success without knowledge, 
knowledge is in fact any more valuable than anything that falls short of it. However, as I want to 
get clear on the nature of achievements before discussing its relation to knowledge and value, I 
will return to this specific problem later in the chapter when discussing cases of testimonial 
knowledge.  
 Returning to the definition of achievements, then, what arose from the issues 
surrounding the nature of achievements and testimonial knowledge is an important distinction 
between an achievement being of credit (partially creditable or deserving some credit) and an 
achievement being primarily creditable (the achievement being due in large part to the abilities of 
the agent).  Let me begin by saying that it seems clear that there are very good reasons to think 
that what we want from an understanding of achievements is that they be primarily creditable. 
First, by weakening the notion of credit we, unwillingly perhaps, open the door to a wide range of 
cases that are problematic for the KA thesis.165 In other words, if we allow for partial credit (in 
order to support our thesis) in some cases, it will be necessary to allow for partial credit in all 
analogous cases. And this might prove problematic for Gettier-type cases. Further, if 
achievements are thought to be valuable, then it seems that it would derive its value only from 
those successes that are significantly due to our abilities as an agent. We value achievements 
because of the effort, determination, and demonstration of abilities. Allowing for partial credit 
                                                 
                                164   dit,   209.   Related,   there   are   two  
important   papers   by   John  Greco   and   Jennifer   Lackey   that   started   the   discussion   on   testimony.   See   Jennifer  
Philosophical  Studies  142:27-­‐
and  the   Philosophical   Issues  17:57-­‐69  (2007).  Pritchard,   in  discussing  the  testimonial  
case,  makes  an  important  distinction  between  an  achievement  being  primarily  creditable  and  an  achievement  
being  of  credit.  Something  is  primarily  creditable  when  the  goal  in  question  is  attained  because  of  
ability.  In  other  words,  an  achievement  is  primarily  creditable  when  the  achievement  is  due  in  large  part  to  the  
abilities  of   the  agent.  See  Pritchard   ,  40-­‐41.  However,   I   take   it   that  what   is  also  
going  on   in   the  distinction  between  of  credit  and  primary  credit   is   that  something  can  be  of  credit  when  the  
agent  deserves  at   least  partial   credit   for   the  achievement.  And,  as  noted  above,   the  agent  deserves   primary  
credit  when  the  achievement  is  due  in  large  part  to  the  abilities  of  the  agent.  I  think  this  is  a  more  natural  way  
to  understand  the  distinction.   I  discuss   this   in  more  detail   in  sections  4.6  and  4.7  with  respect   to  testimonial  
knowledge.  
   165  More  on  this  in  the  following  sections.      
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cheapens, in a sense, what we normally expect from those who have achieved something as a 
result of their abilities. The following example will illustrate this preference nicely:   
 
Mt. Everest: Edmund and Didier both have a desire to reach the top of Mount Everest. The primary goal, 
then, of both Edmund and Didier is to reach the peak. Edmund, who has been training for some time, 
successfully climbs Mount Everest by starting at the base. Didier, on the other hand, realizes his goal by 
taking a short and painless helicopter ride to the summit.  
 
the top of Mount Everest (e.g., you are at the highest point on the planet), surely the person who 
has reached the summit of Mount Everest by starting at the base has achieved something more 
significant than the person who takes a helicopter to the top. The reason for this is that Edmund 
clearly has reached his goal because of his abilities. Didier, on the other hand, has reached his 
goal perhaps only partially because of his abilities. The reason why we value the achievement of 
Edmund has to do with the effort and abilities on display.  
 
entirely clear that Didier has actually achieved anything significant. Thus, in terms of value, we 
value the effort and ability of the person who started at the base because we value the effort it 
takes to achieve this particular success more than the mere attainment of the success. And while 
Didier has successfully reached his goal, the success is not due to his abilities in any significant way. 
The credit, in the case of Didier, is due to the helicopter and her pilot. And not, as it were, to the 
abilities of Didier. Edmund, on the other hand, has successfully climbed Mount Everest because of 
his abilities. What explains the success in question, then, are the abilities of Edmund.  
 Now, there is some ambiguity in this example that needs to be clarified. First, we are 
strictly s
success is not an achievement. What is being claimed is that in understanding achievements, they 
are often considered valuable when the success is primarily creditable. Despite this, however, one 
might still think that Didier has met the conditions that are set forth in defining an achievement. 
After all, he does deserve some credit for reaching the summit. He chose a helicopter instead of a 
car, he might have chosen a clear day instead a stormy windy day, or he might have chosen an 
expert pilot as opposed to a novice. These things are all certainly of credit to Didier.  
 However, it could be argued that what we want from an understanding of the nature of 
achievements is 
agency one where the success in question is primarily due to his ability. In other words, what 
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we want from a definition of achievement is one where the success in question produces a result 
that is primarily creditable to the agent.166 Didier, for the most part, is a passive bystander. And we 
expect those who claim to have achieved something to be active throughout the process. In this 
case, Didier is not an active participant when it comes to him successfully reaching his goal. In 
primarily 
creditable to him. In the case of Didier, his success is primarily due to the proper functioning of 
something external to him namely, the helicopter. 
 Keep in mind, of course, that it is still partially creditable (of credit) to Didier that he 
reached the top of Mount Everest, but it is not primarily creditable to him as an agent (in other 
because of his 
abilities to reach the top. And had he not used some of his abilities, he never would have reached 
the top (e.g., the ability to recognize that he needed an expert pilot as opposed to a novice). 
Nevertheless, it might be argued that it is still not the kind of success we would normally call an 
achievement given that his success was not attained because of his abilities. 167  
 Thus, prima facie anyway, the notion of partial credit lacks the explanatory power that 
comes with a definition of achievement that requires primary credit. The notion of primary credit 
seems to explain why we value achievements in the first place. This leads us to a more refined 
definition of achievements:  
 
 (A3) Achievements are successes from ability that are primarily creditable to          
         the agent. 
 
From (A3), it follows that any account of achievements where the success in question is not 
primarily creditable to the agent, the agent lacks a genuine achievement. This explanation does 
well to explain what is going on in the case of Didier and why one might believe that a helicopter 
ride to the top of Everest is not a genuine achievement.  
                                                 
   166  For  more  on  this  see  Duncan  Pritchard,   -­‐   The  Journal  of  Philosophy  
109  (2012):  247-­‐279.  
   167  Another  way  to  think  about  this  is  that  there  are  really  two  successes  in  question  here.  First,  there  
is  the  goal  of  picking  an  expert  pilot  and  then  there  is  the  goal  to  reach  the  summit  because  of  the  abilities  of  
the   expert   pilot.   In   choosing   the   expert   pilot   (and   assuming   Didier   successfully   reaches   the   top),   the   agent  
exercises   his   relevant   abilities   (the   ability   to   recognize  what   it   takes   to   reach   the   summit   of   Everest  with   a  
helicopter  and  choosing  an  appropriate  pilot).   In   this   case,   then,  we  have  a   genuine  achievement.  However,  
once  Didier  assumes  a  passive   role   inside   the  helicopter,   he  becomes  a  passive  participant   to   the  success   in  
question.  Thus,  the  only  one  who  gets  credit  for  the  success  of  reaching  the  summit  is  the  pilot  (and  of  course  
in  cases  where  Didier  is  the  pilot  this  would  count  as  a  genuine  achievement).    
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 However, this is not the whole story concerning partial credit as it has significant 
explanatory power in other cases. Consider the following example:  
 
Emie: small child named Emie. Emie can walk on her own most of the time, but   
like most children she has trouble when the ground is uneven or littered with obstacles (e.g., rocks). In 
always a friendly one and she now finds herself on a trail that is uneven and strewn with large rocks. 
However, she still needs to go from point A to point B.  She stands to her feet and wobbles along. As her 
and hold her arms as she navigates the more difficult obstacles on the path. In due course, however, Emie 
arrives at her destination.  
 
primarily due to her abilities. In fact, it seems that 
her success could be creditable to me. Without me, s
still an achievement;; regardless of the fact that her success is not primarily creditable to her 
agency. Perhaps the explanation here is that Emie has found herself in an excessively hostile 
environment. Thus, all that is required in such an environment is some exercise of the relevant 
ability for that success to be counted as an achievement. 168   Moreover, there is another example 
that seemingly reflects poorly on the criteria for achievements that is offered in (A3). Consider 
the following example offered by Greco: 169 
 
Wayne: Wayne plays center forward for a local football team. His teammate Ashley is a speedy winger for 
the same team. As it typically happens, Ashley is the creative player who makes possible all the goals that 
Wayne scores. This occasion is no different. Ashley dribbles the ball past several players and Wayne nods 
home the sublime cross that Ashley delivered from the wing. Wayne celebrates his achievement with his 
teammates as they congratulate him.   
 
The above example is typical of many football matches. The one who scores the goals seems to 
get all the praise despite not having done most of the work that led up to the goal. The reason, I 
think, is that the agent (Wayne in this case) seems have achieved something because of his abilities. 
This is in spite of the fact that Ashley, the speedy winger, seems to deserve at least some of the 
credit for the g
                                                 
   168  This  argument  will  be  important  in  the  next  chapter  when  we  discuss  whether  knowledge  of  God  is  
a  genuine  cognitive  achievement.  Thus,  the  same  argument  concerning  excessively  hostile  environments  might  
apply  to  our  knowledge  of  God.  Perhaps  the  human  condition  is  so  severe  that  the  environment  in  which  we  as  
humans  find  ourselves   is  excessively  hostile   in  relation  to  our  cognitive  ability.     Thus,  the  cognitive  success   in  
question  need  not  be  primarily  creditable  to  the  agent,  but  only  partially  creditable  to  the  agent.    
   169   -­‐65  
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ed to be a genuine 
achievement. He is involved, but not in the right way.  
 
case (even if both Ashley and Wayne are partially creditable), is because, as Greco puts it, 
abilities are appropriately involved, one deserves credit  170 
 It would seem, then, that we have two counter examples to the idea that the success in 
question must be primarily creditable if the agent is to be credited with a genuine achievement. In 
both cases, it seems that partial credit is all one needs in certain cases. While I agree that the Emie 
 
football example we have two agents with two very distinct roles to play. Ashley, the speedy 
winger, has the goal of crossing the ball in order that Wayne might score the goal. Wayne, the 
burly center forward, has the goal being in the right position so that he can be on the end of a 
great cross in order to score the goal. Each individual, in this case, seems to be primarily 
creditable for the respective success in question. While there is cooperation, we determine the 
ore goals) based on the actual outcome and whether the 
past his opponents in order to provide a great cross. There are two different goals and thus two 
different achievements. And each of the agents in this case can be primarily creditable for their 
achievement. Further, if Wayne failed to score the goal from a great cross, Ashley still achieved 
the success in question namely, providing a great cross. 171  
 
 172 One might be able to conjure up an example where the goal in 
question is the same for both of the players involved and their mutual cooperation is essential.173 
                                                 
   170  Ibid.,  65.  
   171     
   172  Provided  we  set  up  the  example  in  a  slightly  different  manner.  The  way  in  which  Greco  sets  up  the  
example,   however,   it   does   seem   that   there   are   two   distinct   goals   at   play   (the   aim   of   setting   up   goal   by  
providing  a  great  cross  and  the  aim  of  scoring  the  goal  from  the  great  cross).      
   173  Consider  two  center  forwards  who  both  have  the  goal  of  scoring.  One  is  driving  forward  toward  to  
goal  and  just  as  he  is  about  to  shoot,  he  trips  and  inadvertently  kicks  the  ball  in  the  path  of  the  other  forward  
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Rather than worry about the many possible examples, we still have the Emie case which still 
poses a problem for (A3). Thus, we need another solution in order to retain the idea that primary 
credit is a necessary condition for a genuine achievement. However, the notion of primary credit 
has important explanatory power and we are not in position to give this up as of yet. Thus, for 
the time being, we will move to an equally important topic: the relationship between knowledge 
and achievements.  
  4.4  Knowledge-as-Achievement Thesis  
 
 Thus far, we have examined the nature of achievements and have tentatively concluded 
that an achievement is a success from ability that is primarily creditable to the agent. However, 
there is at least one, possibly two, counter examples that might challenge the notion that primary 
credit is a necessary condition for a genuine achievement. Yet, we are not in position to reject the 
notion of primary credit as it has important explanatory power. The aim of this section, and those 
remaining in this chapter, will be to provide a more detailed understanding of the nature of 
achievements by analyzing the debate surrounding the -as-
In doing this, we will then be in position to better offer an account of both the nature of 
achievements and the value of knowledge. 174 
 The KA thesis is most strongly defended by those who offer a virtue theoretical account 
of knowledge. The robust virtue epistemologists, as they are sometimes called, offer an account 
belief comes about because of e are ultimately concerned with the final 
value of knowledge, it will be useful to see how this understanding of knowledge relates to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
o  any  of  the  
above,   that   the   two  players  have   two  distinct  goals   in  mind   (and   thus   two  different  achievements).   Further,  
there   is  an  eleme
anyway,  was  to  shoot  the  ball  in  order  to  score.      
   174  I   am   specifically   concerned   here   with   the   virtue   theoretic   account;   or   as   it   is   sometimes   called,  
robust  virtue  epistemology.  While  there  are  a  variety  of  important  virtue  theoretic  accounts  of  knowledge,  I  am  
for   this   is   that   these   accounts,   especially  Gr
what  we  are   concerned  with).   It  will   be   important   to  note  here   that  while   I  will   discuss   the   virtue   theoretic  
solution  to  the  value  problem,  I  am  in  no  way  committing  myself  to  this  account  of  the  nature  of  knowledge.  
What  I  am  committing  myself  to,  however,  is  merely  that  if  knowledge  is  an  achievement,  then  the  reformed  
epistemologist   is  well  placed  to  offer  an  account  of  the  value  of  knowledge  (in  this  case,  specifically  religious  
beliefs  like  the  belief  that  God  exists).  The  claim  I  make  can  be  much  weaker  than  this  as  well.  Even  if  it  turns  
out  that  not  all  knowledge  is  an  achievement  and  only  some  instances  of  knowledge  are  finally  valuable,  I  can  
still  show  why  knowledge  of  God,  for  example,  is  finally  valuable.  
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final value of knowledge. The KA thesis, as it relates to final value, can be summarized in the 
following way: 
 
(1) Achievements are finally valuable.   




(3) Knowledge is finally valuable.175 
 
The central idea, then, is that knowledge is a cognitive achievement, achievements are finally 
valuable, and thus knowledge is finally valuable. If successful, robust virtue epistemology (RVE) 
provides a compelling account of how relationship between knowledge, achievements, and value. 
What makes knowledge valuable is the effort and ability it takes to achieve knowledge. Thus, not 
only is knowledge a result of our cognitive abilities, it might also explain the intuition that 
knowledge is distinctively valuable.  
 
important to highlight its obvious appea
belief is formed because of  176 There is an important causal connection, 
then, between the ability of the agent and the true belief. Given this, (RVE) and the KA thesis 
can explain a number of difficult Gettier cases. 177 Consider the following well-known Gettier 
cases: 
Nogot: S believes that her co-worker Nogot owns a Ford. S has many good reasons for believing that 
Nogot owns a Ford. For example, Nogot has told her that he owns a Ford. Thus, on the basis of such 
evidence, S forms the belief that someone in the office where she works owns a Ford. However, it is not 
                                                 
   175  
-­‐225.    
   176  Greco   takes   because   of   why   S   has   the   true   belief.   There   is   an  
important  causal  connection  that  Greco  wants  to  make  between  the  true  belief  that  is  gained  and  the  ability  it  
understand   because   of   in   this   context.   Should   it   be   in   understood   in   the   strong   sense   or   weak   sense?   In  
footnote  5  of  this  chapter,  I  pointed  out  that  because  of  reflects  that  idea  that  the  agent  be  primarily  creditable.  
While   this   is   the   idea   that  we  are  working  with  at   the  moment,   I  will  offer  a  different  understanding  of   this  
concept   below.   I   suggest   that   the   notion   of   primary   credit   is   useful,   but   overly   restrictive.   If   a   true   belief   is  
gained  because  of  the  ability  of  the  agent,  then,  as  I  will  argue,  in  some  close  possible  world  where  the  goal  is  
not   attained,   the  agent  must  be   responsible   for  nearby   failures.   This,   I   think,   is   how  one   should  understand  
primary  credit.    
   177  See  Greco,  Achieving  Knowledge,  71-­‐75.  
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that case that Nogot owns a Ford. Yet, some in the office, Havit, does in fact 
someone in her office owns a Ford is therefore true. 178 
 
Sheep Case: S sees what he takes to be a sheep in the field. S knows that the field he is looking at is owned 
by Jones who commonly lets his sheep graze in the field. S therefore forms the belief that there is a sheep in 
the field. On this occasion, though, what S is looking at is in fact a sheep dog that looks a lot like an actual 
sheep. Unbeknownst to S, however, there is a sheep in the field that is hiding behind 
that there is a sheep in the field is true. 179 
   
 
Gettier cases. In each case, the agent in question fails to acquire the true belief as direct result of 
her agency. As Riggs puts it, the true belief that is present is not attributable to the agent in 
question. 180 In both cases, the agent comes to the true belief in a way that fails to be creditable to 
belief, but not because of his cognitive abilities. His normally reliable faculties led him to believe 
that there was a sheep in the field while he was in fact looking at a dog. So the epistemic goal in 
question was achieved (e.g., he gained a true belief about the sheep in the field), but not as a 
result of his cognitive abilities. It was simply a matter of luck. The same goes for the first case. 
There is no connection between the true belief that was achieved and the cognitive abilities of the 
agent.    
 For the robust virtue epistemologist, then, the benefit of such an account is obvious. The 
account seems to explain a whole host of important Gettier problems and it provides an answer 
to the intuition that knowledge is of distinctive value. However, there are important challenges to 
(RVE) and the (KA) thesis on which it depends. Many of these objections come in the form of a 
rejection of (2).181 With this in mind, we will discuss the important challenges related to (2).  
 Two things to note about the KA thesis. First, recall that the KA thesis is supposed to 
solve the value problem. Specifically, it is supposed to answer the tertiary problem that 
knowledge has distinctive value over and above anything that falls short of knowledge. In order 
for this to be the case, knowledge must always be a cognitive achievement and cognitive 
achievements must always amount to knowledge. On the RVE account, a cognitive achievement 
                                                 
   178   Analysis  25  (1965):  168-­‐175  
   179  Roderick  Chisholm,  Theory  of  Knowledge  2nd  ed.  (Englewood  Cliffs,  New  Jersey:  Prentice  Hall,  1977),  
105.    
   180     knowledge  that  properly  addressed  the  issue  of  luck.  
  
   181      -­‐
73.  This  will  be  discussed  in  the  section  on  weak  achievements.  
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is both a necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge. This being the case, we ought to 
understand the KA thesis in the strong sense (that it is both necessary and sufficient for 
knowledge) and not the weak sense (that it is merely a necessary condition). Thus, in order for 
the KA thesis to accomplish what it hopes, it needs to address problematic cases of knowledge 
without achievement and cases where there is an apparent achievement without knowledge.  
 Given this, I first will discuss whether there are cases that involve a cognitive 
achievement without knowledge;; and second, discuss whether there are cases of knowledge that 
he 
(KA) thesis would need to be either revised considerably or abandoned all together if it is to 
answer the tertiary value problem.182  
  
 4.5  Achievements without Knowledge  
 
Despite the obvious appeal of (RVE), however, there do seem to be cases where there are 
problem for a holistic understanding of the KA thesis. Consider the following case offered by 
Pritchard: 
 
Archie: Archie is a skilled archer who, under normal conditions, successfully hits the target at which he 
aims. The goal in question is successful because of the ability of Archie. This counts as a genuine 
get and 
successfully hits the target because of his skill. Yet, while Archie is successful because of his ability, he is 
unaware that there are force fields around all the other targets. This means, then, had he selected any other 
target he would have failed in his goal. 
 
There are several things going on this example. First, we have two different cases. One where 
Archie successfully achieves the goal in question because of his ability. On the second account, 
Archie successfully achieves the goal in question because of his ability despite the fact the he 
could have easily failed. The problem, then, is with the second case. Archie is successful because 
of his ability and it seems that the success in question is primarily creditable to his agency. 
Pritchard lays out the problem with such an account of achievements clearly:  
 
                                                 
   182  
the  RVE  maintains  that  their  account  can  
answer   the   value   problem   (which,   as   we   saw   in   the   previous   chapter,   involves   accounting   for   the   value   of  
knowledge  over  and  above  anything  that  falls  short).  If  this  is  the  case,  it  will,  as  stated  above,  need  to  address  
issues  surrounding  those  cases  where  there  is  an  achievement  that  does  not  amount  to  knowledge.    
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The problem that cases like this pose for the robust virtue epistemologist is that if 
success to count as an achievement, then we seem to be compelled to treat cognitive successes which are 
relevantly analogous as also being achievements. Given the KA thesis, however, this would mean that we 
would thereby be compelled to regard the cognitive achievement in question as knowledge, even despite the 
luck involved. 183 
 
 In order to see why this is problematic, consider the following well-  
   
Barney: Barney, unknowingly, is driving through barn façade county. In barn façade county all the barns 
are made to look like actual barns. Barney, however, happens to see the barn in barn façade county that is 
an actual barn. Thus, Barney forms the true belief that he has seen a genuine barn.  
 
Archie is successful because of his ability. However, he could have easily failed as well (and his 
success was, in part, due to luck). In the Barney case, Barney is successful because of his 
cognitive ability. However, he could have easily failed as well (and his success was, in part, due to 
luck).184 
there are cases of cognitive achievement that do not amount to knowledge.  
 How, then, should the robust virtue epistemologist respond to this claim? There are 
several interesting responses that might be made. First, you might claim that the Barney case is a 
genuine cognitive achievement and an instance of knowledge. Second, you might claim that there 
achievement. There is a third option however. You might claim that neither the Archie case nor 
the Barney case represent genuine achievements.  
 
nowledge undermining luck in this case 
does have some support. Perhaps those motivated by such a response are inspired by the 
following example:  
 
Fanny: Fanny is an avid football fan. Every morning, she looks up the results of all the football games 
from the previous day on the internet. This particular morning, however, the computer in her office is 
broken. She leaves her office and wanders down the hall in hopes of finding a functional computer. As she 
results from the previous  matches. 
Unbeknownst to Fanny, though, her colleague has a list where all the scores except one are incorrect. Fanny 
                                                 
   183     
   184  Note  that  I  am  taking  it  as  a  given  that  Barney  does  not  have  knowledge  of  the  barn  that  is  in  front  
of  him  due  to  the  element  of  luck  that  is  involved.  I  will  discuss  this  more  below.  
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only hears her colleague read off one result she was desperate to know. And as it 
turns out, it was the one correct result on the list. Content by this, Fanny wanders back to her office. 
 
 
 The intuition here, I think, is that Fanny does know in this case. And yet, this seems to be 
analogous to the Barney case which most, rightly I think, reject as an instance of knowledge. 
Perhaps what is going on in cases like this is that there are several possible different instances of 
knowledge. In the Barney case, however, there is only one possible instance of knowledge
whether Barney sees a red barn. Yet, in the Fanny case, there is possible knowledge of the result 
of game a, game b, game c, etc. And Fanny wants to know the result of game b, which turns out 
result of game b in the same way that Barney could have easily been wrong about the red barn.  
 From this, it seems to follow that had Fan results from 
the same game, then even if she had heard the correct result 
knowledge. For example, imagine the score in question is a match between Greece and England. 
Fanny really wants to know the result 
a sheet with 10 different results of the same Greece/England match and Fanny walks by and 
happens to hear the correct one, then this  count as an instance of knowledge. In short, 
Greece/England match. This scenario, then, seems more analogous to Barney case. 
 However, if different results from 10 different matches, 
and the scenario unfolds as initially described above, it seems that Fanny does know in this case 
bout the Greece/England score. The colleague in 
question is a reliable source about the Greece/England match. Thus, this counts as an instance of 
knowledge. Though, as mentioned above, this case is not analogous to the Barney case.   
 The second response i 185 Greco 
argues that there is a disanalogy between the Barney case and the Archie case offered by 
Pritchard. There are two steps in this argument. First, abilities need to be understood relative to 
the environment. Greco offers an example of Yankees shortstop Derek Jeter to illustrate this 
point. In claiming that Jeter has the ability to hit a baseball, we are merely saying that he has the 
ability to hit the baseball in conditions that are normal for baseball. So, for example, Jeter 
presumably lacks the ability to hit a baseball on the moon. However, if Jeter were able to hit a 
                                                 
   185     
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baseball on the moon it would not be because of his ability. And given that our definition of 
achievement is success because of abi
achievement (given that his success is not because of his ability).   
 
achievement either. If Barney finds himself in 
have the ability to differentiate between an actual barn and a barn façade, even if he gets it right 
achievement).  
 Even if the above reasoning is correct, we still have the problem of the Archie case. The 
 discriminate between those 
in question ought to be able to discriminate between cases of p and not-p. In the Barney case, 
Barney does not have the relevant cognitive ability and thus believing the truth is not a success 
from ability.186 
 
going in the Barney and Archie case. After all, even if there is a disanalogy between the Archie 
case and Barney case, there is still an element of luck that is involved in the Archie case. We seem 
to have a lucky achievement. Thus, we need some kind of condition whereby the lucky 
achievements do not count as genuine achievements. This brings us to the third option which 
claims that that neither the Archie case nor the Barney case represent genuine achievements.    
  
4.6  Rethinking the Notion of Primary Credit   
 
Recall that we defined achievements in the following way:  
 
 (A3) Achievements are successes from ability that are primarily creditable to          




                                                 
   186  Ibid.,  229-­‐230.  
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 (A4) Achievements are successes because of abilities that are primarily              
         creditable to the agent.187 
  
Let (A4) represent achievement(pc) where (pc) stand for primary credit. Now the problem with 
(A4) is that it generates strange results (such as in the Barney and Archie case) with regard to 
knowledge. The Archie and Barney case seem to be analogous, yet when it comes to the Barney 
case we are faced with a genuine achievement(pc) 
offers an interesting response, it does seem problematic to reject the intuition that the Barney and 
Archie cases are not analogous.  They are both cases where the agent involved uses his ability to 
successfully realize his goal. Thus, they both seem to represent examples of genuine 
achievements(pc).  
 In order to give an appropriate response to the challenge that the Barney case represents 
an achievements(pc) that does not amount to knowledge, I think we need we need to examine 
what exactly (A4) is trying to say with regard to achievements. Part of the problem, I think, is that 
creditable. In seeking to better understand the relationship between achievements and primary 
credit, we need a better understanding of what it means for a success to be primarily credible to 
the agent. Once we have a working definition of primary credit, we can then examine the 
ramifications it might have on the cases outlined above.  
 Given the ambiguity of achievement(pc), what exactly does it mean for a success to be 
primarily credible to an agent? What are the conditions that need to be met in order for an agent 
to receive primary credit? There are at least two conditions that need to be met in order for the 
success in question to be primarily creditable. First, a success is primarily creditable to an agent 
when the success in question comes about, and to a significant degree, because of the relevant 
ability of the agent. Second, and more controversially, success is primarily creditable to an agent if 
the agent is responsible for nearby failures. I take it that the second condition follows naturally 
from the first. And further, if the second condition is met, the first will also be met. Why is this 
exactly? In cases where the agent is responsible for nearby failures, it seems that in turn the agent 
can be credited with success in the actual world. Being credited with real world (primarily 
creditable) success comes as a result of being responsible for nearby failures. Thus, in 
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previously   Anti-­‐Luck   Virtue   Epistemology,   The   Journal   of  
is  being  presented  thus  far,  I  take  it  that  Pritchard  is  using  these  phrases  interchangeably.    
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determining whether an agent is primarily creditable for the success in question, one only needs 
to determine if the agent would be responsible for nearby failures. If the agent is responsible for 
nearby failures, we have a genuine achievement(pc). Consider an expert architect who designs a 
building largely considered by most experts to be a modern marvel. The expert architect designs 
this particular building in an area where high winds are common. This fact, however, is of little 
concern to the architect because his design allows for such winds to be present without affecting 
the structure of the building. As things stand, it is clear that that this architectural feat is a genuine 
achievement. The expert architect is successful because of his abilities and the success in question 
is primarily creditable to him as an agent. However, in some nearby possible world where the 
building collapses due to high winds, it is clear where the responsibility lies. The responsibility of 
the collapsed building rests solely on the shoulders of the architect. 188    




Archer: Archie is a skilled archer who, under normal conditions, successfully hits target at which he aims. 
Archie always takes things like wind and distance into account before taking aim. Archie takes aim and 
successfully hits his target. The goal in question is successful because of the ability of Archie. This counts as 
a genuine achievement. 
 
The question, then, is whether the above case counts as a genuine achievement where the success 
in question is primarily creditable to the agent. In order to determine this, we need to see if the 
above case meets the second condition of primary credit, which states that the agent must be 
responsible for nearby failures. Consider the following case, where Archie, in some close possible 
world, fails to hit the target:  
 
Archer*: Archie is a skilled archer who, under normal conditions, successfully hits the target at which he 
aims. Archie always takes things like wind and distance into account before taking aim. Archie takes aim, 
but misses his target. As Archie fails to hit the target, it is not a genuine achievement. 
 
In the second Archie case, he alone is responsible for his failure. Archie does have the relevant 
ability for his environment and usually hits the target with ease. In this instance however, he 
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the  success  in  question  will  also  be  responsible  when  there  is  a  failure  to  succeed.  Of  course  we  can  imagine  a  
scenario  where   the   responsibly  of   the  collapsed  building   is  not  because  of   the  architectural  design   (e.g.,   the  
building  crew  did  not  follow  the  design  plans  correctly,  the  materials  used  were  compromised,  etc.).  But  this  
does  little  to  undermine  the  thesis  that  when  a  success  is  primarily  creditable,  it  ought  to  entail  the  notion  of  
responsibility  for  failure.  Keeping  in  mind  of  course  that  in  this  example  what  is  being  implied  is  that  the  design  
itself  is  somehow  faulty  and  not  some  external  factor  unrelated  to  the  control  of  the  architect.    
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failed to exercise the relevant ability. Perhaps it was a lack of concentration or a lapse in judgment 
about the actual distance. Whatever the cause may be, Archie has the ability in a favorable 
environment, but still fails.  
 The question to be answered, however, is how such a condition will hold up against the 
problematic cases to see how they measure up to the claim that a genuine achievement(pc) ought 
field case:  
 
Archie:  Archie is a skilled archer who, under normal conditions, successfully hits the target at which he 
aims. The goal in question is successful because of the ability of Archie. This counts as a genuine 
successfully hits the target because of his skill. Yet, while Archie is successful because of his ability, he is 
unaware that there are force fields around all the other targets. This means, then, had he selected any other 
target he would have failed in his goal.     
 
As noted above, the problem with accepting this as a genuine achievement is that we are then 
compelled to accept analogous cases of cognitive successes as genuine achievements despite the 
obvious lack of knowledge (see Barney case above). However,  force field case only 
meets one of the conditions with regard to the success being primarily creditable (and thus a 
abilities. However, it is clear that Archie would not be responsible for nearby failures had he 
failed to hit the target. If Archie had taken aim at another target, and missed because of the force 
possess the relevant 
abilities to distinguish between a target with no force field and a target with a force field. Thus, if 
-world success 
(pc).  Archie case, then, is not an 
example of a genuine achievement(pc).189   
 If the Archie case is indeed analogous to the Barney case, then the same principle ought 
to apply:  
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f
notion  of  primary  credit.  This  would  of  course  challenge  the  idea  that  primary  credit   is  a  necessary  condition  
for  a  genuine  achievement.    
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Barney: Barney, unknowingly, is driving through barn façade county. In barn façade county all the barns 
are made to look like actual barns. Barney, however, happens to see the one barn in barn façade county that 
is an actual barn. Thus, Barney forms the true belief that he has seen a genuine barn. 
 
relevant abilities. In the Barney case, however, we have a cognitive success that ought to result in 
knowledge. Yet, as discussed above, it is agreed that the Barney case is not a case of knowledge. 
Thus, it would seem that we have an example of a genuine achievement(pc) without knowledge. 
in barn façade county.  Here is modified account Barney case where he fails is a nearby world:  
 
Barney*: Barney, unknowingly, is driving through barn façade county. In barn façade county all the barns 
are made to look like actual barns. Upon entering Barn façade county, Barney observes a fake barn and 
concludes that he has seen an actual barn. Thus, Barney forms the false belief that he has seen a genuine 
barn. 
 
beliefs. (I am assuming here of course that Barney is like any other good epistemic agent and 
possess the relevant abilities to distinguish between a 
lures, 
-
achievement(pc). The Barney case, then, is not an example of a genuine achievement(pc). 
For sake of clarity, we can define achievement(pc) in the following way: 
Achievement(pc): Achievements are primarily creditable to the agent in question when the success in 
question comes about, and to a significant degree, because of the abilities of the agent. Further, a success is 
primarily creditable to an agent iff the agent is responsible for nearby failures. 
 
Now there are at least two problems with understanding the nature of achievements in the 
manner described above. First, it could be argued that this definition is overly restrictive. If we 
understand achievements as achievement(pc), then there might be very few successes from abilities 
that we would consider as genuine achievements. This is an important objection given that we are 
hoping to describe knowledge as a cognitive achievement. This being the case, if the definition of 
achievements is overly restrictive then knowledge will be unreasonably difficult to attain.    
 A second objection to achievement(pc) is that the relationship between primary credit and 
responsibility for nearby failures is ambiguous. After all, one might easily argue that one s ability 
directly relevant to the fact that one is responsible for 
nearby failures. In other words, the ability to hit a target with an arrow is an action that 
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ility;; responsibility for failing to hit the target is a wholly separate issue.190 
However, I take it that this objection fails to recognize an important part of the definition of 
achievement(pc) namely that the achievement be primarily creditable. With this in mind, the 
objection fails given that primary credit entails responsibility for nearby failures. And in the cases 
Thus, if one is to object to this definition of achievements, the objection needs to come in the 
form of rejecting primary credit and not what it might entail.  
 Yet the question that remains, however, is what exactly is going on in the Archie case 
with respect to his abilities. Perhaps we migh (pc),  
possible to be credited with a genuine achievement without conceding that Barney and Archie 
represent cases of achievement(pc)? Here is a case that might get us closer to a better 
understanding of achievements: 
 
Jean: Jean is a world famous tightrope walker. Jean has famously crossed many well-known landmarks and 
is widely regarded for his abilities and skills in tightrope walking. On this particular occasion, Jean attempts 
to cross the Niagara Gorge between the New York and Canada. With much fanfare, he successfully crosses 
the Niagara Gorge. However, unbeknownst to Jean (and those who admire him), there was an evil demon 
who very much wanted Jean to fall into Niagara guardian angel was determined to thwart 
the evil demons efforts and battles the evil demon throughout the crossing.  Thankfully, as it turns out, 
because of this, Jean is able to successfully cross the gorge.    
 
The firs partially 
the result of his abilities as a tightrope walker. However, it is not fully a result of his abilities as a 
tightrope walked. We can safely assume that the success in question is at least partially a result of 
his abilities as a tightrope walker because had there been no evil demon or guardian angels 
present, Jean would have successfully crossed the Niagara Gorge. 191  However, according to 
achievement(pc) this would not 
                                                 
   190  I  take  it  that  argument  is  related  to  the  one  that  Pritchard  is  making  with  respect  to  the  Barney  and  
Archie   cases.   Regardless  of  what  else   is   going  on   in   the   analogies,   the   success   in  question   is   a   result   of   the  
   because   of   his   cognitive   abilities   and  Archie   hits   the   target  
because  of  abilities  as  an  archer.  Greco,  on  the  other  hand,  wants  to  argue  that  there  is  something  about  the  
environment,  and  the  relationship  between  the  abilities  relevant   to  that  environment,   that  make  the  Barney  
case  problematic  in  identifying  it  as  a  genuine  cognitive  achievement.    
   191  
successfully  have  the  ability  to  complete  the  objective  on  their  own.  In  this  particular  case,  however,  it  helps  in  
highlighting   the   ability   of   Jean   regardless   of   the   external   factors.   As   I   will   argue   below,   cases   of   testimony  
represent   a   joint   achievement  where   the   primary   agent   involved   cannot   complete   his   task   on   his   own.   The  
efforts  and  abilities  of  someone  else  are  clearly  necessary  in  cases  of  testimony.        
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ability to walk across the Niagara Gorge  include the ability to ward off (invisible) evil 
demons. Despite this, however, I think we can safely say that this is a genuine achievement. 
However, this is not an achievement that is primarily creditable 
have an achievement(pc).   
 achievement(pc),  we do have an achievement that is 
partially or jointly creditable to both Jean and the guardian angel. In this particular case, without the 
note here is that while Jean has the relevant abilities to cross the gorge without assistance from 
his guardian angel, the conditions of the environment deman
or intervene in such a way that had the guardian angel not interfered, Jean would have otherwise 
been unsuccessful.192  
 
Achievements(jc): Achievements are jointly creditable when two or more agents are involved with the 
success in question and the success in question comes about because of the abilities of the agents involved. 
Achievements(jc) are distinct from Achievements(pc) in that a single agent is not primarily creditable for 
the success in question.         
 
Achievements(jc) explains a number of problematic cases that were previously discussed. The 
Emie case described above is a prime example of an agent that needed some sort of help or 
s excessively 
hostile for her abilities. Yet, she was still able to complete her goal with the help of her 
explained, rightly I think, through achievements(jc). Further, the football case discussed by Greco 
and Pritchard points to another possible example of achievements(jc).193   
 Despite this explanation, however, there are still several question that must be asked 
before we can begin to discuss the nature of cognitive achievements with respect to knowledge 
of God.  First, how exactly does an understanding of achievements(jc) help us with respect to the 
                                                 
   192   God,  Mind,  and  Knowledge,  
however,  is  overly  ambiguous.    
   193  Though  I  think  it  is  possible  to  explain  the  football  case  in  terms  of  a  joint  achievement,  I  take  it  to  
be  more   likely   that   the   football   case   is   an   example   of   several   different   achievements.      As   I   describe   above,  
there  is  the  achievement  that  involves  crossing  the  ball  and  the  there  is  the  achievement  that  involved  scoring  
the  goal.    
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problematic Archie and Barney cases highlighted above? Second, with respect to knowledge, does 
this explanation of achievements get us any closer to understanding the relationship between 
knowledge and credit in cases where testimony is involved? And last, in what specific ways can an 
agent demonstrate that the cognitive success in question is the result of their ability? 
 I will discuss the second concern first as it will hopefully shed light on the Barney and 
Archie cases. Further, I will deal with the third concern last and discuss the nature of strong 
achievements and how overcoming obstacles is one way in which it might be demonstrates that 
 
 
4.7  Achievement(jc) and Testimonial Knowledge  
 
  A possible benefit of the achievements(jc) thesis is that it explains what is going on in 
cases that involve testimony. Testimonial knowledge and attributable credit has been problematic 
for those who endorse the achievement thesis about knowledge.194 Here is a common example, 
first put forth by Lackey:195 
  
Chicago Visitor: Having just arrived at the train station in Chicago, Morris wishes to obtain directions 
to his desired destination. The passer-by, who happens to be a Chicago resident who knows the city 
extraordinarily well, provides Morris with impeccable directions to the Sears Tower by telling him that it is 
located two blocks east of the train station. Morris unhesitatingly forms the corresponding true belief. 
 
To be clear, it needs to be determined whether the above case of testimonial knowledge 
represents a genuine achievement. Keeping in mind, of course, that I have broadened the notion 
of a genuine achievement to include achievements(jc) and achievements(pc).  However, there may 
be another option available to us. We might readily claim t knowledge in 
                                                 
   194   -­‐
361   (2007).   Also   by   L Philosophical   Studies   142:27-­‐42   (2009).   Pritchard  
address  this  problem  at  length  in  The  Nature  and  Value  of  Knowledge,  40-­‐
y  that  most  virtue  epistemologist   (who  hold  to  the  
If  S  knows  that  p,  then  S  deserves  
credit   for   truly   believing   that   p   whether   S   deserves  
mean   that   S   deserves   some   kind   of   praise   for   a   job   well   done.   What   is   the   issue,   however,   is   whether  
testimonial   knowledge   is   the   result   of   the   agents   cognitive   abilities.   Despite   missing   this   important   point,  
  
   195   Why  We     
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testimonial knowledge. Why on earth would we say that Morris knows where the tower is when 
he picked a stranger at random, and unhesitatingly (and, one assumes, unreflectively) accepted 
what that person said? On the face of it, this is a terrible epistemic practice. Intuitively, more is 
required on the part of the hearer than simply opening his brain and putting into it whatever 
196 I take it here that Riggs wants Morris to play a more active 
 and putting into it whatever some 
to note that Morris has no good reasons to not ask the first person he sees (perhaps the Chicago 
rist, an evil demon, etc.).  Certainly the example by Lackey implies this 
much. Moreover, surely one can modify the Chicago Visitor case to include a bit more detail 
about why Morris choose the first person he saw. Either way, it seems rather unproblematic to 
 
 
achievement. First, let (pc). Recall that one 
of the requirements for an achievement(pc) is that the agent be responsible for nearby failures. 
While I think there are cases of testimonial knowledge where the agent might be responsible for 
If Morris walks up to what appears 
like a tourist, scam artist, evil demon, etc.), then Morris is within his epistemic boundaries to 
believe that the testifier is a reliable source of information (which it turns out he is). However, 
had the testifier mistakenly told Morris to take a right out of the train station instead of a left 
tow
an otherwise reliable agent giving him slightly wrong directions? If this correct, then the Lackey 
t(pc).  
 The other option that is available, however, is that cases of testimony are not    
achievements(pc), but rather achievements(jc). 
seemingly agrees that such a proposal is reasonable, but adds that achievements(jc) are still 
susceptible to Gettier-type cases.197 I take it, however, that this is separate question and one that 
                                                 
   196     
   197     
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can be dealt with only after one determines whether the more typical cases of testimony (i.e., 
Gettier free cases of testimony) represent a genuine achievements(jc). Greco, 198  Riggs, 199  and 
Sosa200 have all claimed, in one form or another, that cases of testimony represent a joint effort 
amongst individuals. As Riggs puts it,  
all the credit? Why not just say that both parties involved get 
completely on the basis of his own powers and abilities alone. And yet, even in many of those cases, we 
unhesita  201    
  
While achievements(pc) are perhaps more common than Riggs seems to indicate, the point put 
forth by him and others is simply this: collaboration with others toward a common goal is a 
creditable success so long as the success in question demonstrates sufficient ability for a genuine 
achievements(jc) by meeting these requirements. Morris approaches someone who appears to be a 
Chicago native (after all, he has no reason to think otherwise) and asks the location of a 
prominent landmark in Chicago, the Sears Tower. At this moment, the testifier, as any good 
epistemic agent, becomes jointly involv to know the location of the Sears 
way that the guardian angel, in the tightrope case, is an active agent heavily involved in making 
sure 
location of the Sears Tower. The testifier gives good directions and the hearer, Morris, reliably 
location of the Sears tower without the help of a reliable testifier in the same way that the Jean 
 location of the Sears tower without being a reliable hearer in the 
                                                 
   198     
   199  Riggs,     
   200  Sosa,  A  Virtue  Epistemology:  Apt  Belief  and  Reflective  Knowledge  (Vol.  1),    93-­‐95  
   201  Riggs,  
asks  us  to  consider  a  drowning  child.  In  the  example,  the  agent  that  saves  the  drowning  child  notices  that  the  
current  will  bring  the  child  right  to  where  he  is  standing.  The  agent  then  rescues  the  child  by  pulling  the  child  
from   the   water   once   the   current   brings   the   child   close   enough   to   be   rescued.   Riggs   claims   that   this   is   an  
achievement.  This  example,   I  think,   is  a  poor  one.   I  take  it  that  this   is  a  genuine  achievement(pc)  and  not  an  
achievement(ic)  as  Riggs  claims.  The  child  was  saved  as  result  or  because  of  the  rescuers  abilities.  There  is  no  
other   agent   involved   in   the   case   to   share   the   credit.   The   river   has   no   abilities   that   are   attributable.   The  
tightrope  case,  however,  does  represent  an  achievement(jc).  There  are  two  agents  involved  who  both  have  the  
same  end  in  mind that  Jean  successfully  crosses  the  Niagara  Gorge.        
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walker. Given this, knowledge via testimony represents genuine achievement that is jointly 
creditable to the parties involved.  
 
 4.8  Luck, Achievements, and Knowledge 
 
creditable in any significant way to the agent involved. In other words, knowledge isn
cognitive achievement. However, it is argued that while testimony many not represent an 
achievement that is primarily creditable, it does represent a joint achievement. Lackey is willing to 
concede that there are instances of testimonial knowledge where the credit might be shared.202 So 
Lackey claims, because the joint credit view (as I am calling it) makes credit for achievement too 
weak and opens the door to Gettier-type cases. Lackey puts it this way:  
 
As should be clear, either horn of this dilemma undermines the Credit View of Knowledge at its core. For, 
on the first horn, credit may be adequately blocked in Gettier-type cases, but only at the expense of also 
blocking credit in countless cases where testimonial knowledge is intuitively present despite minimal work 
being done on the part of the hearer. And, on the second horn, credit is secured in cases of testimonial 
knowledge where such minimal work is done by the recipient, but only at the expense of also securing 
credit in Gettier-type cases. Either way, the Credit View not only fails to shed light on what is absent in 
Gettier-type cases, but it also fails to explain the additional value that knowledge has over merely 
accidentally true belief.203    
  
What Lackey is claiming, then, is that if we allow cases of testimonial knowledge to be creditable 
notion of credit is far too weak and we must therefore attribute credit in Gettier-type cases as 
well. I take it that this observation is generally right and does indeed pose a problem for the 
robust virtue epistemologist. After all, one could easily set up a Gettier case that involves credit 
for testimonial knowledge. Thus, if there are Gettier-type cases of testimony where credit is 
attributable, then the cases highlighted earlier, the Barney and Archie cases, might also represent 
genuine achievements.204 Let
thesis, so far anyway, can handle at least some of the Gettier cases.205 However, there seem to be 
                                                 
   202     
   203  Ibid.      
   204  Recall   that   it   was   claimed   earlier   that   the   Barney   and   Archie   cases   do   not   represent   an  
achievement(pc)  given  the  agents  lack  of  responsibility  for  nearby  failures.    
   205     
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certain Gettier- ement 
thesis.206 Consider this modified testimony case.  
 
Chicago Visitor*: Having just arrived at the train station in Chicago, Morris wishes to obtain directions to 
the Sears Tower. Unbeknownst to Morris, however, the mayor has asked all Chicago natives to mislead all 
visitors who ask the location of the Sears Tower. If they ask, the Chicago natives are told to give the visitors 
the wrong directions. Except for Smith, all the Chicago natives at the train station that day plan to comply 
nds.  Morris arrives, looks around, and approaches Smith who happens to be the 
-by, who happens to be a Chicago native who knows the city 
extraordinarily well, provides Morris with impeccable directions to the Sears Tower by telling him that it is 
located two blocks east of the train station. Morris unhesitatingly forms the corresponding true belief. 
 
Two things to note about this modified Lackey testimony case. First, it is nearly identical to 
easily been wrong. Second, 
this case is analogous to the Barney case. Concerning the first note, I think we can easily assume 
knowledge in the Barney case). However, Morris has exactly the same role in this modified case 
that he has in the original case: He steps off the train, approaches the first person he sees (the 
person he sees appears to be a Chicago native and he has no reason to think that the testifier is a 
tourist or an evil demon), and gets impeccable directions. There seems to be no reason in this 
instance to assume that Morris cannot be credited with a genuine achievement in the modified 
testimony case (especially given that we credit Morris with a genuine achievement in the original 
case). Furthermore, and concerning the second note, this case is analogous to the Barney case. 
We have a genuine achievement without knowledge.207  
 Where, then, does this leave us with respect to achievements and knowledge? Recall that 
so far we have identified two types of achievements: achievements(jc) and achievements(pc). Both 
                                                                                                                                                        
        
Sheep  Case:   S   sees  what  he   takes   to  be  a   sheep   in   the   field.   S   knows   that   the   field  he   is   looking  at   is  owned  by   Jones  who  
commonly   lets  his   sheep  graze   in   the   field.      S   therefore   forms   the  belief   that   there   is  a   sheep   in   the   field.  On   this  occasion,  
though,  what  S  is  looking  at  is  in  fact  a  sheep  dog  that  looks  a  lot  like  an  actual  sheep.  Unbeknownst  to  S,  however,  there  is  a  
sheep  in  the  field  that  is  hiding  behind  a  rock.   there  is  a  sheep  in  the  field  is  true.  
  
It  is  these  types  of  Gettier  cases  that  I  take  to  be  easily  dealt  with  by  the  achievement  thesis.  However,  as  we  
will  see,  there  are  other  Getttier  cases  that  are  not  so  straightforward.    
   206See   Sosa,  A   Virtue   Epistemology,   94-­‐97   (see   especially,   fn.   1,   p.   96)   and   Pritchard,  
Quasi-­‐Reductionism  in     Philosophica  78  (2008),  15-­‐
very  helpful  here.  There  are  two  kinds  of  luck  in  the  Gettier  cases:  intervening  and  environmental.  As  we  will  
see,  the  cases  that  the  virtue  epistemologist  ought  to  be  concerned  about  are  the  cases  of  environmental  luck.      
   207  Keep  in  mind  that  we  have  identified  the  KA  thesis  with  the  RVE  attempt  to  account  for  the  value  of  
knowledge.  Thus,   if   they  are   to  adequately  deal  with  the  value  problem  they  must  answer  the  tertiary  value  
problem.      
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of these types of achievements are compatible with the KA thesis. However, we have now 
identified another type of achievement one that is not a kind or type of knowledge as the 
claimed above that the Barney case did not represent a genuine achievements(pc) given that 
Barney did not meet the necessary requiremen
However, what the testimony cases have illustrated is that in weakening our understanding of 
achievements, we must also concede credit in some Gettier cases. The Barney case represents 
such a case.  
 Put another way, what these Gettier cases have shown is that there are certain 
environmental factors that undermine the notion that achievements are only those successes from 
ability that are either primarily or jointly creditable to the agent. Three such cases are the modified 
to, then, is that while luck a genuine achievement, it does undermine the 
notion of primary credit. 208  While the other two types of achievement are compatible with 
knowledge, it appears we now have a third kind of achievement that is incompatible with 
knowledge
(achievement(pcul)).209  How exactly is primary credit undermined by luck? In the Barney case, the 
explains his cognitive 
knowl
epistemologists would agree he lacks), but the combination of the success in question being a 
result of his creditable cognitive faculties and environmental luck.210 
 We now have three types of achievements: achievements(jc), achievements(pc), and 
achievements(pcul). Only the first two are sufficient for the robust virtue account of knowledge 
(i.e., knowledge is a kind or type of success from ability), yet all three types of achievements are 
sufficient for a cognitive success (i.e., the cognitive success being truth gained via the cognitive 
abilities of the agent). Given this, we are now compelled to give a weaker account of the analysis 
                                                 
   208  
that  the  Barney  case  (and  those  similar)  is  an  achievement  but  not  one  that  is  primarily  creditable.        
   209  
Barney   case   is   whether   the   agent   is   primarily   creditable.   Thus,   this   third   type   of   achievement   that   is  
incompatible  with  knowledge  could  just  as  well  be  an  achievement  where  the  joint  credit  is  undermined  by  luck.    
   210  
sufficient  credit  for  knowledge  (even  though  in  this  case  he  lacks  knowledge).      
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of knowledge one where a cognitive achievement is not sufficient for knowledge, but merely 
necessary. The strong version of the KA thesis fails to account for the value of knowledge. 
Knowledge, in every instance, does not have distinctive value over that which falls short of 
knowledge.211 A weaker suggestion must be offered: Knowledge, in most cases, is more valuable than that 
which falls short of knowledge.    
 This, however, does not undermine the thesis that knowledge is of final value. After all, if 
this account is correct, knowledge is always a cognitive achievement. One can happily concede 
that knowledge is always a cognitive achievement without endorsing, as the robust virtue 
epistemologist does, that cognitive achievements are sufficient for knowledge. This is because the 
KA thesis is  
 
(1) Achievements are finally valuable.   




 (3)  Knowledge is finally valuable 
 
the KA thesis is to be understood 
in the weak sense given its inability to deal with the value problem. 
                                                 
   211  This  weaker  account  is  similar  to  the  one  offered  by  Pritchard.    See  Pritachrd,   'Cognitive  Ability  and  
the  Extended  Cognition  Thesis',  Synthese  175  (2010),  133-­‐51.  COGAweak,  according  
-­‐forming   process   which   is   appropriately  
h
-­‐forming  process  which  is  appropriately  integrated  
er   such   that  her   cognitive   success   is   primarily   creditable   to  her   cognitive   agency.  
Pritchard  goes  on  to  highlight  the  difference  between    COGAweak  and  COGAstrong  in  the  following  way:    
     
e  extent  to  which  the  cognitive  success  is  creditable  to    
s  being    the  test  by    which  one  determines  whether  it  should    count  as  the  product  of  
cognitive   ability.  More   generally,   on   both      views   one   can      use   this   test   to      determine   whether   a   reliable   belief-­‐
forming    process  is   r  such  that  it  counts  as  a  bona  fide  
cognitive   ability.   Where   the   two   accounts   differ   is   on   the   extent   to   which   the   cognitive   success   in   question   is  
cy.  Whereas  the  strong  account,  COGAstrong  insists  on  a  very    demanding    
relationship    between    cognitive  success  and  cognitive  agency    on    this  score,  such    that  knowledge  can    be  defined    in    
terms   of   the   satisfaction   of   this   relationship,   the   weaker   account,   COGAweak,   allows   other   factors   to   be  
  
  
On  COGAweak   also  fits  
well  with  my  definition  of  joint  achievements.  An  agent  might  not  be  primarily  creditable  for  an  achievement,  
as   other   factors  might   play   an   important   role   in   the   acquisition   of   knowledge.   This  will   be   important   in   the  
cases  of  testimonial  knowledge  that  I  discuss  below.      
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 Moreover, while there are certain anti-luck conditions that might make this virtue 
epistemic account more appealing for a general analysis of knowledge -Luck 
Virtue Epistemology, for example, is one such account that deals nicely with the Barney and 
Archie cases we can ignore these accounts as we are merely concerned with an analysis of 
religious knowledge and whether knowledge of God is in fact a cognitive achievement.212 And 
always more valuable than that which falls 
which falls short of knowledge.  
 Before moving on to this discussion in the next chapter, I want to briefly discuss a 
lingering question concerning the nature of strong and weak achievements.  
 4.9  Strong vs. Weak Achievements  
  
 , we have taken this question for granted. 
Recall the KA thesis:  
 
(1) Achievements are finally valuable.   




(3) Knowledge is finally valuable. 
 
But what, if anything, makes an achievement finally valuable? We came close to answering this 
question while evaluating the Mt. Everest Case:  
 
Mt. Everest: Edmund and Didier both have a desire to reach the top of Mount Everest. The primary goal, 
then, of both Edmund and Didier is to reach the peak. Edmund, who has been training for some time, 
successfully climbs Mount Everest by starting at the base. Didier, on the other hand, realizes his goal by 
taking a short and painless helicopter ride to the summit.  
 
g. Further, it is also clear 
why we value Edmunds success over the success of Didier. Edmund overcame an extremely 
hostile environment while successfully reaching the summit. The effort and clear ability it takes to 
reach the top of Mount Everest is certainly something we value. Didier, on the other hand, was a 
passenger in a helicopter who did very little to successfully accomplish his goal. Did he overcome 
any obstacles along the way? Not really. In fact, the way the example is set up, he could have 
                                                 




successful goal of reaching the top?  
 Perhaps the issue here is that achievements, when understood in terms of final value, are more 
than just successes because of ability (after all, it was noted earlier that Didier does demonstrate 
some ability). And in order for achievements to be understood as such, it needs to be the case 
that achievements are also the result of overcoming obstacles or the demonstration of significant 
skill.213 
genuine achievement. But there are other examples where agents seemingly demonstrate an 
achievement (according to our definition) that requires little effort or skill on the part of the 
agent:  
 
successful action on my   
part, in that there is something that I am aiming to do and which I do in fact do. Moreover, if 
circumstances really are normal then there ought to be no problem with the idea that this success was 
because of 
arm in these circumstances an achievement? Intuitively, the an
 
 
Here we have a success that seemingly meets our previous requirement for a genuine 
achievement. It is certainly 
arm is hardly the kind of achievement that we value. It takes very little effort or skill, under 
think about 
it. 
 It might turn out that this is a worry that we need not be overly concerned about. As 
Riggs points out:  
 
What we have to do in order to be responsible for some outcome is: enough. There is not some stable 
threshold of effort or determination or skill that must be superseded on my part before it is  reasonable to 
say that I did such-and-such. I simply have to do enough to bring it about. If the world cooperatives by 
making it easy, so much the better It would be silly to require that someone do more than was necessary to 
bring about some end in order for it to be attributable to them that they did so.214 
 
to be considered an achievement is c
could still be an achievement albeit a very weak one that requires very little effort or skill on the 
part of the knower.  However, is this weak understanding of an achievement what we have in 
                                                 
   213     
   214     
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mind when we think of an achievement being finally valuable? As Pritchard points out, this 
we still need an account where the value of achievements is properly understood and accounted 
for.  
 Returning, then, to the points raised by Pritchard, there are two things that need to be 
many cases where the achievements are seemingly easy? Also, are there instances of knowledge 
while some genuine achievements are indeed too weak to be valuable, cognitive achievements 
may not suffer the same fate.  
 Concerning the first question, is it the case that we rule out too many genuine 
achievements with the strong understanding? Keep in mind that there are certain achievements 
that might appear easy, but still require great skill and ought to be considered strong 
achievements. Consider Michael Jordan effortlessly sinking a routine 3-point shot in a basketball 
game. For the average person, this is something exceedingly difficult. But for Michael Jordan, this 
shot is might be rather routine. However, the sinking of a 3-point shot, while not the type of 
obstacle-overcoming achievement that summiting Mt. Everest might represent, still requires great 
skill.  It looks easy to us, and perhaps it is easy for Michael Jordan, but it still requires great skill 
that comes as the result of continual practice.  
 What about knowledge then? Are there equivalent cases of knowledge where the 
 case is perceptual 
knowledge:  
 Suppose that I form that true belief that the wall before me is white by looking at it in entirely normal 
 circumstances. Here we have a cognitive success and the cognitive success is, intuitively, appropriately 
 related to my relevant cognitive abilities in such a way that it is because of cognitive ability. And yet it 
 seems odd to think of such a success as an achievement on my part, given that this is a cognitive 
 success which is neither the result of my overcoming a significant obstacle that that success nor 
 involving the exercise of significant cognitive skill.215   
   
Now there are two conclusions one might draw from the above example. You might think, like 
Pritchard, that perceptual knowledge is problematic as it represents a weak achievement. If this is 
the case, then not only is knowledge only sometimes more valuable than that which falls short of 
always the case that knowledge is of final value. However, I take it that 
                                                 
   215     
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edge. Perceptual knowledge, as it 
turns out, might be a strong achievement after all. One might think, for example, that cases of 
perceptual knowledge are similar to those achievements that appear easy, but require great skill. It 
was noted above that Michael Jordan sinking a 3-point shot is a strong achievement because of 
question appears effortless, and is for someone like him, it is only effortless because he has 
abilities. Our perceptual faculties develop over time. And while it might be the case that sinking a 
3-
perceptual faculties, while effortlessly contributing to our cognitive successes now, required 
development and refining in order to be presently successful.  
 If the above argument is correct, then perceptual knowledge is a strong achievement. 
that needs to be shown is that religious knowledge, specifically knowledge of God, is in fact a 
strong achievement. This being the case, we are now in a position to defend the idea that 
knowledge of God is an achievement because of success from ability (achievement being 
understood in the strong sense). Further, it will be argued that knowledge of God is not only of 
final value because it is cognitive achievement, it is also more valuable than anything that falls 
short of this knowledge.    
 
 














§5 Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement? 
 
 
 5.1  Introduction  
  
 We now turn to the most pressing question: Is knowledge of God a cognitive 
achievement? Put simply, does knowledge of God have anything to do with the cognitive abilities 
of the agent? In answering this question, I hope to show two things. First, that knowledge of 
God is finally valuable;; and second, that knowledge of God is more valuable than anything that 
falls short of this knowledge. If successful, we will effectively answer the tertiary value problem. 
In order to do this, then, I will adopt a similar approach to that endorsed by the robust virtue 
epistemologist (RVE) namely, the achievement thesis. While it is noted in the previous chapter 
that RVE fails to account for the tertiary value problem, it is further claimed that reformed 
epistemology 216  This is because reformed epistemology, on the 
model I am endorsing anyway, effectively deals with the tertiary value problem. Thus, if the 
above holds true, knowledge of God will need to be a strong achievement (in order to 
demonstrate its final value). Further, it will also need to be the kind of cognitive achievement 
where the cognitive success is both necessary and sufficient for knowledge of God (in order to 
fully deal with the tertiary value problem).217   
 I will make three main arguments in this chapter in order to demonstrate that knowledge 
of God is a cognitive achievement. First, I will argue that the proper functioning of the sensus 
divinitatis, whether primarily or partially, is down to the cognitive abilities of the agent who 
believes. Second, I will argue that the cognitive success of having a true belief about God is the 
result of overcoming a hostile environment that is not conducive to belief in God given the 
cognitive consequences of sin. The maxi-environment that we all find ourselves in is hostile to 
the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis. This, I argue, results in the belief being a strong 
achievement. Last, I argue that those cases (e.g., Barney cases) which undermine the successful 
answering of the tertiary value problem are absent on the model of religious knowledge that I am 
                                                 
216  The  kind  of  religious  knowledge  we  are  concerned  with  here  is  knowledge  of  God.  As  discussed  in  
the  chapter  1,  I  am  specifically  concerned  with  the  Christian  God  as  understood  in  orthodox  traditions.        
   217  Keeping  in  mind  of  course  that  the  religious  account  of  knowledge  I  am  working  within  is  reformed  
epistemology.     There  might  be  other  accounts  of   religious  knowledge  where   these  arguments  will  not  apply  
and  the  final  value  of  religious  knowledge  will  not  be  adequately  demonstrated.        
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endorsing.  In the end, I demonstrate that knowledge of God is a cognitive achievement and has 
distinct value over and above anything that falls short of this knowledge.  
 I also deal with two main objections to my model. First, I argue against the idea that my 
model endorses a semi-Pelagian soteriology. I do this by drawing a distinction between warranted 
belief in God and saving faith. Given that this project concerns only the former, I claim that one 
the 
relationship between religious knowledge and children. In the end, I maintain that if children do 
in fact have knowledge of God, my model sufficiently accommodates these types of cognitive 
successes.  
 5.2  The Problem Explained  
  
 Perhaps an easy way around the question of whether knowledge of God is a cognitive 
achievement would be to simply demonstrate the parallels between perceptual knowledge and 
religious knowledge. On the reformed account of religious knowledge, the similarities are 
obvious. Both perceptual knowledge and religious knowledge are the result of my cognitive 
faculties which, when successful, are the result of my cognitive abilities. In each of the cases, the 
cognitive success in question is appropriately related to my cognitive abilities. What explains the 
explained in the last chapter, perceptual knowledge falls under the category of a weak 
achievement.218 Thus, if knowledge of God is a cognitive achievement of the sort that is required, 
it needs to be the kind of achievement, for reasons discussed in the previous chapter, that we 
value. In other words, it needs to be a strong achievement the kind of success where the agent 
demonstrates great skill or the overcoming of some obstacle on the way to believing. So the 
parallels between perceptual knowledge and religious knowledge must come apart if we are to 
insist that religious knowledge is a strong cognitive achievement.    
 Prima facie, this seems very problematic for the specific religious epistemology we are 
endorsing.219 To begin, it seems that the cognitive faculty responsible for belief in God, the sensus 
                                                 
   218  Noting   of   course   that   there   might   be   cases   of   perceptual   knowledge   that   are   in   fact   strong  
achievements,  I  am  referring  to  those  cases  of  perceptual  knowledge  that  are  more  typical  or  ordinary those  
cases  where  there  are  no  epistemic  defeaters  and  thus  no  obstacles  to  overcome.      
   219  Recall   that   reformed   epistemology   makes   the   claim   belief   in   God   is   the   result   of   a   properly  
functioning  faculty.  Further,  unbelief  is  the  result  of  a  malfunctioning  cognitive  faculty.    
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divinitatis, is all too similar to our perceptual faculties. So even if our account of religious 
exactly they differ. After all, like perception, belief in God is supposed to be immediate in the 
same way that our perceptual faculties give us immediate knowledge of the external world. 
Similar to perceptual beliefs, reformed accounts of religious knowledge often claim that the agent 
afflict the strong achievement thesis with regard to perceptual knowledge also afflicts any account 
of religious knowledge. The question for religious knowledge is the same: What kind of obstacle 
are we overcoming on our way to belief in God?  
 Related to the concern above, another immediate worry is that one might also wonder in 
what specific ways an agent is creditable for having knowledge of God. The question here 
concerns the role the agent plays with regard to moving from unbelief to belief in God. Recall 
that, unlike our perceptual faculties, the sensus divinitatis is a malfunctioning faculty that is in need 
of repair if the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis are to give us true belief about God. Those who 
believe in God, then, go from a malfunctioning cognitive faculty to functioning cognitive faculty. 
What, if anything, is the explanation for this? Consider the following example:  
  
Majestic Sunset: Jon and Jane are both skeptical about the existence of God. Neither of them are       
convinced by any of the arguments that are traditionally associated with theism. Further, neither of them 
has ever had any kind of religious experience that many theists claim to have had. As it happens, Jon and 
Jane take a trip to the mountains and both take in a beautiful majestic sunset.  However, 
surprise, skeptic Jon becomes believer Jon while observing the majestic sunset. He comes to believe in God 
on the model provided by Plantinga. It is some experience a majestic sunset for example that triggers 
the sensus divinitatis, which in turn gives rise to the belief that God exists. Jon, lacking direct control over his 
beliefs, simply finds himself believing in God. 220  Skeptic Jane, however, being in the same exact 
environment as Jon, finds herself with no such belief. For Jane, t belief 
that God exists.  
 
What is interesting about this example, I think, is that two people with similar beliefs about God 
enjoy the same sunset. Yet only one comes away a theist, while the other remains a skeptic. Is it 
really plausible to say that Jon has anything to do with the previously malfunctioning cognitive 
control or knowledge of the faculty that gives rise to his belief in God. It just so happens that 
sensus divinitatis
faculty, the sensus divinitatis
                                                 
   220  As   a   non-­‐
Philosophical  Perspectives  2  (1988),  37.      
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which case, Jon  of cognitive achievement we are looking for.221 As 
Zagzebski notes:  
 
Theistic believers whose faculties are working properly are heavily blessed with good luck. Nontheistic 
believers whose nonbelief is due to the fact that their faculties are not working properly are cursed with 
epistemic bad luck. The fact that the presence or absence of warrant is very heavily, if not totally, a matter 
of luck does not, however, alter the fact that warrant is intended on this theory to be a normative 
concept.222   
 
What we need is an account on  
What I will argue, then, is that there is an important story to be told with regard to the proper 
functioning of the sensus divinitatis and the nature of cognitive achievements. The sensus divinitatis is 
like any other faculty in that it malfunctions when not exercised in the appropriate environment. 
Perceptual faculties, for example, malfunction with age and fail to be reliable when not used in 
the environment for which they were designed. Attempting to use your perceptual faculties in the 
ocean, for example, would not produce the same result as using your perceptual faculties on a 
clear sunny day. The same goes for the sensus divinitatis it is prone to malfunction.  
 But what exactly, if anything, causes the malfunctioning of the sensus divinitatis?  The 
answer to this, on the reformed account we are endorsing, is the cognitive consequences of sin. 
 by sin. 
is the result of a properly functioning sensus divinitatis. And this properly functioning sensus 
divinitatis needs to be the result, crucially, of J 223   
 The key, then, in identifying knowledge of God as a cognitive achievement is an account 
                                                 
   221  Note   that   here   that   I   am   claiming   that   it   is   not   the   kind   of   cognitive   achievement   that   we   are  
tive  achievement  that  is  sufficient  for  knowledge.  Similar  to  the  
Barney   case,   Jon   could   have   been   easily   been  wrong   about   the   existence   of   God   had   this   true   belief   been  
simply   the   result   of   luck.   Keep   in  mind   that  while   this   still   be   a   cognitive   achievement,   it   is   not   the   kind   of  
achievement  that  is  sufficient  for  knowledge.  As  we  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  only  those  achievements  
that  are  either  primarily  or  jointly  creditable  are  sufficient  for  knowledge.  Achievements(pcul)  are  not,  however,  
sufficient  for  knowledge.      
   222   Rational   Faith:   Catholic   Responses   to  
Reformed  Epistemology  ed.,  Zagzebski  (Notre  Dame:  Notre  Dame  University  Press,  1993),  202.  
223   ch  about  how  or  why  the  cognitive  came  to  malfunction.  All  
While  I  discuss  this  later  in  the  chapter,  it  is  only  highlighted  to  add  more  detail  to  model.          
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compare the sensus divinitatis to our perceptual faculties given the problems that ordinary 
perceptual knowledge is faced with concerning strong achievements.224 Thus, any account we 
provide will not only need to identify this role, but also stay to true to the account of religious 
knowledge we are endorsing.  
 
5.3  The Noetic Effects of Sin: A Malfunctioning Cognitive Faculty 
 
 Before we can determine what role the agent might play in the belief forming process, we 
need to return to a topic we briefly discussed in the second chapter. We need to determine what, 
if anything, is wrong with the faculty that gives rise to belief in God. This will take us through, 
albeit briefly, some of the more cherished theological dogmas of the reformed tradition. To begin, 
consider these words from Calvin: 
 
There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity. This we take to be 
beyond controversy. To prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God himself has 
implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty. Ever renewing its memory, he repeatedly 
sheds fresh drops. Since, therefore, men one and all perceive that there is a God and that he is their Maker, 
they are condemned by their own testimony because they have failed to honor him and to consecrate their 
lives to his will. If ignorance of God is to be looked for anywhere, surely one is most likely to find an 
example of it among the more backward folk and those more remote from civilization. Yet there is, as the 
eminent pagan says, no nation so barbarous, no people so savage, that they have not a deep-seated 
conviction that there is a God. And they who in other aspects of life seem least to differ from brutes still 
continue to retain some seed of religion. So deeply does the common conception occupy the minds of all, 
so tenaciously does it inhere in the hearts of all! Therefore, since from the beginning of the world there has 
been no region, no city, in short, no household, that could do without religion, there lies in this a tacit 
confession of a sense of deity inscribed in the hearts of all.225 
 
This natural awareness of God, as Calvin puts it, is what we are calling the sensus divinitatis. 
cognitive faculty that is part of our original prelapsarian cognitive equipment. It functions 
primar
faculty that is supposed to give us a sense of deity in our hearts.226 In its original state, then, the 
                                                 
   224  There   are   of   course   accounts   of   perceptual   knowledge   that  might  meet   the   strong   achievement  
thesis.  Perhaps  there  are  defeaters  present  and  in  order  to  determine  if  your  perceptual  faculties  are  accurate  
you   engage   in   a   lengthy   process   of   reasoning.   This,   then,  might  meet   the   strong   achievement   thesis   as   you  
knowledge,  though,  given  that  most  perceptual  knowledge  is  not  of  the  kind  discussed  in  this  example.    
   225  John  Calvin,  Institutes  of  the  Christian  Religion,  trans.  F.L.  Battles  (London:  S.C.M.  Press,  1960),  44.  
Institutes.           
   226  Note  that  at  this  point,  accord
capable   of   finding   expression   in   a   variety   of   theologies;   polytheism   in   religion,   for   example,   is   for   Calvin  
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sensus divinitatis gave us true beliefs about God in all those situations or environments where it was 
originally intended to function. One way to think about this is that in those environments that 
now only sometimes give rise to belief in God, they would have, in their original state (and if 
exercised in the proper environment for which they were created), always given rise to belief in 
God.  
 always give rise to 
s faculty is part of 
our prelapsarian cognitive equipment, it is also a part of our postlapsarian cognitive equipment. 
In other words, the sensus divinitatis 227 The above quote by 
Calvin stresses the universality of this cognitive equipment. 228  What is lost, however, is the 
original function or purpose of the sensus divinitatis. And as we noted above, the original function of 
the sensus divinitatis is to give rise, when occasioned by the appropriate circumstance and in the 
appropriate environment, to those true beliefs about the existence of God. As Plantinga notes, 
229 This statement on the noetic effects of sin from the 
Canons of Dort sums up nicely the reformed understanding of sin and the consequences:  
 
Man was originally created in the image of God and was furnished in his mind with a true and salutatory 
knowledge of his Creator and things spiritual, in his will and heart with righteousness, and in all his 
emotions with purity;; indeed, the whole man was holy. However, rebelling against God at the 
instigation and by his own free will, he deprived himself of these outstanding gifts. Rather, in their place he 
                                                                                                                                                        
,  and  the  Noetic  Effects  of  Sin International  Journal  for  Philosophy  
of  Religion  Vol.  43  No.  2  (April,  1998),  90.  
   227  The  fall  of  humankind  refers  to  the  story  in  the  early  part  of  Genesis  when  humans  disobeyed  God  
y   in  
order   for   the   point   to   be  made   that   sin,   regardless   of   when   or   how   it   was   introduced   into   the  world,   has  
for   the  point   to  be  made  that   the   sensus  was  originally   intended  to   function   in  a  world  without  sin.  We  will  
discuss  some  of  these  points  later  in  the  chapter.          
   Also,   it   is   argued   by   John   Beversluis   that   the   above   quote   by   Calvin   applies   only   to   those   in   a  
prelapsarian   world.   See   Beves Faith   and  
Philosophy  12,  no.  2   (April  1995),  193.   I  discuss   later   in   the  chapter,  but   the  quote   is   clearly   referring   to   the  
universality   of   the   sensus   divinitatis.   In   a  prelapsarian  world,   belief   in  God  would   be  uncontroversial.   In   the  
quote,  however,  the  picture  being  painted  is  that  of  world  with  lots  of  false  belief  about  God.  Something  that  
properly  functioning    sensus  divinitatis     
   228    Note  the  strong  words  by  Calvin  from  the  a Yet  there  is,  as  the  eminent  pagan  says,  
no  nation  so  barbarous,  no  people  so  savage,  that  they  have  not  a  deep-­‐seated  conviction  that  there  is  a  God
sensus   divinitatis,   no   matter   how   impaired,   is   functioning   in   a  
postlapsarian  world.    
   229  Plantinga,  Warranted  Christian  Belief,  184.    
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brought upon himself blindness, terrible darkness, futility, and distortion of judgment in his mind;; 
perversity, defiance, and hardness in his heart and will and finally impurity in all his  emotions.230 
 
As a result of this historic fall from grace, what we have now is the same faculty whose role in the 
belief forming process has been compromised. Thus, if some majestic sunset triggers the sensus 
divinitatis and gives Jon (from the example above) a non-inferential true belief about God, it 
-
inferential true belief about the existence of God. While the sensus divinitatis is a universal 
 about the existence of God.   
 There is one important question that we must address before we can offer a solution to 
the noetic effects that sin has on a malfunctioning sensus divinitatis. We need to know a bit more 
about why exactly the sensus divinitatis no longer gives everyone accurate beliefs about the existence 
of God. From the above discussion and the discussion in chapter 2, we noted that sin has an 
effect on the sensus divinitatis itself 
that is diseased? Or are we as individuals oppressing the faculty (knowingly or unknowingly) in 
such a way the deliverances of this faculty are no longer accurate or clear? Answering these 
questions will of course bring us closer to providing an answer to the question of the relationship 
between the a cognitive achievement and belief in God.   
 We have briefly mentioned that the cognitive consequences of sin were introduced after 
cussion), which entails, as a 
result of the noetic effects of sin, that the sensus divinitatis will malfunction. But what exactly does 
this amount to? And how exactly does the sensus divinitatis malfunction? There are three ways to 
look at this, all of which I take to be correct. The first is that the sensus divinitatis, as an 
independent cognitive faculty, is itself diseased and malfunctioning. The second way to look at 
the malfunctioning of the sensus divinitatis is that there is something about the nature of the agent 
that, in a sense, smothers or corrupts the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis. The third way to 
understand the malfunctioning of sensus divinitatis would be to claim that there is something about 
the environment in which the sensus divinitatis is attempting to function. Put another way, the 
environment in which the agent finds himself in is hostile to the deliverances of the sensus 
divinitatis. On the first account, the faculty itself is diseased and thus the deliverances of the sensus 
                                                 
   230  Canons  of  Dort  in  Ecumenical  Creeds  and  Reformed  Confessions  (Grand  Rapids,  MI:  CRC  Pulications,  
1988),   III-­‐IV.I,   133.   For   a   good   brief   discussion   of   this   quote   and   the   reformed   understanding   of   the   noetic  
effects  of  sin  see  Michael  Sudduth,  The  Reformed  Objection  to  Natural  Theology  (Burlington  VT:  Ashgate,  2009),  
chapter  7.    
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divinitatis are hindered because the faculty itself is in need of repair.  On the second account, 
however, the sensus divinitatis would malfunction because it was meant to function in a specific 
kind of person. The nature of this person, though, has been corrupted as a result of sin.  
 A detailed look into these differences would take us well beyond the scope of this project 
and into, as Plantinga calls it, deep, dark, and gloomy theological waters.231 However, it should be 
noted that Calvin, where most contemporary discussions on the sensus divinitatis originate, sees the 
deliverances of the sensus divinitatis being hampered primarily because of human nature. In other 
words, Calvin would claim that there is something wrong with us as agents that explains cases of 
 
   
What is error about God due to? According to Calvin it is not due, basically, to a lack of information. Error 
is not due to ignorance. Nor is it due to mere weakness. Nor is it due to the influence of the  environment;; 
nor to a combination of these factors. In fact, it is surprising that Calvin seems to pay little or no attention 
to the fact that the environment now bears the marks of the fall, and might be expected to affect the 
trig Rather, error is due to perversity or willfulness of the human self, a perversity 
that is often, but not always, or necessarily accompanied by, and made possible by, self-deception. Because 
the issue of God's existence is of considerable importance for men and women, that is, it is not a mere 
theoretical or trivial issue, sin leads, via a mechanism of self-deceiving willfulness, to the true God being 
displaced from within the category of the divine by many gods, or by no god.232 
 
Plantinga seemingly takes note of this as well and argues that because of the noetic effects of sin 
our ability to know God is hampered by our human nature:  
 
Due to that basic and aboriginal sin pride, I may unthinkingly and almost without noticing assume that  I am 
the center of the universe (of course if you ask me, I will deny thinking any such thing, vastly exaggerating 
the importance of what happens to me as opposed to what happens to others. I may vastly overestimate my 
own attainments and accomplishments, consequently discounting the accomplishments of others. I may 
also fail to perceive my own sin or see it as less distasteful than it really is;; I may fail to see myself as a 
creature, who, if not viewed through t would be worthy of divine punishment. 
(Thus among the ravages of sin is my very failure to note those ravages.) Our grasp of ourselves as image 
bearers of God himself, the First Being of the  universe, can also be damaged or compromised or dimmed. 
For example, we may think the way to understand human characteristics and ventures such as love, humor, 
adventure, art, music, science, religion, and morality is solely in terms of our evolutionary origin, rather than 
in terms of our being image bearers of God. By failing to know God, we can come to a vastly skewed view 
of what we ourselves are, what we need, what is good for us, and how to attain it.233    
 
Plantinga is no doubt heavily relying on the work of Calvin and other reformed thinkers here.234 
The idea is that we, or better, our human nature, suppresses the deliverances of the sensus 
                                                 
   231  Plantinga,  Warranted  Christian  Belief,    213.  
   232  Helm,   ,  and  the  Noetic  Effects  of  Sin   
   233  Plantinga,  Warranted  Christian  Belief,    213-­‐14.         
   234  
a  self-­‐righteousness,  self-­‐exalting  disposition  is  naturally  in  man;  and  what  he  will  not  do  and  suffer  to  feed  and  
of  spiritual  pride  or  self-­‐righteousness;  and  that  they  may  have  
106 
 
divinitatis in that we are more concerned with ourselves and what we desire, than knowing 
anything about God. We understand the world around us in terms of our own accomplishments, 
rather than the work of someone like God. The deliverances of the sensus divinitatis tell about 
something about someone other than ourselves who deserves our attention and praise. And given 
rally desire. On this 
account, then, the malfunctioning of the sensus divinitatis is down to our self-righteous, prideful 
attitude that comes as the result of sin.235 
 The second way in which the sensus divinitatis might malfunction would be the result of the 
postlapsarian environment. Similar to the above proposal, the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis 
are suppressed or hindered. But on this account the deliverances of sensus divinitatis are hindered 
not because of human nature, but because of the environment in which the sensus divinitatis is 
thus hostile to the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis. In what way exactly is this environment not 
conducive to 
innocent and most vulnerable suffer, die of starvation, and are afflicted with pai
an environment where natural disasters afflict those who live in parts of the world where they 
already have access to few resources. These examples of course are all instances of the 
philosophical problem of evil.236 On this account, then, the malfunctioning of the sensus divinitatis 
is down to the suppression of the faculty as a result of the hostile environment.237  
                                                                                                                                                        
n  Edwards,  Religious  
Affections  (Edinburgh:  The  Banner  of  Truth  Trust,  1961),  241-­‐42.              
   235  Plantinga   notes   that   the   damage   of   the   sensus   divinitatis  
sensus   divinitatis   is   malfunctioning.   This   is   right,   I   think,   and   falls   in   line   with   the  
reformed   idea   that  we   inherited   sin   and   thus  we   inherited   a  malfunctioning   sensus   divinitatis.   John   9:1-­‐3   is  
often  referenced  to  support  this  idea.  Plantinga,  Warranted  Christian  Belief,  fn.  22  p.  214.    
   236  What  I  have  in  mind  here  is  the  evidential  problem  of  evil  and  not  the  logical  problem  of  evil.  The  
latter  is  rarely  discussed  philosophically,  with  the  former  presenting  more  of  problem  for  theists.        
   237   sensus   divinitatis   is   meant   to   function   in   a  
prelapsarian  environment an  environment  where  the  cognitive  consequences  of  sin  are  not  present.  Belief  in  
God,  on  this  account  anyway,  would  be  uncontroversial.  There  would  be  no  sin  and  thus  no  defeaters  for  belief  
i
oddly  I  think,  never  thought  or  entertained  the  idea  that  the  created  order  now  bears  the  marks  of  the  fall.  As  
Calvin   understood   it,   God   revea
inconsistent  with  the  idea  that  the  whole  of  creation  is  fallen  and  thus  in  need  of  redemption.  Compare  what  
Calvin  says  in  Institutes  I.V.I.  and  Romans  8.  
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 The third way in which the sensus divinitatis might malfunction would be that the sensus 
divinitatis itself, as an independent cognitive faculty, is diseased or broken as a result of sin. This 
would be similar to other cognitive faculties that malfunction as a result of disease. As Plantinga 
inability to tell 
right from wrong, insanity;; and there are analogues of these conditions with respect to the 
operation of the sensus divinitatis  238 So in the same way that a genetic disorder might cause my 
perceptual faculties to malfunction (blindness, impaired vision, etc.), sin causes the sensus divinitatis 
sensus divinitatis is 
diseased or broken. The claim is that on this account the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis are 
seriously hindered as a result of the damaged faculty.  
 Thus, on the model we have been discussing, the deliverances of sensus divinitatis have 
been damaged, corrupted, interfered with, and hindered;; or perhaps even the faculty itself is in 
need of repair. Of the three models presented, though, what is the correct way to think about the 
sensus divinitatis? I think we can happily concede that all three might bear some truth. The noetic 
effects of sin are such that the human nature, the environment, and the faculty itself have all been 
affected. 239 
the repair and restoration of the sensus divinitatis can be accommodated by all three of the 
discussed noetic effects of sin. If successful, the model I am offering will demonstrate that the 
agent who believes in God can overcome the cognitive consequences of sin.   
5.4  From Malfunction to a Properly Functioning Cognitive Faculty 
  
 In order to get clear on the nature of achievements with regard to religious belief, we 
outlined some possible accounts of the malfunctioning of the sensus divinitatis. One possibility that 
is mentioned is that the environment we currently find ourselves in is hostile and not conducive 
to belief in God. Our present environment, as whole, is less than favorable for the proper 
                                                 
   238  Plantinga,  Warranted  Christian  Belief,  184.    
   239  
reality   apply   to   each  
n   this   regard  and  seems   to  conflate   the  noetic  
effects   at   various   points).      Other   reformed   theologians   and   philosophers   that   have   touched   on   this   topic  
include   Abraham   Kuyper,   Emil   Brunner   and   more   contemporary   thinkers   like   Wolfhart   Pannenberg   and  
Wolterstorff.   For   an   excellent   summary   of   their   respective   positions   see   Stephen   K.   Moroney,   The   Noetic  
Effects  of  Sin:  A  Historical  and  Contemporary  Exploration  of  How  Sin  Affects  Our  Thinking  (Lanham,  Maryland.:  
Lexington  Books,  2000).    Moroney  also  provides  his  own  account  on  the  noetic  effects  of  sin.    
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functioning of the sensus divinitatis. But in what ways exactly does an agent who has a true belief 
about God participate in the process? Can it really be said that belief in God is because of my 
cognitive abilities as an agent? There are many ways, I think, that the cognitive success in 
question might be primarily or jointly creditable to the agent. Briefly, perhaps putting yourself in 
the right environment might suffice. After all, certain environments are more conducive to belief 
in God than others. This might involve, for example, participating in the sacraments or spending 
more time reading books from those who are favorably disposed to theism. Or perhaps being 
open-minded is a virtue and despite the disposition you have to not believe in God (recall 
sensus divinitatis
theism despite the 
excessively hostile environment you find yourself in and your seemingly natural disposition to not 
believe in God. The idea, then, is that these things will nurture and repair the sensus divinitatis so 
that the deliverances are no longer hindered. It is this process, the process of nurture and repair, 
where the agent is directly involved. If this model is correct, it is possible for knowledge of God 
to be appropriately attributable to the agent in question.   
 We need to take each of thes
knowledge of God is the result of his cognitive abilities and thus a cognitive achievement.240 To 
sensus divinitatis it is currently attempting to 
f sensus divinitatis is currently attempting to function 
in the maxi-environment.241   
 
Maxi-Environment: The maxi-environment is that environment in which the sensus divinitatis is currently 
malfunctioning. Its malfunction is due, in part or whole, to the fact that this environment is not conducive to 
belief in God. The result of this is that the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis are suppressed.   
 
So the maxi-environment is not conducive to belief in God. You might think that one way 
around this would be to improve the maxi-environment. Perhaps eradicating poverty, hunger, or 
                                                 
   240  As   a   reminder,   we   briefly   discussed   the   possibility   that   perceptual   beliefs   might   be   similar   to  
theistic   beliefs.  While   it   was   claimed   that   perceptual   beliefs  might   be   thought   of   as   genuine   achievements  
(after  all,   true  beliefs   that  are   formed  as  a   result  of  our  perceptual   faculties  demonstrate  sufficient  cognitive  
demonstrate  final  value.  Thus,  in  claiming  that  belief  in  God  must  be  the  result  of  our  cognitive  abilities,  I  am  
claiming   that   the   achievement   must   be   understood   in   the   strong   sense e.g.,   in   that   it   overcomes   some  
obstacle.    
   241  This   is   the   term   that  Plantinga  uses,   though   the  way   I   am  using   it   here  will   be   slightly  different.  
Analysis  57.2   (April  
1997),  140-­‐145.        
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diseases would result in an improved maxi-environment. After all, it is noted above that these are 
all instances of evil and it would certainly go a long way in creating an environment that is more 
conducive to belief in God. This solution, however, seems improbable given the unlikelihood 
that one could ever eradicate all 
it comes to the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis our human nature and the diseased or broken 
sensus divinitatis also play a role. So how do we overcome this hostile maxi-environment? Put 
another way, how do we stop suppressing the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis? The way to do 
this, I argue, is by engaging in those activities in those mini-environments where the surroundings 
are more conducive and favorable to belief in God.  
 
Mini-Environment: The mini-environment is that environment where the surroundings are more 
favorable and conducive to belief in God. While the mini-environment is still contained within the hostile 
maxi-environment, the mini-environment is more favorable or conducive to belief in God thereby allowing, 
in a more clear and unhindered manner, the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis. 
 
The model then is this. The natural world that we currently find ourselves in is one where the 
deliverances of the sensus divinitatis are hindered. The natural world, in its postlapsarian state, is 
and thus in order to liberate the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis, we need to be in those 
environments that are more favorable or conducive to belief. Put simply, we escape the effects of 
the maxi-environment by our presence in the mini-environment. What kinds of mini-
environments are more conducive to belief in God? Following Pascal here, you might say that a 
place of worship or a place where belief is accepted and not rejected is the ideal mini-
environment. 242 You might even go further and argue that active participation in those mini-
environments make the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis more probable. Whatever the mini-
environment (church, participation in the sacraments, reading more Augustine and less Dennett), 
in escaping the maxi-environment you create a more conducive environment, an environment 
that is more similar to that environment for which the faculty was originally created. On this 
model, the mini-environments are intended to be more like the original prelapsarian 
environments and a lot less like the postlapsarian maxi-environment.    
 -
environments guarantees the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis. The model is much weaker than 
                                                 
   242   -­‐environments   directly   (especially   as  we   are  
understanding  it).  He  is  concerned,  though,  with  showing  that  there  is  a  connection  between  participation  and  
belief.  See  footnote  below.    
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 243 The model 
sensus 
divinitatis necessitates a kind of nurturing of the faculty. And the nurturing of this faculty, I argue, 
begins by maximizing your time in those environments that are more conducive to belief in God.  
 What we have so far, then, is a model that concerns the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis 
in a hostile maxi-environment. But is there a model where the nurturing of the sensus divinitatis 
actually repairs a broken faculty or changes our corrupt human nature? After all, it is argued that 
the malfunctioning of the sensus divinitatis is not merely down to the unfavorable maxi-
environment, but also the result of the sensus divinitatis itself being broken and our corrupt human 
nature. Given this, is it possible that the above model actually applies to all the discussed 
hindrances of the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis? In short, yes. Placing yourself in those mini-
environments that are more favorable to belief in God not only decreases the noetic effects of sin 
that resulted in the hostile maxi-environment, but also begins the healing process of both the 
broken faculty and our human nature. Concerning the latter, if our postlapsarian human nature is 
such that we see nothing beyond ourselves and have no desire to worship anyone but ourselves, 
it could be argued that certain environments are such that they counter the selfishness and 
egotistical attitude that hinders the deliverance of the sensus divinitatis. Being in those 
environments where humility and selflessness are encouraged, is in effect more like the 
environment where the sensus divinitatis was originally created to function. Thus, the process of 
cognitive renewal whereby the effects of the maxi-environment is weakened and our corrupt 
human nature is diminished, begins with us being in the right kind of environment. 244     
                                                 
   243    Nicholas  Rescher,     (Notre  Dame:  Notre  Dame  Press,  1985),  121-­‐127.  The  argument  I  
are   closely   related.   As   Rescher   points   out,  
s   life.   It  appeals   to  
prudence  because  in  apologetics  prudence  is  the  best  available  instrument  we  have  before  taking  the  plunge,  
as  it  were.  Later  on,  ex  post  facto,  one  can  of  course  do  more
the  effects  of  the  mini-­‐environment  that  nurture  the  sensus  divinitatis  which  lead  to  belief.    
   244    It  is  no  part  of  the  model  to  say  that  this  is  the  only  way  in  which  the  process  begins.  Perhaps  the  
open-­‐minded,   for   example,   is   one  way   in  which   the  
nurturing  of   the  sensus  divinitatis  might  happen.  You  do  not  believe   in  God,  but  you  are  not  opposed  to  the  
idea  and  earnestly  seek  the  truth.  You  read  books  on  the  topic,  spend  time  with  those  with  whom  you  disagree,  
epistemic  agent.  On  this  model,  it  could  be  argued  that  in  being  the  right  kind  of  person  you  exhibit  the  kind  of  
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 But what about the repair of the sensus divinitatis? The above model also fits nicely with 
the idea that the faculty itself is diseased or broken and in need of repair. The repair of the 
broken faculty involves being in those environments where healing and restoration can take place. 
However, to focus merely on this would be to tell only part of the story. Put simply, the ravages 
of sin are also healed by the regenerative power of the Holy Spirit. As Plantinga notes, 
 
there is the repair of the sensus divinitatis, so that once again we can see God and be put in mind of him in 
the sorts of situations in which that belief-producing process is designed to work. The work of the Holy 
Spirit goes further. It gives us a much clearer view of the beauty, splendor, loveliness, attractiveness, glory 
of God. It enables us to see something of the spectacular depth of love revealed in the incarnation and 
atonement. Correlatively, it also gives me a much clearer view of my heinousness of sin, and of the degree 
and extent to which I myself am enmeshed in it. It gives me a better picture of my own place in the 
universe. Perhaps I will no longer see myself as the center of things, or see my wants, needs, and desires as 
tant and valuable than God, and all equally 
important and valuable. 245     
 
Thus, what we have here is the regenerative work of the Holy Spirit that heals both the broken 
and malfunctioning sensus divinitatis and our corrupt human nature. It allows for the proper 
functioning of the sensus divinitatis in a postlapsarian environment, which would otherwise remain 
hostile to the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis. The result of the right kind of nurturing, which 
Calvin eloquently summarizes, is this:  
 
Just as old or bleary-eyed men and those with weak vision, if you thrust before them a most beautiful 
volume, even if they recognize it to be some sort of writing, yet can scarcely construe two words, but  with 
the aid of spectacles will begin to read distinctly;; so Scripture, gathering up the otherwise confused 
knowledge of God in our minds, having dispersed our dullness, clearly shows is the true God. 246       
  
With a malfunctioning sensus divinitatis we are like those who attempt to read without the 
necessary tools. The regenerative work of the Holy Spirit, however, is such that the right kind of 
nurturing and healing results in the accurate deliverances of the sensus divinitatis.  
 In summary, then, the model I am proposing sees the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis 
as a process that we are involved in. By placing ourselves in the right kinds of environments we 
allow the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis to function in a more familiar environment an 
environment that is more favorable and more similar to the one in which it was originally 
                                                                                                                                                        
virtues  that  are  consistent  with  true  belief  and  thus  diminish,  in  some  important  way,  the  noetic  effects  of  sin  
on  the  human  nature.            
   245    Plantinga,  Warranted  Christian  Belief,  280-­‐281.            
   246    Institutes,  70.              
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achievement because the success in question is the result of our cognitive abilities as agents. 
belief. The agent overcomes a significant obstacle the maxi-environment by placing himself in 
those kinds of environments that are more conducive to belief in God.      
 5.5  Joint or Primary Credit?  
 
 In the previous chapter it is argued that there are two kinds of achievements that are 
compatible with knowledge: achievements(pc) and achievements(jc). Further, it is argued that both 
kinds of achievements are to be understood in the strong sense if we are to retain the idea that 
achievements are of final value. 247 The question, then, is whether knowledge of God is primarily 
creditable or merely jointly creditable to the agent. An important caveat to note here is that belief 
in God would be primarily creditable on the weak achievement thesis. In this regard, the sensus 
divinitatis might function like our perceptual faculties and give rise to belief in God in the 
appropriate environment. On this account, the belief would be explained by or the result of our 
cognitive ability, similar to beliefs that come about as the result of our perceptual faculties. 
However, given that we are concerned with providing an account of the strong achievement 
thesis (whether this be joint or primary), the question we are concerned with might be put this 
way: Is the success in question the result of a cognitive ability that results in a strong 
achievement? Thus, with regard to the question of primary or joint credit, the question is whether 
the cognitive success (in this case the success is true belief in God that is the result of 
overcoming some obstacle to belief) is explained primarily because of the abilities of the agent?    
 At this point, given that both joint credit and primary credit are sufficient for a genuine 
achievement, it may seem of little consequence which kind of achievement knowledge of God 
amounts to. However, we need to keep in mind that the model we are presenting is supposed to 
be consistent with the reformed approach to epistemology. And it might turn out that one or 
both of these types are inconsistent with some of the cherished dogmas of reformed philosophy 
and theology.  With this in mind, we need to be clear on what kind of (strong) achievement 
knowledge of God amounts to.  
                                                 
   247     Keep   in  mind   that   in   discussing   achievements,   unless   otherwise   noted,   I   am   referring   to   strong  
achievements.      
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 To begin, the model I am presenting above is most compatible with the idea that 
knowledge of God is an achievements(jc). The reason for this is that knowledge of God on the 
primary credit account, intuitively anyway, presents serious problems for the reformed account.  
to do with the agent. There is extensive discussion in reformed literature about God being solely 
responsible for the belief of the theist. 248 The noetic effects of sin are so severe that God needs 
to significantly intervene if the agent is to have knowledge of him. Thus, it is God, through the 
repair of the sensus divinitatis, who is primarily responsible for the belief of the agent. There is 
no primary (or perhaps even joint) credit to speak of on this account. The agent is too blind, 
unwilling, and averse to the things of God. We are passive agents in the process and overcome 
no obstacles on the way to belief. God removes all the obstacles and supernaturally fixes the 
broken faculty. What is our role, then? We simply believe. After all, we had little choice. Consider 
a modified version of the Emie example from the previous chapter:  
 
Emie*: small child named Emie. Emie can walk on her own most of the  time,   
but like most children she has trouble when the ground is uneven or littered with obstacles (e.g., rocks). In 
other words, under normal condition
always a friendly one and she now finds herself on a trail that is uneven and strewn with large rocks. 
However, she still needs to go from point A to point B.  She stands to her feet and wobbles along. As her 
. So I pick her up and carry her from point A to 
point B.  
  
In this modified example, the success in question is not the result of an agent that is active in the 
process. There are obstacles to overcome, but Emie does nothing significant to bring about her 
is the abilities of God, not the agent, that explain true belief. 249  
 Cleary, if Emie* is analogous to the way we come to believe in God then the problem of 
present a problem for the notion of primary credit, it also poses a problem for the idea of joint 
credit. If God is solely responsible for the agents believing (e.g., removing obstacles, healing and 
                                                 
   248     For   a   good   introduction   to   these   topics   see   Herman   Hoeksema,   Reformed   Dogmatics,   (Grand  
Rapids,  MI:  Reformed  Free  Publishing  Association,  1966).                
   249  This  line  of  thinking  also  has  implications  for  the  example  given  above  where  Jon  believes  and  Jane  
Whether  or  not  this  is  just  or  fair  is  a  discussion  that  unfortunately  goes  beyond  the  scope  of  this  chapter.  And  
,     
the  case  of  Jon  (as  opposed  to  Jane)  is  necessarily     
good  reason  to   intervene  in  the  case  of  Jon  and  
not  Jane.        
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enabling the sensus divinitatis, 
demonstrating the value of knowledge on reformed accounts will be difficult.  
 However, the above model is too strong. 250 On the model I am endorsing, the original 
Emie and tightrope cases from the previous chapter are more analogous to the model I am 
endorsing: 
 
Emie:  is a small child named Emie. Emie can walk on her own most of the time, but 
like most children she has trouble when the ground is uneven or littered with obstacles (e.g., rocks). In 
lk is apparent. 
always a friendly one and she now finds herself on a trail that is uneven and strewn with large rocks. 
However, she still needs to go from point A to point B.  She stands to her feet and wobbles along. As her 
father, I notice 
and hold her arms as she navigates the obstacle. In due course, Emie arrives at her destination.  
 
Jean: Jean is a world famous tightrope walker. Jean has famously crossed many  well-known landmarks and 
is widely regarded for his abilities and skills in tightrope walking. On this particular occasion, Jean attempts 
to cross the Niagara Gorge between the New York and Canada. With much fanfare, he successfully crosses 
the Niagara Gorge. However, unbeknownst to Jean (and those who admire him), there was an evil demon 
the evil demons efforts and battles the evil demon throughout the crossing. Thankfully, as it turns out, 
  
 
In the cases noted above, the agent is an active participant in the process. However, as noted in 
the previous chapter, these cases represent an achievement(jc). This is because of the hostile 
environment that Emie and Jean find themselves in. Some environments are excessively hostile in 
is the exercise of the relevant ability for that 
success to be counted as an achievement. Both Emie and Jean possess the ability to successfully 
complete their goals. Yet, in their current environments, they need some sort of intervention. 
Noting, of course, that their respective abilities are still on display. What explains their successes, 
in part anyway, are their abilities.  
 The model I am proposing is very similar. The human condition is so severe that the 
environment is excessively hostile in relatio
at work together in overcoming the maxi-environment. The agent, by putting himself in those 
environments that are more conducive to belief in God, aids in the nurturing and proper function 
of the sensus divinitatis. God, through the Holy Spirit, also aids in the repair and restoration of the 
sensus divinitatis. This understanding of the sensus divinitatis claims that God must intervene given 
                                                 
   250  I   will   return   to   this   briefly   in   the   sections   below.  While   I   reject   the   idea   that   belief   in   God   on  
reformed   accounts  must   accept   t
traditional  position.  Thus,  I  will  discuss  some  of  these  concerns  below.      
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the severity of the human condition on the sensus divinitatis. The cognitive consequences of sin are 
so great that the sensus divinitatis is unable, without divine intervention, to produce true beliefs 
about God. Despite this intervention, however, it should be clear that the belief forming process 
is a joint effort and one where mutual cooperation is necessary. 
 Is it ever the case that knowledge of God (as I am understanding it on the reformed 
that God might play in the belief forming process. If God plays a minimal role, whatever that 
might entail, then perhaps the success in question is primarily creditable. One would need to 
construct a weaker model of the healing and repair of the sensus divinitatis where the agent is the 
primary reason for its proper functioning. Whatever the weaker notion entails, however, it will be 
difficult to retain the distinctive reformed character that is provided by the achievement(jc) model 
I am offering above.    
 5.6  Benefits of this Model  
  
 In this section I want to focus on two benefits of the model I am presenting.251 First, if 
the above model is correct, we are in a position to answer, convincingly I think, a problem that 
was raised by early critics of reformed epistemology. The problem, as described by DeRose and 
others, is that religious beliefs are not typically acquired in the same immediate or spontaneous 
fashion that perceptual beliefs are.252  Religious belief often times seems to be a gradual one, as 
Keith DeRose claims, that has 
firm belief. Put another way, the reformed account seems to suggest that the agent is passive in 
253 Pritchard sums up this 
concern nicely:  
 
The problem with this construal of the epistemology of the religious belief is that it overstates, in relevant 
respects, the parallels between religious experience and perceptual experience. In particular, there is a worry 
about the putativel  was noted above that 
might find in the perceptual case, as if one is directly responding to a religious being in the way that one 
directly responds to objects in the physical world via perception. It was this spontaneity of perceptual belief 
that made it apt for a radically non-evidentialist construal since evidence seemed to play no essential 
warranting role as regards standard perceptual belief. The problem, however, is that whereas this sort of 
                                                 
   251  The  most  obvious,  of  course,  has  already  been  discussed:  that  we  can  account  for  the  final  value  of  
knowledge  of  God.      
252  See  Pritchard,  Reforming  Reformed  Epistemology,  188-­‐91  and  Keith  DeRose,  Are  Christian  Beliefs  
Properly  Basic,  unpublished  manuscript.      
253  Ibid.    
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in the religious case. Indeed
beliefs often seem to be formed in a far less immediate and compelling fashion. As Keith DeRose has put it, 
254 
  
The above points really address two concerns. F
about in the same way that perceptual beliefs do. This is because, it is assumed, that religious 
like the 
255 The second worry that seems to be raised is that the agent is more active in 
some of these worries. 
The account I am providing takes a middle ground approach by claiming that while belief in God 
is ultimately immediate and basic, it is not analogous to many of the typical cases of perceptual 
belief as the criticism suggests. In other words, the immediacy and basicality of the belief is where 
the similarity ends. And while this is one of the concerns raised above, another concern is that 
religious beliefs are acquired by a passive agents who do nothing more than find themselves with 
hole story. Cases of perceptual belief, 
for example, rarely involve the overcoming of obstacles to belief. The account I am endorsing 
sees the process of knowing that God exists in a much more detailed and intricate manner than 
reformed accounts initially suggest. Perhaps the belief is immediate and basic (and thus shares 
this similarity with perceptual belief), but the nurturing of the sensus divinitatis is necessary if the 
belief is to ever come about in the first place. Thus, the agent plays an active role in the process. 
 
  Second, my account addresses the claim that the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis are 
arbitrary. Recall the example given above where Jane and Jon are simultaneously enjoying the 
if anything, explains this phenomenon?  On the model I presenting, what explains the properly 
functioning faculty in Jon is the nurturing and healing of the sensus divinitatis that has taken place. 
                                                 
   254  Pritchard,  Reforming  Reformed  Epistemology,  189.    
   255  C.S.  Lewis,  Surprised  by  Joy  (Orlando,  FL:  Harcourt  Brace  and  Company,  1955),  221.    
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What explains the lack of function in Jane, as stressed by the reformed epistemologist, are the 
cognitive consequences of sin. Thus, the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis are not random, 
down to luck, or merely the result of God choosing Jon over Jane;; rather, the deliverances of the 
sensus divinitatis is process that involves an active agent who plays a role in the belief forming 
process.     
  5.7 Criticisms and Concerns Addressed  
 
 In this last section I want to discuss a number of objections that might come about from 
this account. 256 The first objection that one might raise is to question whether the knowledge-as-
achievement thesis is compatible with reformed theology. The first response to this objection 
might come in the form of a question: Does it matter? How important is it that the model above 
be compatible with the various nuances of reformed theology?  Since I am committing myself 
only to reformed epistemology and not a holistic embrace of the reformed tradition, it would 
seem that this worry is of little significance.    
 Further, note that this same question might be asked of the reformed epistemologist. I 
take it that Plantinga and other reformed epistemologists see their model as consistent within the 
reformed tradition (as do I), but are not committed to providing a model that is wholly 
compatible with everything that Calvin, for example, and other reformed theologians claim. The 
key here is that reformed epistemology bears some of the important marks of the reformed 
tradition (e.g., the sensus divinitatis), but whether the entire model is consistent with the 
reformed tradition is going to be difficult to assess given the lack of uniformity amongst 
reformed scholars. The same, I think, applies to my model. My model bears some of the 
markings of the reformed tradition, (eg., because of the cognitive consequences of sin, belief in 
God, in a postlapsarian environment, is more difficult and controversial), while the various 
nuances of the model are going to be difficult to assess and may depart slightly form more 
traditional understandings.  
 Despite this, however, there is one point I would like to clarify with regard to my model 
that might serve to alleviate some of the concerns that might be raised by those committed to 
                                                 
   256  Many  of   the  objections  discussed  here  were  raised  at   two  different  conferences  where  early  and  
recent  versions  of  this  chapter  (and  portions  of  chapter  4)  were  presented.  The  first  was  at  The  British  Society  
for  the  Philosophy  of  Religion  held  at  Oxford  in  2011.  The  second  was  at  the  Society  of  Christian  Philosophers  
held   at   the  University   of   Colorado,   Boulder   in   2013.   Also,   an   anonymous   reviewer   from  Ashgate   Publishing  
provided  some  very  helpful  points  that  will  be  discussed  in  this  section.      
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this tradition. 257 Put simply, it might be thought that the above model is committed to a semi-
Pelagian soteriology. Semi-Pelagianism is the view that God and humans work together, jointly, 
for salvation. This view is often seen as a compromise between the Augustinian view of 
predestination and the Pelagian view of autonomous human agency. Rebecca Weaver 
summarizes the semi-pelagian view clearly:  
 
Like Augustine, his adversaries in this controversy acknowledge the necessity of grace but believed  that 
it was equally important to affirm the significance of human agency. They insisted that human persons have 
a genuine role in shaping their own lives and destiny;; therefore, they objected to the teaching of a sovereign 
predestinating grace that severely diminishes or even denies human agency. 258    
 
The Augustinian view, however, differs significantly: 
  
According to the bishop of Hippo, such re
actions. One 
 
 259    
 
-Pelagianism was rejected by the church at the Synod of 
Orange in 529. And despite some similar language between my model and the semi-Pelagian 
model, it is not my intention to resurrect a semi-Pelagian soteriology that is deemed unorthodox. 
Thus, I think the claim that my model reflects a semi-Pelagian soteriology conflates those 
significant differences between warranted belief and saving faith. Warranted belief, as I 
understand it, is sufficient for knowledge. Unlike saving faith, however, warranted belief is not 
sufficient, for example, for what theologians call justification (in the words of Erickson, 
justification is the legal process of being brought into union with Christ). 260 Put another way, 
 261 
eestablishment of this relationship or the 
                                                 
   257  
as  it  turns  out,  be  a  point  of  contention  for  various  religious  traditions.    
   258  Rebecca   Weaver,   Divine   Grace   and   Human   Agency:   A   Study   of   the   Semi-­‐Pelagian   Controversy  
theologians  who  advocate  the  semi-­‐ The  Oxford  
Dictionary  of  the  Christian  Church  eds.,  F.L.  Cross  and  E.A.  Livingstone  (Oxford:  OUP,  2005),  1491.    Further,  the  
semi-­‐
together   accompli Christian  
Theology  (Grand  Rapids,  MI:  Baker,  1986),  911.    
   259  Ibid.,  2.      
   260  Christian  Theology,  904-­‐905.      
   261  Now  it  might  be  the  case  that  relationship  entails  knowledge,  but  my  model,  rightly  I  think,  avoids  
these   more   complex   theological   doctrines.   My   model   is   concerned   with   the   deliverances   of   the   sensus  
divinitatis  producing  warranted  belief.    
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regeneration of the individual who comes to believe in God on the model I am proposing. 
Justification, adoption, regeneration are all part of the process of saving faith and are not 
necessarily related to warranted belief. Thus, the tension between divine grace and human agency 
agency in soteriological terms (justification, adoption, regeneration, etc. are all, happily, down to 
the divine grace). In short, semi-Pelagianism is concerned with divine action and its role in saving 
faith. The model I am proposing, however, is merely concerned with the role that we as humans 
play in the process of warranted belief. 262     
 A second objection that might be raised is that my model is not sufficiently diverse to 
accommodate other models of religious knowledge. So, for example, my model says nothing 
about those who come to knowledge of God on the bases of, say, testimony or the traditional 
arguments for theism. While it is true that my model says nothing about other examples of 
I am providing is meant to serve a specific purpose: namely, account for the value of knowledge 
value of knowledge with regard to reformed epistemology arbitrarily. I take it that this account of 
religious knowledge is consistent with the ideas set forth in chapter 1. In this regard, then, the 
account might be seen as narrow, but it is certainly sufficient for the overall goals of the project. 
Thus, the responsibility of providing an all-inclusive account of the value of religious 
necessary. It would be up to those who endorse other models of religious knowledge to provide 
an account of the value of knowledge as it specifically relates to the account they are endorsing.263 
                                                 
   262  There   is  another  related  point  of  contention  here  that  might  be  solved   in   the  same  manner.  The  
model  I  am  proposed  sees  the  individual  as  merely  crippled  in  a  sense.  The  illustration  I  give  of  the  small  child  
Emie  is  a  good  example  of  this.  In  the  example,  Emie  has  some  ability,  but  needs  help  along  the  way  in  order  to  
get   from  point  A   to  point  B.  The   reformed   tradition,  however,  would   see   the  agent   as  more  analogous   to  a  
helping  hand;  rather,  on  the  reformed  account,  the  agent   is   dead  (and  thus  completely  useless  and  helpless)  
and  needs  to  be  carried  from  point  A  to  point  B.  I  take  it  that  the  same  distinction  above  between  warranted  
belief  and  saving  faith  apply  here  as  well.  When  it  comes  to  saving  faith,  we  are,  perhaps,  like  the  dead  man
wholly   unable   to   contribute   anything   to   our   regeneration   and   justification   (in   the   theological   sense).   But  
warranted  belief  in  God  is  less  theologically  complex  and  is  more  similar  to  the  Emie  case  discussed.  We  need  
help  to  achieve  the  success,  but  we  are  merely  hampered  by  the  environment  and  not  totally  useless  as  a  result.        
   263  The   reason   for   adopting   this   specific   model   has   to   do   with   the   fact   that   I   take   reformed  
epistemology  to  be  the  kind  of  religious  epistemology  that  we  want  and  expect  (see  chapter  1).  Where  these  
other  models  of   religious   knowledge   fall   short,   reformed  epistemology   succeeds.   Thus,   part   of   its   success   is  
that   it   does   in   fact   allow   for   an   account   of   the   value   of   knowledge.   Whether   other   accounts   of   religious  
knowledge  can  make  such  a  claim  remains  to  be  seen.          
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 Related to the above objection, it might also be claimed that my model is too narrow in 
knowledge of God (and its subsequent value) is dependent on the overcoming of some obstacle 
to belief, how does my model accommodate religious belief in children? After all, children who 
are born into a friendly mini-environment might never be exposed to the hostile maxi-
environment that is described above. 264 In order to see the force of this objection, consider the 
following example: 
 
Allan: Allan is a small child who happened to be born into a very religious Christian family. He attends his 
religious ceremonies every week and for as long as he can remember, he has always believed in God. He 
believed in 
God. In fact, most everyone that Allan knows believes in God and his beliefs, as of yet, have never been 
challenged.   
  
From the example, it appears that Allan is born into a very favorable environment and one that is 
obstacles  surrounded by like-minded people and has, as the 
example puts it, always believed.  
 Despite the force of this objection, there are two ways one might respond to this example. 
First, one might simply claim that children lack knowledge. Children, like Allan in the example, 
might have very strong beliefs, but they simply lack knowledge. There is an important theological 
component to this response. For example, this response is consistent with the attitude, 
historically anyway, that religious organizations might have taken towards children. Within the 
Christian tradition, Catholics and Protestants alike have baptized babies and, when they were of 
baptism seals those children making them part of the covenant until they are old enough to 
decide for themselves. Babies and small children lack the reasoning capacity to think for 
themselves and thus inherit the benefits of the faith until they have developed the necessary 
reasoning skills that are required.    
                                                 
   264  
assume,  for  the  purposes  of  this  paper  anyway,  that  children  might  mean  anyone  who  lacks  the  reasoning  skills  
we   would   expect   of   a   normal,   cognitively   functioning   adult adding   of   course   that   they   would   need   to   be  
under   a   certain   age.   How   old,   however,   might   differ   according   to   cultures   and   their   customs.   Despite   this  
somewhat  unclear  definition,  I  take  it  that  a  general  understanding  of  what  it  means  to  be  a  child  is  sufficient  
for  the  force  of  the  objection.                
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 While this approach is appealing, it does face some difficulties for the account I am 
account. If knowledge of God is similar to perceptual knowledge (in that there is some cognitive 
faculty that gives rise to both kinds of beliefs), denying this type of religious knowledge might 
entail the denial of perceptual knowledge in children as well.  Rather than delve into the different 
issues at play here, perhaps the objection can be phrased in somewhat weaker fashion: If children 
have knowledge of God, how does my model accommodate this possibility?     
 
-environment, the deliverances 
of the sensus divinitatis are still hindered, smothered, and broken. The maxi-environment that he 
was born into is still hostile to the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis. Thus, the same exact 
process as the one described above needs to take place in order for the sensus divinitatis to function 
properly. The obstacles are virtually the same for everyone. Where there is knowledge of God, 
there is the nurturing and healing of the sensus divinitatis. Still, one could argue, the sorts of 
obstacles that Allan had to overcome are not equivalent to the sorts of obstacles someone else in 
a less favorable mini-environment would have to overcome. This is true. The child of Billy 
and she tells me that I need to lose 20 pounds in order to be at my ideal weight. In order to do 
this, she claims, I need a healthy diet and I further need to train and run in a marathon. 
Committed to living a healthy life, I begin a strict daily regimen of diet and exercise. And, per my 
 instructions, I train and run in a marathon. After sometime, I reach my ideal.  Suppose 
also that I then find out that my friends Kyle and Jamie also went to the doctor and were told 
they were 10 and 5 pounds over their ideal weights respectively. Kyle is told that he needs to train 
and run a half marathon while Jamie is told that he needs to train and run a 5k. Kyle and Jamie 
 
 Now while it is clear that I put in the most effort in order to reach my ideal weight, this 
does not take away from the fact that Kyle and Jamie achieved something as well. Should you be 
easiness of the task. Thus, while children who are born into those very favorable mini-
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environments seemingly overcome very little, their warranted belief it is still a cognitive ability of 
the sort we looking for when evaluating genuine achievements.  
 
 5.8 Luck, Knowledge of God, and the Tertiary Value Problem  
 
It was conceded in the previous chapter that the achievement thesis is not sufficient for a 
general account of the value of knowledge where the tertiary value problem is addressed. This 
concession was due to the fact that we cannot account for Barney type cases where agents 
demonstrate a cognitive achievement and still lack knowledge. While this might not be 
cases), it is problematic for the tertiary value problem in that knowledge is not more valuable 
than that 
I am providing. On the model I am presenting, there seem to only be cases of evidential luck, 
which are not incompatible with knowledge. Consider the following example:  
 
Bank Robber: Suppose a bank is being robbed. The bank robber, unbeknownst to anyone at the bank, is 
recognizes him given the mask he is wearing. James demands and receives all the money at the bank. On 
to recognize that the bank robber is Jesse James. James quickly places his mask over his face and escapes.265  
 
have obtained the evidence for the belief that the bank robber is Jesse James. Yet, it seems clear 
e, she still knows that Jesse James is the bank robber. 
This is because it is widely agreed that evidential luck is compatible with knowledge;; while other 
forms of luck, such as veritic luck, are incompatible with knowledge. Evidential luck, according 
to P
266 On the model I am proposing, cases where luck is involved 
are of the evidential type described above.  
 In order to see th
watch a football match at a local pub. I find out that the game is showing at a pub called St. 
                                                 
   265  See  Robert  Nozick,  Philosophical  Explanations   (Cambridge,  Mass:  Harvard  University  Press,  1981),  
193.        
   266  Duncan   Pritchard,   Epistemic   Luck   (Oxford:   Oxford  University   Press,   2005),   136.   For  more   on   this  
The  Southern  Journal  of  Philosophy  30  
(1992)  59-­‐75.  A  paper  by  Peter  Unger  gives  several  accounts  of  luck  that  are  also  compatible  with  knowledge.  




the way, I get a bit disoriented given the excitement and enthusiasm I have for the match. I stop 
iving me directions assumes I want to 
pictures). I end up at church and have a Plantinga-type religious experience of the sort described 
in this essay.  
 What we have from the above example, I believe, is a case where the agent luckily 
acquired evidence in favour of her true belief. It is not a case of knowledge undermining luck. 
-type cases 
discussed in the previous chapter. Here, then, is another example that is more similar to the 
Barney case, but still a case of knowledge-compatible evidential luck. Suppose I want to talk 
about religion with someone. I make my way to the local univ
philosophy grad students often talk about these things. As I arrive, I see a group of students at 
the university who, from their appearance and conversation, seem to be the ones I am looking 
for. Unbeknownst to me, however, 10 of the 11 graduate students are adamantly against religion. 
And if I approach any of those 10 graduate students, they will do their best to convince me that 
God does not exist. However, I approach the one theist in the group. We begin to talk and, on 
the model suggested above, I have a Plantinga-type religious experience of the sort described 
earlier in this essay.267 Compare the above example with the following case of evidential luck: 
 
Detective: A detective is trying to solve a murder mystery. Upon receiving a reliable tip, he walks into a 
room which contains a total 11 boxes. 10 of the boxes in the room contain misleading evidence about the 
murder the detective is trying to solve. Fortunately for  the detective, he opens the one box that contains 
evidence about the true nature of the murder. From the evidence found in the box, the detective finds and 
arrests the suspect.  
 
of the murder. The detective is lucky, but it is only a matter of luck that he has obtained the 
evidence for p;; it is not, crucially, a matter of luck that his belief in p is true. This is what 
distinguishes Barney-type cases from these types of cases. In the Barney case, Barney  belief that 
p is lucky. The Detective Case, then, is an example of evidential luck where the luck involved 
                                                 
   267  
the  one  we  are  endorsing)  is  that  theism  is  warranted  only  if  true.    
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where I approach the one theist philosopher in the room. The belief that God exists is only 
evidentially lucky, but it is not a matter of luck that my belief in God is true.     
 So what explains the lack of Barney-type cases for this specific kind of religious 
knowledge? What seems to be going on here is that the sensus divinitatis analogous to our 
perceptual faculties. Our perceptual faculties can give us true beliefs about red barns even when 
we could have easily been wrong about the red barns. Our perceptual faculties are easily misled in 
certain environments. T sensus divinitatis. 
only gives rise to belief in God if nurtured in the appropriate environment. Consider this 
analogous example. Suppose I have a specific faculty that, when functioning properly, detects 
genuine red barns. I am in Barn Façade County where some alien who is unaware that I have 
this faculty erects a bunch of barn façades. Like the original case, I look at the only genuine red 
barn in the county. In this case, I believe, it is clear that I do know that there is a genuine red 
barn in front of me. The reason is that unlike the original Barney case, it is not a matter of luck 
that my belief in 
barn. This red barn faculty functions similarly to the sensus divinitatis. When one forms a warranted 
belief about the existence of God, one cannot have easily been wrong. The deliverances of the 
sensus divinitatis are sure.  
 One might wonder, however, whether evidentially lucky true beliefs about God are still 
strong achievements? The response to this objection is similar to response given above 
concerning religious knowledge in children. The same process of nurturing and repair of the 
sensus divinitatis is undertaken where there is evidential luck. The agent involved is still overcoming 
obstacles to belief and must still involve himself in the mini-environment. While the agent has 
born into those environments that are more conducive to belief in God. Is the agent lucky, 
fortuitous, and perhaps blessed? perhaps, but not in any way that undermines knowledge or the 











The primary aim of this thesis was to determine whether knowledge of God is a cognitive 
achievement. We were concerned about this question because of the implication it has on the 
value question. The value question, put simply, is this: Is knowledge of God more valuable than 
that which falls short of this knowledge? Moreover, why all the emphasis on knowledge as 
opposed, for example, 
knowledge of God? The attention that has been given to knowledge (as opposed to mere true 
belief) would indicate otherwise. Rightly or wrongly, we value knowledge over other epistemic 
states that seemingly fall short of knowledge. Knowledge of God, as I have claimed in this thesis, 
is no different. There is something unique, precious, or desirable about knowledge of God. In 
our effort to show that knowledge of God is more valuable than a mere true belief about God, 
we opted to consider this question in light of recent work being done by the virtue epistemologist. 
The virtue epistemologist (e.g., Greco and Sosa) locate the value of knowledge within the context 
of achievements. Know
knowledge of God, if it is more valuable than that which falls short of this knowledge, needs to 
be a cognitive achievement.  
 gued that we value 
achievements because of the effort or ability that is on display in the process. Further, we value 
achievements often times because of the obstacles that are overcome in the process. The agent 
must, therefore, be an active participant in the process. On the model I have endorsed, the agent 
in an active participant in the belief formation process. Thus, in understanding knowledge of 
God as a cognitive achievement, the agent plays an active role in the process. Further, the agent, 
with respect to belief in God, overcomes significant obstacles on his way to belief in God. The 
agent, as an active participant in the process, overcomes the cognitive consequences of sin. The 
 or a being zapped by a deity, but the result of a properly 
functioning sensus divinitatis that has been nurtured and repaired as a result of the efforts of the 
agent.  
 I described two kinds of environments that the sensus divinitatis is currently attempting to 
function in. First, there is the maxi-environment where the deliverances of the sensus divinitatis are 
hindered or smothered. The maxi-environment is that postlapsarian environment where the agent 
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is faced with many potential defeaters or obstacles to belief.  The mini-environment, however, is 
that environment that is more conducive to belief in God. It might be described as an 
environment that is more similar to that prelapsarian environment where the sensus divinitatis was 
originally intended to function (e.g., where belief in God would be uncontroversial). The 
important point here is that the mini-environment is a place where the malfunctioning sensus 
divinitatis can be nurtured or repaired. As an agent, you place yourself in those environments that 
are more conducive to belief in God and escape the noetic effects of sin thereby nurturing and 
repairing the sensus divinitatis.               
The primary obstacle in demonstrating that knowledge of God is cognitive achievement 
came as a result of the specific model of religious epistemology that was endorsed in this thesis. 
For reasons mentioned in chapter 1, reformed epistemology was our starting point. The problem, 
any role in the process. Put 
another way, one might wonder if the reformed account allows for a true belief about God to be 
attributable to the cognitive abilities of the agent. The difficulty of answering this question was 
primarily 
creditable, but merely jointly creditable. Thus, it is both God and the agent who are involved in 
the belief forming process. This of course raised the question of whether the account I am 
providing is semi-pelagian. The response to this charge is straightforward. This project concerned 
warranted belief and not saving faith. The issue concerning human agency and divine grace is 
best understood in the context of saving faith and not, as I am describing it here, warranted belief.  
The question, of course, is whether this project has been successful. Early in the project it 
was claimed that we should expect a religious epistemology to consider issues from contemporary 
philosophy. This, it was argued, will deepen and clarify our understanding of the accepted 
religious epistemology (in this case, reformed epistemology). Insofar as this expectation is 
concerned, we have done this. And in doing this, we have contributed to the discussion and 
issues that encompass religious epistemology, but especially reformed epistemology. We have 
provided a unique way to understand the malfunctioning sensus divinitatis. In all of this, I think, we 
have been true to the ideas of reformed epistemology and retained some of the distinctive 
features for which it is well known. Are there other projects that might come as a result of this 
thesis? Indeed, I believe there are many. In this regard, then, the project is incomplete. It has not 
covered every possible understanding of the value of knowledge as it relates to God. However, 
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the aim of this project was to provide a useful example of how those who work in religious 
epistemology might incorporate contemporary themes into their research projects. Thus, this 
project will hopefully serve as a foundation for other projects in religious epistemology that 
consider not only the value question, but other areas of contemporary philosophy as well. 
Considering this, one might, for example, look for a different way to understand the value of 
knowledge as it related to reformed epistemology. Perhaps knowledge of God is valuable because 
it is part of the design plan. God always intended for his image bearers to know him and this 
desire alone is what makes knowledge of God more valuable than that which falls short of this 
knowledge.  
 Perhaps another project that might come as a result is an investigation into the analysis of 
understanding. We have claimed here that knowledge of is more valuable than that which falls 
short of this knowledge, but what is the relationship between knowledge and understanding in a 
religious context? Understanding, as outlined by Kvanvig, is a unique epistemic state that 
involves an internal seeing or appreciating of explanatory and other coherence-inducing 
relationships in a body of information. It has also been described as something that requires a 
deep appreciation, grasp, or awareness of how things hang together.  Understanding, then, is 
seemingly different than knowledge. It requires more, epistemically, of the agent. And if this is 
the case, there are several ways that a focus on understanding might benefit religious 
epistemology. First, if understanding requires a different kind of appreciation or awareness than 
knowledge requires, then perhaps this is the epistemic state that the religious believer ought to 
aim for. Understanding can be seen as the difference between warranted belief and saving belief.  
Perhaps an example can illuminate this point to some extent. One might think, for example, that 
the state of knowing the truth claims of a particular religion is as a belief that saves. In other 
words, believing religious claim x ensures some kind of present or future reward (e.g., eternal life). 
However, there is a problem here. There seem to be some who have the correct beliefs (or even 
knowledge) about some religious claims, yet lack the kind of belief that ensures the reward in 
question. Consider, for example, what James says about belief: You believe that there is one 
God. Good! Even the demons 
agents who believe and seemingly have knowledge. However, this belief seems to be a different 
kind of belief. They lack, in other words, saving belief the kind of belief that entails some 
present or future reward.   
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The point to be made, then, is that one group seems to have a warranted belief (a 
necessary condition for knowledge), while the other group can be said to have saving belief (a 
necessary condition for understanding). But what are the indicators of understanding? After all, 
how can we tell if one person has simple belief and the other has saving belief? I think there are 
different ways to answer this question, but one possibility is to explore the notion between 
understanding and action. From the text in James, good deeds are what separate simple belief 
from saving belief. In this context, then, understanding involves a deep grasp or awareness that 
saving belief inevitability leads to the right kind of action.  
While the notion of understanding  presents some interesting topics for discussion in 
religious epistemology, there are of course other areas in contemporary philosophy that can 
illuminate and enrich the discussions in religious epistemology.  This, I think, presents a 
promising future for religious epistemology. And while my project represents only a small part of 
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